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MEX Mexico
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REER Real effective exchange rate
RUS Russia
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SOE Small open economy
SVAR Structural vector autoregression
THA Thailand
TUR Turkey
TIC Treasury International Capital Reporting System
UMP Unconventional monetary policy
UIP Uncovered interest rate parity
U.K. United Kingdom
U.S. United States of America
USA United States of America
USD U.S. Dollars
VAR Vector autoregression
VARX Vector autoregression with exogenous regressors




The onset of the global financial crisis and the implementation of extraordinarily
expansionary monetary policies in many economies triggered a renewed interest in
the effects of global and foreign shocks in individual countries. At the same time,
the cross-country heterogeneity of the macroeconomic and financial effects of shocks
highlighted the need to study closely the factors that affect their propagation. This
thesis contains four independent essays which address these issues. The first three
chapters share a common theme and investigate the effects of foreign and global
shocks in the domestic economy and how the transmission mechanisms of these
shocks work. The last essay studies how individual country characteristics, especially
that of the exchange rate and monetary arrangement, affect the propagation of
domestic shocks that are of first order relevance for debt sustainability analysis.
The first chapter of this thesis is joint work with Michael Hachula and Christian
Offermanns. We employ a structural global VAR model to analyze whether U.S.
unconventional monetary policy shocks, identified through changes in the central
bank’s balance sheet, have an impact on financial and economic conditions in emerg-
ing market economies (EMEs). Moreover, we study whether international capital
flows are an important channel of shock transmission. We find that an expansionary
policy shock significantly increases portfolio flows from the U.S. to EMEs, which is
accompanied by a persistent movement in real and financial variables in recipient
countries. Moreover, EMEs on average respond to the shock with an easing of their
own monetary policy stance. The findings appear to be independent of heteroge-
neous country characteristics like the underlying exchange rate arrangement, the
quality of institutions, or the degree of financial openness.
In the second chapter, I investigate the macroeconomic and financial effects of
U.S. dollar (USD) exchange rate fluctuations in small open economies. Exchange
rate movements affect the economy through changes in net exports, i.e. the trade
channel, and through valuation changes in assets and liabilities denominated in for-
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eign currencies, i.e. the financial channel. I specifically examine how the financial
channel affects the overall impact of exchange rate fluctuations and assess to what
extent foreign currency exposure, defined as debt in USD, determines the financial
channel’s strength. As a novel result, I empirically find that, if foreign currency
exposure is high, an appreciation of the domestic currency against the USD is ex-
pansionary and loosens financial conditions, which is consistent with the financial
channel of exchange rates. Moreover, I estimate an open economy New Keynesian
model, in which a fraction of the domestic banks’ liabilities is denominated in USD.
The model shows that an appreciation against the USD can be expansionary de-
pending on the strength of the financial and trade channels, which is linked to the
level of foreign currency exposure and trade openness, respectively. Finally, the
model also indicates that the financial channel potentially amplifies the effects of
U.S. monetary policy shocks, due to the resulting change in the USD exchange rate.
The third chapter, which is joint work with Florentine Schwark, is my latest re-
search project and should be understood as an early draft. In this essay, we assess
the relationship between international capital flows and investment. In particular,
we aim to understand whether capital flows and its components, i.e. foreign direct
investment (FDI), credit, and portfolio flows, affect investment in EMEs and ad-
vanced economies (AEs) differently and what drives those differences. Using Local
Projections - Instrumental Variable methods, we find that the impact of interna-
tional capital flows in EMEs is positive, especially that of FDI and credit flows. The
effects of international capital flows to and from advanced economies is much weaker
and, in these countries, investment is mainly affected by domestic credit conditions.
Finally, we find evidence that suggests that financial development accounts for the
large differences between the effects of capital flows in EMEs and AEs.
Finally, the last chapter is a joint work with Alex Pienkowski and was written
during a research internship at the International Monetary Fund. In this essay, we
present an approach to detail the propagation of shocks to public debt. We employ
a structural VAR with an endogenous debt accumulation equation to assess how
the main drivers of sovereign debt dynamics – the primary balance, the interest
rate, growth and inflation – interact with each other. Addressing this question is
particularly useful for debt sustainability analysis. We find that some interactions
exacerbate the impact of shocks to the accumulation of debt, while others act to
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stabilize debt dynamics. Furthermore, the choice of monetary policy regime plays
an important role in these debt dynamics – countries with constrained monetary
policy, e.g. those with a fixed exchange rate regime, are more at risk from changes




Der Beginn der globalen Finanzkrise und die Implementierung einer außerordent-
lich expansiven Geldpolitik in vielen Volkswirtschaften lösten ein erneutes Interes-
se an den Auswirkungen globaler und ausländischer Schocks in einzelnen Ländern
aus. Zugleich hat die länderübergreifende Heterogenität der makroökonomischen
und finanziellen Auswirkungen von Schocks die Notwendigkeit unterstrichen, jene
Faktoren, welche die Ausbreitung der Schocks beeinflussen, genau zu untersuchen.
Diese Dissertation besteht aus vier unabhängigen Aufsätzen, die sich mit den oben
genannten Themen befassen. Die ersten drei Kapitel behandeln ein gemeinsames
Thema. Sie untersuchen die Auswirkungen ausländischer und globaler Schocks auf
die heimische Wirtschaft sowie die Funktionsweise der Übertragungsmechanismen
dieser Schocks. Der letzte Aufsatz analysiert, wie sich einzelne Ländereigenschaf-
ten, insbesondere das Wechselkurs- und Geldpolitischensystem, auf die Ausbreitung
inländischer Schocks auswirken, die für die Analyse der Schuldentragfähigkeit von
Relevanz erster Ordnung sind.
Das erste Kapitel dieser Dissertation ist ein gemeinsamer Aufsatz, der mit Micha-
el Hachula und Christian Offermanns geschrieben wurde. Unter Verwendung eines
strukturellen globalen VAR-Modells, untersuchen wir, ob unkonventionelle geldpo-
litische Schocks in den USA Effekte auf die Finanzmärkte und die wirtschaftliche
Situation in Schwellenländern haben. Zur Identifikation der geldpolitischen Schocks
benutzen wir die Bilanz der US Zentralbank als Indikatorvariable. Darüber hinaus
untersuchen wir, ob internationale Kapitalströme ein wichtiger Kanal der Schock-
übertragung sind. Unsere Schätzungen ergeben, dass ein expansiver geldpolitischer
Schock die Portfolioströme aus den USA in die Schwellenländer signifikant erhöht,
was mit einer anhaltenden Bewegung der dortigen realenwirtschaftlichen Variablen
und der Finanzmärkte einhergeht. Zudem reagieren Zentralbanken in Schwellenlän-
dern auf den Schock im Durchschnitt mit einer Lockerung ihres eigenen geldpoli-
tischen Kurses. Die Ergebnisse scheinen unabhängig von heterogenen Ländereigen-
XXVII
Zusammenfassung
schaften, wie den zugrunde liegenden Wechselkursvereinbarungen, der Qualität der
Institutionen oder dem Grad der finanziellen Offenheit, zu sein.
Im zweiten Kapitel untersuche ich die makroökonomischen und finanziellen Effekte
von Wechselkursschwankungen des US-Dollars (USD) in kleinen offenen Volkswirt-
schaften. Wechselkursbewegungen haben Auswirkungen auf die Wirtschaft durch
Veränderungen der Nettoexporte, d.h. durch den Handelskanal, und durch Bewer-
tungsänderungen der in Fremdwährungen lautenden Vermögenswerte und Verbind-
lichkeiten, d.h. durch den Finanzkanal. Insbesondere untersuche ich, wie der Fi-
nanzkanal die Gesamtauswirkung von Wechselkursschwankungen beeinflusst, und
bewerte, inwieweit das Fremdwährungsrisiko, definiert als Verschuldung in USD, die
Stärke des Finanzkanals bestimmt. Ich stelle empirisch fest, dass bei einem hohen
Fremdwährungsrisiko eine Aufwertung der Landeswährung gegenüber dem USD ex-
pansiv ist, da die finanziellen Bedingungen gelockert werden, was mit dem Finanz-
kanal der Wechselkurse vereinbar ist. Zudem schätze ich ein Neu-Keynesianisches
Modell einer offenen Wirtschaft, bei dem ein Anteil der Verbindlichkeiten der inlän-
dischen Banken auf USD lautet. Das Modell zeigt, dass eine Aufwertung gegenüber
dem USD je nach Stärke der Finanz- und Handelskanäle expansiv sein kann, was
mit der Höhe der Verschuldung in USD und der Handelsoffenheit zusammenhängt.
Schließlich weist das Modell auch darauf hin, dass der Finanzkanal, aufgrund damit
verbundener Änderungen des USD-Wechselkurses, die Effekte von U.S. geldpoliti-
schen Schocks potenziell verstärkt.
Das dritte Kapitel ist in Zusammenarbeit mit Florentine Schwark entstanden. Es
ist mein neuestes Forschungsprojekt und ist als ein früher Entwurf zu verstehen. In
diesem Aufsatz bewerten wir die Beziehung zwischen internationalen Kapitalströ-
men und Investitionen. Insbesondere beschäftigen wir uns mit der Fragestellung, ob
Kapitalströme und ihre Komponenten, d.h. ausländische Direktinvestitionen (ADI),
Kredit- und Portfolioströme, unterschiedliche Auswirkungen auf Investitionen in
Schwellenländern und Industrieländern haben und was diese Unterschiede antreibt.
Mittels Local Projections - Instrumental Variables Methoden stellen wir fest, dass
die Auswirkungen internationaler Kapitalströme in Schwellenländern positiv sind,
insbesondere die der ADI und der Kreditströme. Die Effekte der internationalen
Kapitalströme in und aus den Industrieländern sind viel schwächer, und die Investi-
tionen in diesen Ländern werden hauptsächlich von heimischen Kreditbedingungen
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beeinflusst. Schließlich finden wir Belege dafür, dass die große Differenz zwischen
den Auswirkungen von Kapitalströmen in Schwellen- und Industrieländern auf den
Entwicklungsgrad des Finanzsystems zurückzuführen ist.
Das letzte Kapitel ist ein gemeinsamer Aufsatz geschrieben in Zusammenarbeit
mit Alex Pienkowski. Dieses Papier ist im Rahmen eines Forschungspraktikums
bei dem Internationalen Währungsfonds entstanden. In diesem Aufsatz stellen wir
einen Ansatz vor, der die Ausbreitung von Schocks auf die Staatsverschuldung de-
tailliert beschreibt. Wir verwenden einen strukturellen VAR mit einer endogenen
Schuldenakkumulationsgleichung, um festzustellen, wie die Haupttreiber der Staats-
schuldendynamik - Primärsaldo, Zinssatz, Wachstum und Inflation - miteinander
interagieren. Diese Fragestellung ist besonders nützlich für die Analyse der Schul-
dentragfähigkeit. Wir stellen fest, dass bestimmte Interaktionen die Auswirkungen
von Schocks auf die Schuldenakkumulation verstärken, während andere zur Stabi-
lisierung der Schuldendynamik beitragen. Darüber hinaus spielt die Wahl des geld-
politischen Systems eine wichtige Rolle bei der Schuldendynamik - Länder mit einer
eingeschränkter Geldpolitik, z.B. solche mit einem festen Wechselkurssystem, sind ei-
nem größeren Risiko von Veränderungen der Marktstimmung ausgesetzt und müssen




Over the past decades, international trade and financial openness have risen sharply,
which provoked a surge in the interest in the cross-border effects of foreign and
global shocks among policy makers and academics alike. Moreover, the truly global
nature of the 2008 financial crisis and its consequences have strengthen the urge
to understand the effects from these shocks and their transmission channels, as
well as policy responses to mitigate their adverse effects. At the same time, the
cross-country heterogeneity of the macroeconomic and financial effects of shocks
highlighted the need to study closely the factors that affect their international and
domestic propagation.
This thesis contains four independent essays which address these issues. The first
three chapters share a common theme and investigate the effects of foreign and global
shocks in the domestic economy and how the transmission mechanisms of these
shocks work. More precisely, the first essay of the thesis analyses the effects of U.S.
unconventional monetary policy (UMP) on emerging market economies (EMEs).
The second essay assesses the effects of USD exchange rate fluctuations in small
open economies (SOEs). In particular, it studies to what extent debt in USD affects
the overall impact of exchange rates movements on macroeconomic and financial
conditions. The third paper, in turn, investigates what are the effects of capital
flows on investment in EMEs and advanced economies (AEs) and what accounts
for the cross-country differences in those effects. Finally, the last essay addresses
a somewhat different issue and studies the propagation of shocks that affect public
debt. Specifically, it analyzes whether the exchange rate regime – or monetary
policy arrangement – affects how these shocks propagate domestically. Thus, while
the focus of this essay is on the domestic effects of fiscal shocks, it also provides a




The first chapter of this thesis is joint work with Michael Hachula and Christian
Offermanns. In this essay, we empirically investigate the effects of U.S. UMP shocks
on real and financial key indicators in EMEs. In particular, we analyze whether
UMP shocks are a driver of capital flows into EMEs and whether capital flows are
an important channel of shock transmission. We structure our analysis into the
following consecutive research questions. First, is U.S. UMP related to portfolio
flows into EMEs? Second, does U.S. UMP affect financial conditions in EMEs?
If so, are portfolio flows an important channel of shock transmission? Third, is
the conduct of monetary policy in EMEs in this way influenced by U.S. UMP?
To answer these questions, we estimate a structural global vector autoregressive
(GVAR) model incorporating both real and financial variables for 39 EMEs and AEs
over the period 2008–2014 and evaluate the dynamic responses of these variables to a
U.S. UMP shock. We identify the shock with the size of the Fed balance sheet as an
unconventional monetary policy instrument and employ zero and sign restrictions,
similar to Gambacorta et al. (2014).
Our work is related to two strands of empirical studies that analyze similar ques-
tions. First, it is closely linked to studies that assess the determinants of capi-
tal flows (Fratzscher, 2012; Forbes and Warnock, 2012) and the relationship be-
tween unconventional monetary policy and capital flows (Bruno and Shin, 2015a;
Fratzscher et al., 2013). Second, our paper is related to other studies that in-
vestigate the spillover effects of U.S. policies (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015;
Georgiadis, 2015a) and their impact on financial and macroeconomic conditions in
EMEs (Aizenman et al., 2016).
We contribute to these two lines of the literature by employing a GVAR approach
that takes interactions between financial and real variables, both between countries
and over time, into account. Given that the international transmission of shocks
via financial and trade linkages takes time, this is an important feature that event
studies or panel approaches cannot consider. Moreover, our study provides a sys-
tematic assessment of U.S. unconventional monetary policy on the global financial
cycle (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015) and on international portfolio flows in a
structural GVAR framework, which allows us to quantify the persistent effects of
UMP shocks on capital flows and other variables for individual countries.
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Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that an expansion-
ary U.S. monetary policy shock significantly increases portfolio outflows from the
U.S. for almost two quarters. In the EMEs this is associated with a rise in portfolio
inflows. Second, this increase in inflows goes hand in hand with significant real and
financial effects in EMEs: real output growth and equity returns increase, and the
real exchange rate appreciates. Importantly, portfolio flows prove to be a key channel
of transmission between the U.S. and the EMEs in the GVAR specification. Third,
we find that, the short-term (policy) interest rate in EMEs declines in response to
an expansionary U.S. shock. This result indicates that U.S. policy innovations have
an influence on the conduct of monetary policy in EMEs. Regarding cross-country
differences in our results, we find that the magnitude of portfolio inflows to EMEs
appears to vary with the proximity to the U.S. However, economic country charac-
teristics like the degree of financial openness or the quality of domestic institutions
do not affect the countries’ response to the UMP shock. In particular, a floating
exchange rate arrangement does not appear to provide a better insulation from U.S.
spillovers.
The second chapter of this thesis deals with one important international trans-
mission mechanism of foreign monetary policy and other global shocks to SOEs,
namely USD exchange rate fluctuations (Iacoviello and Navarro, 2019). USD ex-
change rate movements affect SOEs through changes in the value and volume of
exports and imports (the trade channel) and through valuation effects of assets and
liabilities denominated in foreign currency (the financial channel). It has been con-
ventional wisdom in international macroeconomics that a domestic appreciation has
contractionary effects on the economy due to the resulting decrease in net exports,
other things being equal. However, because of the ever higher degree of financial
integration, foreign currency exposure has gained more attention (Bénétrix et al.,
2015), and therefore the relevance of exchange rate movements operating through
the financial channel has increased (Hofmann et al., 2017). Importantly, the fi-
nancial channel operates mainly through changes in the valuation of the liability
side of a country’s external balance sheet. Thus, under foreign currency exposure,
a domestic appreciation decreases the value of liabilities relative to assets, which
strengthens the external balance sheet, loosens financial conditions and ultimately
stimulates investment and GDP (Avdjiev et al., 2019).
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The aim of this chapter is to empirically assess the macroeconomic and finan-
cial effects of USD exchange rate fluctuations in SOEs. In particular, I study how
the financial channel affects the overall impact of exchange rate fluctuations, under
which conditions it dominates the trade channel, and to what extent foreign cur-
rency exposure – defined as liabilities denominated in USD – determines its strength.
After showing the effects of the financial channel, I evaluate whether it amplifies or
dampens the effects of foreign monetary policy shocks. To answer these research
questions, I use Local Projections - Instrumental Variable (LP-IV) methods. Fur-
thermore, to obtain a structural interpretation of the empirical findings and be able
to analyze the trade and financial channels in detail, I estimate a small open econ-
omy New Keynesian model with financial frictions and currency mismatch in the
banks’ balance sheets.
My essay is related to studies that assess the macroeconomic effects of exchange
rate movements in EMEs and AEs using SVAR (Kim and Ying, 2007; Fratzscher
et al., 2010; Forbes et al., 2018) and local projections (Lane and Stracca, 2017).
Moreover, it is closely linked to empirical papers that explicitly consider the financial
channel of exchange rates as an important transmission channel of USD exchange
rate shocks (Avdjiev et al., 2019; Hofmann et al., 2017; Bruno and Shin, 2015b).
Finally, this essay extends the work by by Aoki et al. (2016), Akinci and Queralto
(2018), and Mimir and Sunel (2019), who study the effects of foreign shocks and
the implementation of optimal policy responses in calibrated open economy DSGE
models with currency mismatch in the bank’s liabilities.
I contribute to the literature by systematically assessing the determinants of the
strength of the financial and trade channels. I perform this analysis both empirically
and with a theoretical model. One of the main contributions in the empirical part
is the novel identification scheme for USD exchange rate shocks to individual SOEs.
For this purpose, I construct shocks to the UIP equation between the U.S. and other
major economies. These shocks are exogenous to the individual SOEs that I analyze
and at the same time prove to be a valid instrument for the bilateral exchange rates
between the USD and the SOEs’ currencies.
My empirical results show that if foreign currency exposure is high, an apprecia-
tion of the domestic currency against the USD is expansionary as it loosens financial
conditions and increases investment, which is consistent with the financial channel
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of exchange rates. In line with the empirical results, the estimated New Keynesian
model indicates that the level of foreign currency exposure is an important factor
behind the strength of the financial channel. Moreover, the model shows that it is
the interaction between foreign currency exposure and trade openness, i.e. between
the financial and trade channels, the determinant of the effects of an exchange rate
appreciation in SOEs. Finally, I also find that the financial channel potentially
amplifies the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks.
These results have several important implications. First, as I show in the pa-
per, the financial channel could change how exchange rate fluctuations affect SOEs,
since it works in the opposite direction of the trade channel. Thus, analyzing the
effects of exchange rate movements without considering the financial channel could
be misleading. Further, the financial channel has a significant impact on financial
conditions and potentially amplifies the effects of foreign shocks. Therefore, pol-
icy makers concerned with these two issues should take the financial channel into
account when designing and implementing policies.
The third chapter, which is joint work with Florentine Schwark, is my latest
research project and should be understood as an early draft. Again, motivated by
the large and volatile capital inflows and outflows in the aftermath of the financial
crisis, we assess the relationship between international capital flows and investment.
In particular, we aim to understand whether capital flows and its components, i.e.
foreign direct investment (FDI), credit, and portfolio flows, affect investment in
EMEs and AEs differently, and what drives those differences. To answer these
questions, we use Local Projections - Instrumental Variable methods, and to address
the potential endogeneity of capital flows, we follow Mody and Murshid (2005) and
construct an instrument based on the weighted sum of capital flows into and out
of a region. This instrument is strongly correlated with capital flows into and out
of an individual country, and at the same it is likely that it is exogenous to single
countries in our sample (Mody and Murshid, 2005; Mileva, 2008).
This chapter is related to the extensive literature on the effects of capital flows on
EMEs, which mostly focused on periods before the global financial crisis (Bosworth
and Collins, 1999; Mody and Murshid, 2005; Mileva, 2008). All these previous
studies highlighted the significant positive effects of FDI inflows on investment.
Moreover, our study is also related to studies on the cost and benefits of financial
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account liberalization (Rodrik, 1998; Bhagwati, 1998; Kose et al., 2011). Finally,
our essay is linked to studies on the connection between financial development and
investment (Levine, 2005; Xu, 2000). We contribute to this literature by taking a
fresh look at the data and systematically examining which factors account for the
difference in the impact of capital flows on investment across countries.
We find that the impact of international capital flows on investment in EMEs is
positive, especially that of FDI and credit flows. The effects of international capi-
tal flows to and from advanced economies is much weaker and, in these countries,
investment is mainly affected by domestic credit conditions. We also find evidence
that suggests that financial development accounts for the large differences between
the effects of capital flows in EMEs and AEs. However, since this essay is work
in progress, we still have to address several issues. For instance, we do not have a
clear, structural explanation why financial development weakens the effects of cap-
ital flows on investment. Moreover, we do not explore other potential factors that
could affect the international capital flows - investment relation, such as institutional
quality, quality of policies (Mody and Murshid, 2005), exchange rate arrangements
and competitiveness, or cross-industry differences in access to domestic and foreign
finance and foreign markets (Igan et al. (2016)). Finally, we point out that domestic
credit conditions appear to matter more for AEs than for EMEs. To explore this
important issue in detail, we need to extend our analysis and also identify a exoge-
nous shocks to domestic financial conditions. Thus, this essay’s conclusions should
be taken carefully.
Finally, the last chapter is a joint work with Alex Pienkowski and was written
during a research internship at the International Monetary Fund. This work is moti-
vated by the steep increase in public debt witnessed after the global financial crisis.
As a consequence to this, concerns over sovereign debt sustainability have led to sig-
nificant financial and economic disruption, and the optimal policy response to these
elevated debt levels is a topic of controversy among policymakers and academics.
In this essay, we assess the propagation of shocks to public debt, and specifically
analyze whether the exchange rate regime – or monetary policy arrangement – af-
fects how these shocks propagate domestically. To do so, we employ a structural
VAR model with an endogenous debt accumulation equation to assess how the main
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drivers of sovereign debt dynamics – the primary balance, the interest rate, growth
and inflation – interact with each other.
Our work builds on a vast literature on the effects of fiscal shocks on debt and
economic performance. First, this chapter is linked to studies that assess whether
the primary balance reacts to exogenous changes in debt (Bohn, 1998, 2005; Abiad
and Ostry, 2005). Second, this essay is linked to studies that analyze the effects
of shocks to government spending, taxes or the primary balance on debt and GDP
(Blanchard and Perotti, 1999; Favero and Giavazzi, 2007; Cherif and Hasanov, 2018).
We contribute to the literature by taking a holistic approach and study the effects
of several drivers of public debt and their interaction, which is particularly useful
for debt sustainability analysis. Moreover, we systematically study to what extent
the choice of different monetary policy or exchange rate arrangement affects the
economic responses to fiscal shocks. We find that some interactions exacerbate the
impact of shocks to the accumulation of debt, while others act to stabilize debt
dynamics. Furthermore, the choice of monetary policy regime plays an important
role in these debt dynamics – countries with constrained monetary policy, e.g. those
with a fixed exchange rate regime, are more at risk from changes in market sentiment




Spillovers of U.S. Unconventional Monetary Policy
to Emerging Markets: The Role of Capital Flows1
1.1 Introduction
Since the onset of the global financial crisis, large and volatile capital flows into
emerging market economies (EMEs) have triggered a renewed interest in the deter-
minants and consequences of such cross-border flows. A growing literature perceives
a “global financial cycle” to be a key determinant of capital flows into EMEs (see
Nier et al., 2014). This cycle is described as co-movement in gross capital flows,
credit conditions, and asset prices across countries (see Rey, 2013, or Passari and
Rey, 2015).2 Rey (2013, 2016) argues that one of the main drivers of the cycle is
monetary policy by the U.S. Federal Reserve, whose interest rate decisions are trans-
mitted to EMEs’ financial conditions through international capital flows. Moreover,
she reasons that, as a consequence, U.S. interest rate decisions influence the conduct
of monetary policy in EMEs. Responding to the financial crisis and the subsequent
sluggish recovery, however, the Federal Reserve (Fed) repeatedly engaged in uncon-
1This chapter is based on a research paper that is joint work with Michael Hachula and Chris-
tian Offermanns. We thank Benjamin Beckers, Kerstin Bernoth, Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Sandra
Eickmeier, Marcel Fratzscher, Georgios Georgiadis, João Tovar Jalles, Dieter Nautz, Mathias Tra-
bandt, two anonymous referees and participants of the DIW Macroeconometric Workshop 2015,
Berlin, the FMM Annual Conference 2015, Berlin, the International Conference on Macroeco-
nomic Analysis and International Finance 2016, Crete, the Conference of the Royal Economic
Society 2016, Brighton, the EC2 Conference 2016, Edinburgh, and seminar participants at the
Bank of England, at the Deutsche Bundesbank, at the University of Bamberg, and at the Freie
Universität Berlin for helpful comments and suggestions.
2Passari and Rey (2015) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015) provide evidence for the existence
of a global financial cycle by showing that prices of stocks and other risky assets as well as credit,
leverage, and gross capital flows around the world are related to a common global factor.
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ventional monetary policy measures such as large-scale asset purchases. While many
studies analyze how conventional interest rate policy by the Fed can drive financial
conditions globally (see, among others, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015, or Bruno
and Shin, 2015a), results on unconventional measures are rather scarce.
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the global role of U.S. monetary pol-
icy by empirically investigating the effects of U.S. unconventional monetary policy
(UMP) shocks on real and financial key indicators in EMEs. In particular, we an-
alyze whether UMP shocks are a driver of capital flows into EMEs and whether
capital flows are an important channel of shock transmission. In this regard, Bruno
and Shin (2015a) establish a link between U.S. monetary policy and international
banking flows for the period 1995–2007. However, Shin (2013) presents evidence that
banking flows strongly diminished since the beginning of the financial crisis. Instead,
bond and equity flows to EMEs increased heavily. Accounting for this change in the
capital flow composition, we evaluate whether portfolio bond or equity flows play a
pivotal role in transmitting U.S. UMP shocks to EMEs.
We structure our analysis into the following consecutive questions. First, is U.S.
UMP related to portfolio flows into EMEs? Second, does U.S. UMP affect asset
prices and exchange rates (henceforth: financial conditions) in EMEs? If so, are
portfolio flows an important channel of shock transmission? Third, is the conduct
of monetary policy in EMEs in this way influenced by U.S. UMP? To answer these
questions, we estimate a structural global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model in-
corporating both real and financial variables for 39 advanced and emerging market
economies over the period 2008–2014 and evaluate the dynamic responses of these
variables to a U.S. UMP shock. Identification of the UMP shock is based on the
approach of Gambacorta et al. (2014): we use the size of the Fed balance sheet as
an unconventional monetary policy instrument and employ a mixture of zero and
sign restrictions to distinguish exogenous policy changes from endogenous reactions
to other shocks.
To provide a general assessment of these questions, we turn to the panel dimension
of the EMEs included in our sample and average over the estimated impulse response
functions. Given that existing studies on international capital flows (see below) often
find a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the responses of individual countries
to various pull and push factors, we then also investigate whether specific economic
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country characteristics are associated with diverging responses to the UMP shock
across country groups.3
Our work is related to two lines of empirical studies that address similar ques-
tions. First, it is linked to studies that analyze the determinants of capital flows to
EMEs (see, among many others, Fratzscher, 2012, or Forbes and Warnock, 2012).
More closely, it relates to those studies that explicitly analyze the impact of the
Fed’s unconventional monetary policy on international capital flows. One set of pa-
pers analyzes this question in cross-country panel frameworks (Moore et al., 2013,
Koepke, 2014, Lim et al., 2014, Ahmed and Zlate, 2014, Lo Duca et al., 2016).
Other studies employ high frequency and event study approaches assessing the re-
lationship in selected windows around policy events (International Monetary Fund,
2013, Rai and Suchanek, 2014, Fratzscher et al., 2013).4 Second, our work is con-
nected to studies that investigate the effect of U.S. unconventional monetary policy
on EMEs financial and real conditions in event studies or comparable frameworks
(Eichengreen and Gupta, 2015, Bowman et al., 2015, Aizenman et al., 2016).
We contribute to these two strands of the literature by employing a global VAR
approach that takes interactions between financial and real variables both between
countries and over time into account. Given that the international transmission of
shocks via financial and trade linkages takes time, this is an important feature that
existing event studies or panel approaches do not account for. Moreover, our study
provides a systematic assessment of U.S. unconventional monetary policy on the
global financial cycle and international portfolio flows in a VAR framework, where
the policy shock is structurally identified. It thus allows quantifying the persistent
effects of UMP shocks on capital flows and other variables for individual countries.
3Thereby, a special emphasis is given to how responses differ with respect to the countries’ exchange
rate regimes. This is motivated by the classical “trilemma”, which states that countries can only
have two of the following three policy options: independent monetary policy, free capital flows, or
a fixed exchange rate. Hence, countries that let their currency float freely might have potentially
more leeway to set interest rates independently of the U.S. and, in turn, might be able to buffer
foreign shocks better. For further discussion, references, and empirical evidence on the trilemma,
see Obstfeld et al. (2005), Klein and Shambaugh (2015), or Aizenman et al. (2016).
4Only a few studies employ VAR models, and in those studies capital flows are usually aggregated
across countries (see Dahlhaus and Vasishtha, 2014, or Tillmann, 2016). Our approach differs
from these models as we analyze the effect of U.S. UMP on capital flows and real and financial
variables for individual economies, accounting for trade and financial relations in a global model.
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Conceptually, the paper compares directly to the fast growing literature on the
global effects of monetary policy shocks in structural VAR or GVAR frameworks (see,
among others, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015, Passari and Rey, 2015, Georgiadis,
2015a, Georgiadis, 2015b, or Chen et al., 2015). For instance, Miranda-Agrippino
and Rey (2015) show that conventional U.S. monetary policy is linked to a global
factor in risky asset prices and cross-border credit flows. Passari and Rey (2015)
and Rey (2016) provide evidence for an effect of conventional U.S. monetary policy
on financial conditions in a few small open advanced economies. Closest to our
paper is a study by Chen et al. (2015) who also investigate spillovers from U.S.
unconventional monetary policy on a number of variables in several AEs and EMEs
in a GVAR framework. We complement their work by analyzing the role of capital
flows5 as an important channel of transmission of U.S. monetary policy shocks and
by addressing the debate on the global financial cycle as we consider a broad set
of EME financial indicators. Moreover, we differ from their approach by directly
using an policy instrument, the size of the balance sheet, to identify unconventional
monetary policy innovations.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that an expan-
sionary U.S. monetary policy shock, associated with an exogenous innovation to
the Fed balance sheet, significantly increases portfolio outflows from the U.S. for
almost two quarters. In the EMEs this is, on average, associated with a rise in
portfolio inflows. Second, this increase in inflows is accompanied by significant real
and financial effects in EMEs. In response to the UMP shock, real output growth
and equity returns increase, and the real exchange rate appreciates. Importantly,
portfolio flows prove to be a key channel of transmission between the U.S. and the
EMEs in the GVAR specification. Third, with regard to domestic monetary policy,
we find that on average, the short-term (policy) interest rate in EMEs declines in
response to an expansionary U.S. shock. This result indicates that U.S. policy in-
novations have an influence on the conduct of monetary policy in EMEs. Regarding
potential differences of our results across countries, we find that the magnitude of
portfolio inflows to EMEs appears to vary with the proximity to the U.S. However,
economic country characteristics like the degree of financial openness or the quality
of domestic institutions do not affect the countries’ response to the UMP shock. In
5Henceforth we will use the terms “capital flows” and “portfolio flows” interchangeably.
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particular, a floating exchange rate arrangement does not appear to provide a better
insulation from U.S. spillovers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we outline
transmission channels through which U.S. UMP can affect international portfolio
flows and structure our empirical analysis into three hypotheses along the research
questions. Section 1.3 comprises a description of the data and of the GVAR specifi-
cations. In Section 1.4, we present our main results and a sensitivity analysis, and
study the role of country characteristics. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 UMP, portfolio flows, and financial conditions in EMEs
In our analysis, we are interested in how U.S. UMP shocks affect financial conditions
in EMEs, i.e. we analyze the time period during and after the financial crisis. More-
over, we investigate whether international capital flows are an important channel of
shock transmission. Shin (2013) presents evidence that during and after the finan-
cial crisis direct (portfolio) bond and equity flows play a pivotal role in capital flows
to EMEs. In contrast, the formerly dominant international banking flows strongly
diminished since the beginning of the crisis. Therefore, we focus our analysis on the
role of portfolio flows as an important transmission channel of UMP shocks.6
From a theoretical perspective, there are several channels through which the Fed’s
UMP can affect portfolio allocation decisions by asset managers with a global reach
and hence, international portfolio flows (see, e.g., Fratzscher et al., 2013). In prin-
ciple, they are all linked to the potential domestic transmission channels of UMP
brought forward by the literature (for a review, see Joyce et al., 2012). First and
foremost, a portfolio balance channel is often emphasized. A Fed purchase of e.g.
U.S. Treasury bills crowds out private investment from this market segment. In turn,
investors rebalance their portfolio and move to close substitute assets. Ultimately, a
chain of rebalancing is set in motion which may affect the allocation of assets across
6The arguments of Shin (2013) are in detail laid out in Azis and Shin (2015). A summary of the
evidence given by Shin (2013) can also be found in the working paper version of this chapter. We
do not additionally consider banking flows in the estimations for two reasons. First, the reviewed
stylized facts indicate that the importance of banking flows has strongly diminished since the
beginning of the global financial crisis. Second, banking flows are available only at a quarterly
frequency. Given the short time period covering the financial crisis and UMP, we do not have
enough quarterly observations for a meaningful estimation of their role after the crisis.
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countries. Second, the UMP measures can affect the risk appetite of investors, often
termed “confidence or risk-taking” channel. While theoretical descriptions of this
channel are often rather informal, Bekaert et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence
that conventional monetary policy in the U.S. significantly impacts on financial
market risk taking. An increased risk appetite might drive investors into more risky
high-yield EME assets. Third, UMP might work through a signaling channel. If the
Fed’s measures are understood by markets as keeping future interest rates low for a
period longer than previously expected, this can affect asset prices by lowering the
risk-neutral price component of (future) interest rates. This induced fall in yields
on securities in the U.S. can, in turn, lead to an increase in capital flows to EMEs
due to a “search-for-yield”.7
Foreshadowing our UMP shock identification strategy (see Section 1.3.3), our ap-
proach is linked more closely to transmission channels which imply effects not only
from the policy announcement, but also from the actual policy implementation.
This feature is particularly relevant for the portfolio balance channel, where the
available supply of assets is changed through actual purchases. Regarding the other
channels, the consideration of actual purchases is often criticised as an incomplete
view on the effects of UMP. This objection claims that, since amount and timing of
the Fed’s UMP – in the form of large-scale asset purchase programs – were transpar-
ently communicated, efficient markets should have fully processed the information
when it was announced. However, as Fratzscher et al. (2013) argue, there are two
important points against this notion. First, many UMP measures were installed pre-
cisely because markets were not functioning. Hence, mere announcements may have
been less important than actual purchases because the latter ones restored liquidity
7It has to be emphasized that these channels are not mutually exclusive and may rather be at
work simultaneously (see Fratzscher et al., 2013) and we do not aim at disentangling them in
this paper. Moreover, all of them imply to some extent falling yields in the U.S. and subsequent
capital outflows related to a search for yields and an increase in risk appetite. The signaling
channel, however, potentially also allows for a negative effect of UMP on capital flows. If new
UMP measures are understood as indicating that economic conditions are worse than expected,
this might induce a flight to safety and a decrease in capital outflows to EMEs as investment in
these countries is perceived as being risky. Hence, in our empirical implementation, we do not
impose a sign restriction on the effect of UMP on U.S. bond and equity outflows. As pointed
out by an anonymous referee, also note that the different channels potentially induce a different
timing in the response of capital flows and financial markets. In our empirical analysis, we
therefore also conduct a counterfactual exercise that showcases the importance of capital flows
for the transmission of the UMP shock to other variables in the estimated model.
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and allowed investors to adjust their exposure. Second, even if market expectations
were fairly precise about the actual amount and timing of the purchases, still the
expectations about effectiveness of the actual UMP measures might not have been
accurate. In their empirical analysis, Fratzscher et al. (2013) show that Fed op-
erations, such as purchases of Treasury securities, indeed had larger effects on the
portfolio decisions than Fed announcements of these programs.
Based on the discussion outlined in the introduction and this section, we summa-
rize our research questions for the empirical analysis in three hypotheses in logical
order. We will then interpret our estimation results along these hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: U.S. UMP affects portfolio outflows from the U.S., and, in turn,
portfolio inflows into EMEs.
If Hypothesis 1 holds true, our estimated model should show an increase in port-
folio outflows from the U.S. and in portfolio inflows to EMEs after an expansionary
UMP shock as implied by the three channels discussed above.
The second hypothesis links the response of U.S. portfolio flows to the debate on
whether and how U.S. monetary policy determines financial conditions globally. In
order to test both for effects and their cause, we split the hypothesis into two parts:
Hypothesis 2: U.S. UMP drives financial conditions in EMEs (2a) and portfolio
flows are an important channel of transmission (2b).
The first part, Hypothesis 2a, is supported by our results if we find that variables
which reflect financial conditions in EMEs significantly react in response to a U.S.
UMP shock. Thereby, we assess financial conditions in our analysis using equity
returns, to capture general financial market developments, and the foreign exchange
rate. In response to an expansionary U.S. UMP shock, equity returns should increase
and the currency should appreciate with respect to the U.S. dollar. For the second
part, Hypothesis 2b, to hold true portfolio flows should constitute an important
channel of transmission of U.S. UMP to EMEs in the empirical specification. In
this regard, estimation results in the GVAR should not solely be driven by other
transmission channels potentially related to a U.S. UMP shock like demand effects
e.g. by an increase in trade with the U.S., or an increase in global growth. We address
this issue in estimating the GVAR allowing for different channels of transmission,
see Sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.5.
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Finally, the third hypothesis focuses on how domestic monetary policy in EMEs
reacts to the UMP shock. It connects our estimations to the discussion on whether
and how U.S. monetary policy influences the conduct of monetary policy in other
countries (see, e.g., Rey, 2013, or Klein and Shambaugh, 2015). By similarly splitting
the hypothesis into two parts, we investigate the role of portfolio flows for this effect:
Hypothesis 3: U.S. UMP has a significant impact on EMEs’ monetary policy
(3a) and portfolio flows are an important channel of transmission (3b).
The first part, Hypothesis 3a, is supported by our results if we find that policy
rates in EMEs significantly react in response to a U.S. UMP shock. In particular, we
expect policy rates in EMEs to be lowered despite the easing of real and financial
conditions, mirroring the expansionary U.S. UMP shock as a consequence of the
increase in portfolio flows from the U.S. to EMEs (Hypothesis 3b).
In the empirical analysis, we first generally assess these hypotheses for our panel
of countries by averaging the estimated impulse response function across all EME
countries. We then also analyze whether economic characteristics of the countries,
like the exchange rate regime or the quality of institutions, lead to heterogeneity in
the results.
1.3 Data and empirical methodology
1.3.1 Data
We use monthly data on U.S. portfolio bond and equity asset outflows and EMEs
financial and real conditions from January 2008 to December 2014. The sample cap-
tures the period in which the Fed conducted measures of unconventional monetary
policy. Our source of bond and equity flows are the monthly estimates of changes
in U.S. holdings of foreign securities provided by the Federal Reserve Board. The
dataset is based on estimations that combine two different types of data reported
by the Treasury International Capital Reporting System (TIC). On the one hand,
data is based on annual benchmark surveys of U.S. holdings of foreign securities.
On the other hand, transaction data from mandatory monthly TIC surveys, filed
by U.S. banks, securities dealers, and other entities that report net purchases of
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foreign assets by U.S. residents, is used.8 The dataset covers portfolio investment in
long-term securities, specifically debt instruments with greater-than-one-year origi-
nal maturity (bonds), and equities. It is widely used in the literature on studying
foreign flows into U.S. securities and U.S. flows into foreign securities and considered
as highly accurate (see, e.g., Curcuru et al., 2010, or Hanlon et al., 2015).
Such a large and comprehensive dataset on bilateral capital flows is available only
for flows out of the U.S.. For the purpose of our analysis, this is not a major concern
as we are interested in the effects of U.S. monetary policy that should affect flows
from the U.S. more heavily than bilateral flows involving third countries. Moreover,
U.S. portfolio flows are of major relevance for the emerging market economies that
we study. According to data from the 2012 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Sur-
vey, U.S. investors account for more than a third of all cross-border investment in
bonds and equities of emerging market economies (see Bertaut and Judson, 2014).
The dataset assigns foreign investment of U.S. investors to the country where the
entity issuing the security is legally a resident. Hence, it accounts for the so-called
‘transaction bias’, where the investment is assigned wrongly to the financial center
in which the transaction takes place. However, the dataset cannot account for the
issuance of securities by EME firms through subsidiaries residing in financial centers.
Empirical evidence shows that emerging market firms have increasingly issued debt
through foreign subsidiaries in the UK, Ireland, Luxembourg, and other (off-shore)
financial centers (see Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2016). This implies
that our approach yields estimates which should be interpreted as a lower bound of
the effects of U.S. UMP on EMEs.
Further data on EMEs’ real and financial conditions is obtained from Thomson
Reuters Datastream and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database,
in particular gross domestic product (GDP), industrial production (IP), consumer
8Bertaut and Tryon (2007) for the period 1994–2010 and Bertaut and Judson (2014) for the
period 2011–2014 combine the monthly transaction data with the yearly survey data to obtain
estimates on monthly levels for both flows and valuation changes. The data can be accessed
at the following website: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2014/1113/default.htm. The
estimated monthly flows are subject to several adjustments to reduce the noise and biases in the
underlying monthly TIC flow data. The necessary steps are in detail described in Bertaut and
Tryon (2007) and Bertaut and Judson (2014). We employ only the data on flows and not on
valuation changes, since we are only interested in investors’ decisions following the UMP shock.
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price index (CPI), equity prices, exchange rates, interest rates, commodity prices and
foreign exchange reserves. Data on U.S. GDP, IP and CPI as well as the Fed balance
sheet and the option-implied volatility index VIX is taken from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis database (FRED). Time series with monthly observations for real
GDP are constructed by interpolating the quarterly figures with the monthly index
of industrial production, using the method of Chow and Lin (1971). All variables
in nominal terms have been converted to real terms prior to the estimation using
domestic CPI. Detailed information on data sources and transformations is given in
Table 1.A.1 (Appendix 1.A).
Selection of emerging market countries into the sample is driven by different con-
siderations. First, we do not include countries that have limited access to global
financial markets and hardly issue securities and equities globally. Second, we only
add countries with comprehensive monthly data on economic and financial condi-
tions available. Third, we exclude China as it plays a distinct role through its trade
and financial linkages to the U.S. and its particular institutional settings. Never-
theless, the dataset covers a broad range of EMEs and closely resembles the sample
of many studies on emerging markets (see, for instance, Bowman et al., 2015, or,
Aizenman et al., 2016). Ultimately, our sample contains the following 19 coun-
tries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea,
Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa,
Thailand, and Turkey. In addition, we add 16 advanced economies to the model to
account for trade and financial linkages between them and the included EMEs.9
1.3.2 The GVAR model
To analyze the effects of U.S. UMP on a broad set of EMEs while taking all po-
tential cross-country interlinkages into account, in principle, a large scale vector
autoregressive (VAR) model of the following form would be adequate:
yt = µ+ λt+ Γ1yt−1 + Γ2yt−2 + ...+ Γpyt−p + νt (1.1)
9The added AEs are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Hong
Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Our
model is specified and estimated for the AEs (except the U.S.) in the same way as for the EMEs.
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where yt = (y′1t y′2t . . . y′Nt)′ denotes the vector of k endogenous variables stacked
across N countries for t = 1, 2, ..., T time periods, Γs, s = 1, 2, ..., p denotes an
(Nk × Nk) matrix of coefficients, µ and λ denote Nk × 1 vectors of constant and
trend coefficients, and νt = (ν ′1t ν ′2t . . . ν ′Nt)′ represents shocks. While the model
can accommodate a rich structure of cross-country interrelations, estimation of this
model under a fully flexible parametrization is not feasible due to the large number
of parameters, even for moderate sizes of N .
Dees et al. (2007) employ a parsimonious way of re-specifying this model by mod-
eling the relations between countries via their bilateral trade linkages (the “global
VAR” (GVAR) approach). For estimation, the GVAR model is represented by a set
of linked country VAR models with exogenous regressors (VARX) for each country












Cisdt−s + λit+ µi + εit, (1.2)
where yit is a vector of k endogenous variables and y∗it is a vector of k country-
specific (weakly exogenous) “foreign variables”.10 In order to take account of po-
tential observed common factors (in addition to unobserved common factors cap-
tured by the foreign variables), the models include the kd-dimensional vector dt of
“global” variables affecting every country. The coefficient matrices Ais, Bis and Cis,
s = 0, 1, 2, ..., p, as well as the coefficient vectors λi and µi are of suitable dimension.
The key feature of this approach is to define the so-called foreign variables, y∗it,







wij = 1, wij ≥ 0 ∀ i, j, wii = 0. (1.3)
The weights capture the exposure of country i to country j based on trade link-
ages. The foreign variables y∗it are assumed to be weakly exogenous with respect
10For notational simplicity, we present the model with the number of endogenous and foreign vari-
ables to be the same and homogeneous across countries. In the empirical implementation, these
dimensions might vary. Also the common lag order is presented for convenience of processing of
the coefficient matrices. It does not imply a restriction to the estimation of the model since the
coefficient matrices can be filled with with zeros after country-wise estimation.
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to the parameters of the VARX model in Equation (1.2). This assumption appears
admissible given that N in our case is 39.
Summarizing the influence of global variables and deterministics in the vector
hit =
∑p





Φiszit−s + hit + εit, (1.4)
where zit = (y′it,y′
∗
it)
′, Φi0 = (Ik,−Bi0), and Φis = (Ais,−Bis). Hence, zit is
linked to the endogenous variables yt = (y′1t y′2t . . . y′Nt)′ through the link matrix
W i in the following way
zit = W iyt, W i =
 0 . . . Ik . . . 0
wi1Ik . . . wiiIk . . . wiNIk
 . (1.5)




ΦisW iyt−s + hit + εit. (1.6)































Equation (1.7) has to be pre-multiplied by G−10 to obtain the autoregressive repre-
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F syt−s + h˜t + ut, ut ∼ iid(0,Σu) (1.8)
with F s = G−10 Gs, s = 1, ..., p, h˜t = G
−1
0 ht and ut = G
−1




′. Estimates for the parameters of the global solution can be constructed
based on the estimated individual-country VARX models. The global solution is
equivalent to the reduced-form VAR representation of Equation (1.1), but with
numerous within- and cross-equation restrictions. It can thus be used to perform
standard VAR analysis and obtain structural impulse response functions (IRFs), as
we do. In order to retain a parsimonious specification, the lag order p is set to one
in the baseline case. The sensitivity analysis of our estimation results evaluates the
implications of choosing higher lag orders.
1.3.3 Specification of the GVAR model
In specifying the underlying VARX models for the individual countries, we treat the
U.S. equations differently than the EMEs equations. On the one hand, we include
a different set of weakly exogenous variables, similar to what is commonly done in
GVAR applications due to the dominant role of the U.S. in global financial markets
(see, for instance, Eickmeier and Ng, 2015, Georgiadis, 2015a, or Chen et al., 2015).
More importantly, as we are interested in an unconventional monetary policy shock,
we set up a model that allows identifying such a shock.
Hence, the VARX model for the U.S. resembles VAR specifications from the litera-
ture on identifying conventional monetary policy shocks, usually containing output,
inflation, and the Fed funds rate (see, among many others, Christiano et al., 1999).
However, we replace the Fed funds rate as the monetary policy instrument by the
size of the Fed balance sheet as in Gambacorta et al. (2014). Following the beginning
of the financial crisis in 2008, the Federal funds rate soon reached its effective lower
bound and stayed there for most of our sample period. Instead, the Fed introduced
a number of (new) policy tools, most of which have altered both the size and the
composition of its balance sheet, commonly referred to as unconventional monetary
policy. The purpose of these tools has been to stabilize the functioning of financial
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markets, especially during the crisis, and to provide support to the economy during
the recession and the subsequent sluggish recovery.
The balance sheet of the Fed more than quadrupled between 2007 and 2014 (see
Figure 1.B.2 in Appendix 1.B). By using the size of the Federal Reserve balance
sheet as the monetary policy instrument, the identified unconventional monetary
policy shocks will be linked to all measures that increased the balance sheet. Notable
policies that affected the balance sheet size start after the failure of Lehman Brothers
in September 2008, as the Fed immediately provided credit to intermediaries and
key markets. Other notable expansions are associated with the three programs of
Quantitative Easing (QE) that were conducted. First, QE1, announced in November
2008 and expanded in March 2009, included purchases of mortgage backed securities
and Treasury securities. In November 2010, it was succeeded by QE2 that focused
on buying long-term Treasury securities. Lastly, QE3 was initiated in September
2012 and again included both mortgage backed securities and Treasury securities.
Although these programs also affected the composition of the Fed balance sheet, the
main change in the monetary policy stance was initiated through its expansion.11
Hence, the size of the balance sheet should be a suitable instrument to measure the
Fed’s unconventional policy stance over our sample period.
Changes in the balance sheet size, however, do not only capture exogenous in-
novations to UMP, but also the endogenous reaction of the Fed to the state of the
economy and, importantly, to financial market turmoil as e.g. in the immediate af-
termath of the Lehman collapse. To identify an exogenous innovation to the balance
sheet, we add the volatility index VIX to the model to capture financial market un-
certainty. Lastly, we add total U.S. portfolio outflows as the variable of interest for
our research questions. In sum, the following definition of endogenous and foreign
11In contrast, two unconventional monetary policy measures that did only alter the composition
of the balance sheet are on the one hand the Fed’s response to the run on Bear Stearns in
March 2008, when it increased its lending to investment banks and other stressed financial
intermediaries, but at the same time lowered its holding of short-term Treasury securities. On
the other hand, between 2011 and 2012, the Fed ran a maturity extension program in which
short- and medium-term Treasury securities were sold and proceeds used to purchase long-term
Treasury securities to flatten the yield curve.
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variables is used for the U.S. model:12
yUS,t = (output, inflation,VIX,Fed balance sheet, portfolio outflows)
′,
y∗US,t = (foreign output, foreign inflation)
′,
where the balance sheet is included in its logarithm for the ease of interpretation.
To distinguish between an exogenous innovation to the Fed balance sheet and an
endogenous reaction of the central bank to the state of the economy or financial
market turmoil, we follow Gambacorta et al. (2014) and impose a mixture of zero and
sign restrictions on the structural impulse response functions. First, in accordance
with standard assumptions in the literature, we assume that a shock to the policy
instrument, in our case the Fed balance sheet, only has a lagged impact on output
and inflation. The Fed itself reacts instantaneously to innovations to output and
inflation as commonly assumed in VAR analysis of monetary policy transmission.
Second, to account for the endogenous reaction to financial market turmoil, we use
the sign restrictions displayed in Table 1.3.1. On the one hand, we assume that
an expansionary UMP shock does not increase the VIX. This reflects the notion
that UMP had the effect of mitigating concerns about financial instability. It is
also in line with results by Bekaert et al. (2013) who show that an expansionary
conventional monetary policy shock has a lowering effect on the VIX.13 On the
other hand, we define a shock that affects both the VIX and the Fed balance sheet
in the same direction as a financial market risk shock to which the Fed responds,
most notably seen in the immediate Lehman aftermath. The sign restrictions are
imposed on impact and in the first month after the shock. Note that, as outlined
in Section 1.2, the shock will primarily capture the actual implementation of UMP,
namely measures that enlarge the balance sheet.14
12All models for the U.S. and for the EMEs include a constant and a linear time trend.
13In theory, it is also possible that unconventional monetary policy expansions increase the volatil-
ity by increasing the uncertainty about the future path of monetary policy or if the expansion is
perceived as a harbinger of less encouraging prospects (compare Section 1.2). Fratzscher et al.
(2016), however, show that, on average, press announcements by the Fed regarding unconven-
tional monetary policy lowered the VIX on impact. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive
assessment of the impact of QE purchases on the VIX available, which is a subject potentially
worth examining in future studies.
14Identifying the UMP shock using a Cholesky ordering and sign restrictions might pose a problem
given the inclusion of financial variables, in this application most importantly U.S. portfolio
outflows. Therefore, we have assessed the sensitivity of the results towards a different ordering of
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Table 1.3.1: Sign restrictions to identify UMP shock
Output Inflation VIX Fed Balance Sheet
Unconv. Monetary Policy Shock 0 0 ≤ 0 > 0
Financial Market Risk Shock 0 0 > 0 > 0
The table shows the sign and zero restrictions on the endogenous variables (columns) applied
to identify the unconventional monetary policy shock and distinguish it from a financial market
risk shock (rows).
The VARX specification for the EMEs is restricted by the rather short period of
U.S. UMP. Given the limited number of observations, we cannot include all variables
of interest into one large model. Instead, we consider two different models for
different economic concepts of interest. First, we estimate a model which is focused
on the response of real economic conditions to a U.S. UMP shock (“business cycle”
(BC) model):
yit = (output, real exchange rate change, portfolio inflows, real interest rate)
′,
y∗it = (U.S. portfolio outflows, foreign output)
′.
Second, we estimate a model to analyze the effect of a U.S. UMP shock on financial
conditions in EMEs (FC model):
yit = (portfolio inflows, real interest rate, real exchange rate change, equity returns)
′,
y∗it = (U.S. portfolio outflows, foreign output)
′.
The two models share the same VARX model for the U.S. to ensure that the UMP
shock is the same across models. In the baseline specification, we include U.S. total
portfolio outflows, the transmission channel of interest, and foreign output, as stan-
dard in the literature, as foreign variables y∗ in the EMEs VARX models. Following
Georgiadis (2015b), we include the potentially non-stationary level variables real
GDP and real exchange rate in first difference form in all models.15
portfolio flows and using an identification strategy based on a shadow interest rate (see Section
1.4.3). Another approach would be to identify the VAR using external instruments as pioneered
by Gertler and Karadi (2015) for conventional monetary policy. For a pure UMP shock and our
sample, however, we did not find a valid instrument, most notably due to the zero lower bound.
15This has mainly two reasons. First, using differences ensures stability of the model across all
different specifications. Estimating the different models in (log) levels using co-integrated global
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1.3.4 Implementation of identifying restrictions
To implement the identifying restrictions in the GVAR, we proceed as follows. First,
we estimate the model and retrieve its global solution given in Equation (1.8) that
includes all endogenous variables across all countries. We then carry out a Cholesky
decomposition of the covariance matrix of the residuals of the global model, ut, ob-
taining a lower triangular matrix P . Multiplying this matrix with the corresponding
moving-average coefficients of the global solution of the GVAR, Ψh, h = 0, 1, 2, ...,
yields the preliminary, standard orthogonalized IRF at horizon h, ΨhP . Since the
effect of a shock identified from a Cholesky decomposition depends on the ordering
of the variables, we implement the following concept-based scheme: we order the
variables such that real GDP growth for the U.S. and all other countries (in the
business cycle model) is followed by U.S. inflation and then, by the U.S. UMP vari-
ables (Fed balance sheet and VIX). These variables are then followed by all others,
including interest rates, portfolio flows etc.16
The IRF obtained from this identification scheme does not yet satisfy the sign
restrictions of Table 1.3.1 as the pure Cholesky scheme implies a recursive structure
also in the contemporaneous relation between the VIX and the Fed balance sheet. In
the next step, we multiply the preliminary IRF by an orthonormal rotation matrix








vector error-correction models (GVECMs) often yields explosive dynamics which makes a mean-
ingful interpretation of the results difficult. Second, given our short sample period, estimations
of the long-run relationship between the variables and, hence, the co-integration rank of GVECM
have to be treated with caution. Therefore, for our application using a GVECM does not pro-
vide insurance against model mis-specification. Furthermore, all the variables are checked for
stationarity in a panel unit root test, and are confirmed to be stationary. The results of the test
are available in Appendix 1.D.
16The specific ordering of the variables after a shock does not have any consequence on their or
other variables’ responses to this shock.
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Ir is an identity matrix of dimension r × r, 0r,s is a zero matrix of dimension
r × s, and the corresponding dimensions are given by (m1,m2) = (N + 1, 2N − 1)
in the BC model and by (m1,m2) = (2, 3N − 2) in the FC model. The matrix Q(θ)
is thus set up in such a way that QUMP (θ) affects the responses of the Fed balance
sheet and the VIX to shocks to these two variables. The impulse response function
for each θ is then given by IRF(h) = ΨhPQ(θ). We draw rotation matrices Q(θ)
by drawing θ from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, pi] until we obtain the
IRF(h) that satisfies the sign restrictions in Table 1.3.1. The realized UMP shock
is then given by the corresponding element in ηt = Q
′(θ)P−1ut that raises the Fed
balance sheet and, at the same time, does not increase the VIX.
In principle, there is a variety of models with different rotation matricesQ(θ) that
satisfy the sign restriction. We account for this fact by drawing rotation matrices
Q(θ) until we obtain 1000 admissible IRFs. Then, we apply the “median targeting”
approach by Fry and Pagan (2007) and select among admissible models the one
that yields IRFs that are closest to the median response across models and horizons.
This approach has the advantage that the reported final IRFs are generated by
one particular model and that the shocks are orthogonal. For statistical inference,
we carry out 500 bootstrap replications of the same setup, with 1000 draws of the
rotation matrix in each replication.
1.3.5 Evaluation of portfolio flows as a channel of shock transmission
Even if all the variables in the U.S. and in the EMEs, including portfolio flows, re-
spond to the UMP shock identified above, this is not sufficient evidence that portfolio
flows are indeed an important channel of shock transmission in line with Hypotheses
2b and 3b. In order to evaluate the role of portfolio flows in the transmission process,
we document their quantitative contribution to the impulse responses of the EME
variables by means of the following scenario analysis: given the estimated parame-
ter matrices Gˆs, s = 0, 1, ..., p, we obtain corresponding matrices G˜s, s = 0, 1, ..., p,
where the effects of all variables on both portfolio outflows from the U.S. and portfo-
lio inflows into EMEs are counterfactually set to zero while all other effects are equal
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to their estimated values. The same scenario is applied to the estimated covariance
matrix Σˆε such that we obtain a corresponding matrix Σ˜ε where all covariances
between the portfolio flow variables and all other variables are counterfactually set
to zero while all other variances and covariances are equal to their estimated values.
Using these counterfactual effect matrices in the same algorithm as described
in Section 1.3.4, we compute counterfactual impulse response functions I˜RF(h) =
Ψ˜hP˜Q(θ), where Ψ˜h are the moving-average coefficients corresponding to F˜ s =
G˜
−1







. Comparing the resulting impulse response functions with the ones
obtained from the estimated coefficients uncovers the part of the reaction of each
variable that is generated through the responses of portfolio flows. Note that this
scenario analysis should not be interpreted as representing alternative outcomes
from a policy experiment, but simply as a summary statistic on the magnitudes of
estimated coefficients. If the IRFs based on counterfactual matrices showed sub-
stantially smaller responses than the original ones, we would infer that portfolio
flows constitute an important channel of transmission of U.S. UMP to EMEs’ real
and financial conditions and monetary policy in accordance with our Hypotheses 2b
and 3b. Also note that the counterfactual exercise is conducted using the estimated
parameter matrices and, thus, under the assumption of the estimated model being
correctly specified.
1.4 Empirical results
In this section, we first present the main results regarding Hypotheses 1 to 3 that
arise from the panel dimension of the sample. We also assess their sensitivity to
various alterations of the model. Lastly, we analyze whether and how results from
the panel dimension differ with respect to underlying country characteristics.
Before turning to the results, two facts regarding the estimated U.S. UMP shocks
have to be noted that follow from a detailed examination of their time series repre-
sentation (see Appendix 1.B). First, the identified balance sheet shocks capture the
monetary policy stance of the Fed over the sample period well. The different phases
of QE are, on average, associated with expansionary UMP shocks and ending the
respective program of QE implies contractionary impulses (relative to the trend in-
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crease). Second, while shocks are overwhelmingly estimated to be positive for QE2
and QE3, this is not the case for QE1 as the increase in the balance sheet for QE1
has been less steep than for the other two programs. Hence, we will bear in mind
that expansionary shocks in our specification are mainly associated with QE2 and
QE3 when comparing our results to existing evidence on the individual programs.
1.4.1 U.S. reaction to UMP shock
We start by looking at the U.S. part of the estimated GVAR models for a first in-
dication regarding Hypothesis 1 and assess if a UMP shock is related to an increase
in capital outflows. IRFs for the U.S. variables to a one standard deviation expan-
sionary UMP shock are depicted in Figure 1.4.1. Exemplarily, we present impulse
response functions from the FC model. However, the reaction in the U.S. part of
the model is virtually identical in the BC model. The standard deviation shock
corresponds to an enlargement of the Fed balance sheet of roughly three percentage
points (pp) on impact. As in all the following figures, the solid line represents the
median response, and the red dotted lines represent bootstrapped 16% and 84%
quantiles.
The response of real GDP growth is estimated to be significantly positive for a
period of more than six months, reaching its peak after around four months at an
increase of 0.02 pp. The response of inflation is similarly positive, peaks at a 0.05
pp increase, and remains significant for around five months. Moreover, the VIX is
significantly reduced for four months after the UMP shocks while the balance sheet
is significantly increased for around five months. These results are qualitatively very
similar to the ones obtained by Gambacorta et al. (2014) in a comparable setting.
However, the magnitude by which GDP and inflation respond is smaller which most
likely reflects the larger parameter space of the GVAR. Finally, panel (e) of Figure
1.4.1 shows the response of U.S. portfolio outflows. Following a UMP shock, outflows
increase immediately, reaching a peak at around four billion USD after two months.
This finding is a first indication in favor of Hypothesis 1. Given how the estimated
innovations relate to UMP measures (see above), this result is also in line with,
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for instance, Fratzscher et al. (2013), who find that QE2 triggered an immediate
re-balancing of assets from the U.S into EMEs.17
Figure 1.4.1: Responses of U.S. variables to UMP shock
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 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) real GDP growth
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(b) inflation rate
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 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) VIX








Response of US PORTFOLIO OUTFLOWS (USA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(e) portfolio outflows
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the U.S. variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions model. Confidence bands are
based on 1000 bootstrap replications with 500 draws of the rotation matrix each.
1.4.2 EMEs’ mean response to UMP shock
We then examine the average impulse responses of EMEs to the U.S. UMP shock in
our two models, starting with the one capturing real economic conditions (see Figure
1.4.2).18 As panel (a) shows, U.S. portfolio flows to EMEs increase significantly
17Our results show that the effect does not only appear on impact, but also entails a large degree
of persistence as the UMP shock leads to a significant increase in portfolio outflows for almost
half a year.
18The mean impulse response is calculated as the mean of the IRFs across all EME countries except
Argentina. Argentina is included in the estimation, but it is excluded from the calculation of the
mean because the estimated reaction of the real interest rate is implausibly large. Most likely,
this is due to the data capturing the repeated debt restructuring and default that Argentina
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after a UMP shock, consistent with the increase in outflows found in the U.S. part
of the model. Regarding the magnitude of the effect, however, the mean increase in
inflows has its peak at around 30 million USD. Thus, around 600 million USD are
estimated to flow into all EMEs, representing only about 15% of the total response
of U.S. outflows. This finding is not necessarily surprising, as the data capture
only flows going directly from the U.S. to EMEs. The data do not account for
possibly substantial indirect flows from the U.S. to EMEs through subsidiaries of
EME debtors residing in financial centers like the United Kingdom or Hong Kong,
where the inflows are indeed estimated to be very large.19 In this regard, results
can be interpreted as a lower bound of actual portfolio inflows. In the model for
financial conditions, portfolio flows are also found to increase, showing an almost
identical reaction in shape and magnitude (see Figure 1.4.3). Taken together, these
results provide support for Hypothesis 1.
The other variables in the business-cycle model are also found to respond signif-
icantly to a U.S. UMP shock. Real GDP growth in the EMEs increases by around
0.02 percentage points and stays above trend for almost one year. The short-term
real interest rate, on average, decreases in response to the expansionary shock. This
indicates pro-cyclicality in the monetary policy reaction as interest rates decrease
while output increases, and that monetary policy is expansionary in response to an
expansionary U.S. impulse, which can be interpreted as first support for Hypothesis
3a. Finally, the response of the real exchange rate shows that EMEs experience
a real appreciation of the currency against the U.S. dollar after the UMP shock:
the response peaks at an appreciation of around 0.17 pp and persists for roughly 5
months. Hence, one possible explanation for the decrease in the real interest rate is
that monetary policy authorities to some extent try to deflect the inflows by lowering
the policy rate, in an attempt to avoid an even larger appreciation.
experienced over the sample period, which was associated with strong movements in both nominal
interest rates and inflation. The estimated IRFs for Argentina can be found in Figures 1.C.4 and
1.C.6 in Appendix 1.C. As outlined in Section 1.4.3, all our panel results are robust to dropping
Argentina from the sample for the estimation of the model. Figures 1.C.5 and 1.C.7 in Appendix
1.C present the mean response including Argentina. Qualitatively and quantitatively, mean
responses for the variables other than the real interest rate are very similar to those computed
without Argentina.
19Figure 1.C.9 in Appendix 1.C show that portfolio inflows into the UK and Hong Kong alone
amount to roughly 2.2 billion U.S. dollar during the first quarter after the shock.
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Figure 1.4.2: Responses of EME variables to U.S. UMP shock in BC model









Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows
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 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real GDP growth








Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real interest rate








Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) real fx change
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the business cycle (BC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 1000 bootstrap replications with 500 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Turning to EMEs financial conditions, Figure 1.4.3 shows the results for the model
that includes the responses of portfolio inflows, real exchange rates, real interest
rates, and equity returns to an expansionary U.S. UMP shock. Following the shock,
portfolio inflows increase in the same magnitude as in the model for the business
cycle. Similarly, both the real exchange rate and real interest rate response closely
mirror the responses of these variables in the business cycle model. The surge in
inflows, the real appreciation, and the lower interest rate are accompanied by a
significant increase in equity returns, which lasts for around five months. Hence,
these responses suggest that financial conditions, proxied by the exchange rate and
equity returns, are indeed affected by an expansionary UMP shock in the U.S., thus
providing support for Hypothesis 2a.
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Figure 1.4.3: Responses of EME variables to U.S. UMP shock in FC model









Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
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Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
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(c) real fx change









Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 1000 bootstrap replications with 500 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Next, we evaluate the role of portfolio flows as an important channel of shock
transmission as implied by Hypotheses 2b and 3b. So far, we have presented re-
sults from empirical models where portfolio outflows and foreign output are the
transmission channels of U.S. shocks in the GVAR specifications (compare Section
1.3.3). For a first indication on the importance of capital flows in the transmission,
we re-estimate the FC model with various alterations regarding the transmission
vector y∗it for the EMEs. The results of this exercise can be found in Appendix 1.C.
First, we drop foreign output from y∗it. Doing this leaves the IRFs qualitatively and
quantitatively almost unchanged compared to the baseline specification, suggesting
that foreign output is not the primary transmission channel that drives the results
for financial conditions (see Figure 1.C.8 in Appendix 1.C). On the other hand, if we
use only foreign output as a transmission channel in y∗it, spillovers from U.S. policy
shocks are estimated to be considerably smaller. We also add other financial vari-
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ables to capital flows in y∗it (foreign interest rates, foreign lending rates and foreign
equity returns), replacing foreign output one-by-one, to check whether this alters
our main results. For the first two alternative specifications, we find that results
are qualitatively and also quantitatively similar to the baseline model, suggesting
that transmission is already captured by capital flows. Only the inclusion of foreign
equity returns produces larger total spillovers from UMP shocks.
This underlines the importance of financial markets in transmitting monetary
policy shocks and highlights that portfolio flows are not the only channel of trans-
mission. Overall, the results from the different specifications regarding y∗it are first
support for Hypotheses 2b and 3b: capital flows are an important channel of trans-
mission of U.S. UMP shocks.
To further investigate this hypothesis, we present a counterfactual exercise from
our main specification of model FC where the transmission through capital flows is
artificially turned off after estimation (compare Section 1.3.5). In particular, we set
all coefficients that load on U.S. portfolio outflows or on EME portfolio inflows to
zero, leaving all other coefficients at their estimated values. This exercise should not
be interpreted as a policy experiment (e.g. the implementation of capital account re-
strictions), but simply as a summary statistic on the magnitude of the effects through
portfolio flows within the estimated model. Also note that the counterfactual does
not aim at isolating the effect going through one of the channels of transmission
outlined in Section 2, but captures the overall importance of portfolio flows for the
reaction of the variables in the GVAR to the UMP shock. The resulting IRFs from
this exercise for the EMEs are presented in Figure 1.4.4. They show that responses
of real interest rates, real exchange rate changes and equity returns are substantially
smaller compared to the baseline IRFs and thus, underline the quantitative impor-
tance of portfolio flows for the transmission of the UMP shock to EMEs.20 In sum,
we interpret the results from this section as providing strong evidence in favor of
our Hypothesis 2a and 2b, that U.S. UMP drives financial conditions in EMEs, and
that portfolio flows are an important channel of transmission.
20Feedback effects through portfolio flows to the U.S. economy seem to be small, such that the
IRFs for U.S. variables to the UMP shock are basically unaffected, see Figure 1.C.11 in Appendix
1.C.
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Figure 1.4.4: Counterfactual responses of EME variables to U.S. UMP shock
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(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses (blue solid line) and the 68 per-
cent confidence bands (red dashed line) of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial
conditions (FC) model along with the mean responses in the same model where the transmission
through capital flows is counterfactually turned off (green dash-dotted line).
1.4.3 Sensitivity to alternative specifications
Next, we evaluate the sensitivity of the results from the panel dimension to changes
in the specification of the model.21 We start by assessing the sensitivity of the results
to the ordering of variables in the identification scheme. Instead of the concept-
based ordering implemented in the baseline specification, we choose a country-based
ordering, where the U.S. are placed first. Within the U.S. part of the model, the
variables follow the ordering as specified in Section 1.3.3, i.e. output and inflation
are followed by the UMP variables, the VIX and the Fed balance sheet. All other
variables of the model follow accordingly. This scheme features a stronger isolation
of the U.S. from the rest of the world since U.S. monetary policy does not react to
21IRF graphs from this subsection are available in Appendix 1.C.
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any contemporaneous innovations abroad. The qualitative results are robust to this
change in ordering. Another alternative ordering scheme that we apply focuses on
the timing of portfolio flows. In particular, different to the baseline specification,
we try an ordering scheme where all capital flow variables in the model are placed
in front of the UMP block. This is done to allow for U.S. monetary policy to react
instantaneously to portfolio outflows. On the other hand, this alternative ordering
implies that the immediate response of portfolio flows to the UMP shock is zero.
Despite the difference in the impact reaction, the overall response of U.S. portfolio
outflows and EME portfolio inflows is still very similar to the baseline specification.
This holds qualitatively and quantitatively.
Returning to our baseline ordering, we perform a number of additional robustness
checks. For instance, we drop several countries one-by-one from the sample that
display large reactions in one or more variables and find that mean responses change
slightly quantitatively, but not qualitatively. We also perform the estimation using
only a post-Lehman sample, i.e. starting in November 2008 instead of January 2008,
and find no large qualitative changes resulting from this alteration. Likewise, in the
baseline estimation we parsimoniously only include one lag in each country-specific
VARX model. As a robustness exercise, we allow for a second or a third lag in the
country-specific VARX models based on information criteria. Our findings are very
robust to this exercise. A further robustness analysis is to include commodity price
inflation as an exogenous (global) variable given that commodity price developments
potentially play an important role for several EMEs. The results are qualitatively
similar, but the inclusion of this exogenous variable produces smaller - but still
significant - reactions of the the EMEs’ variables, except for portfolio inflows, which
stay almost unchanged.
We also assess whether only one kind of portfolio assets, equity assets or bonds,
drives the reaction of flows after a UMP shock. To do so, we replace the portfolio flow
variables in our baseline model with equity flows and bond flows, respectively. We
find that both equity and bond inflows into EMEs increase, with the rise in bond
flows being larger on average. Also, from a cross-country comparison no obvious
pattern arises which would indicate the relative importance of one type of flows over
the other for single countries.
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Further, to assess our identification strategy, we investigate how other U.S. vari-
ables react to the UMP shocks in our model and compare the results to evidence
from the literature. As found by Wright (2012) and Rogers et al. (2014), U.S. UMP
causes a depreciation of the dollar and an increase in U.S. equity prices, among
others. Hence, we add those variables separately to the U.S. part of the model and
study the estimated response functions. Both responses look as expected given ex-
isting evidence, but do not affect the responses of the baseline variables, and thus
provide further support for our identification strategy.
As an alternative (unconventional) monetary policy instrument to identify the
structural UMP shocks, we use the shadow federal funds rate constructed by Wu
and Xia (2016). Specifically, we replace the UMP block, namely the VIX and the
balance sheet, in our baseline model with the shadow rate and then apply a recursive
ordering scheme to identify the UMP shock. Doing this yields qualitative similar
responses for the EME variables as our baseline model with the identification scheme
based on Gambacorta et al. (2014).
Lastly, we replace our preferred measures of financial conditions from the main
specification one-by-one by other proxies that potentially similarly capture financial
developments, and assess whether the reaction of the other variables is robust to
this alterations. First, in the model FC, we replace the real interest rate, our proxy
for domestic monetary policy, by the real lending rate. The responses of capital
inflows, the real exchange rate and equity returns remain unaffected compared to
the baseline FC model. The lending rate, on the other hand, displays a reaction very
similar to the response of the interest rate in our baseline model, reflecting a close
connection of the two rates in our sample. Second, following Bowman et al. (2015),
we replace the real interest rate in the model FC by the long-term government bond
yield. As before, we find that the reaction of flows, exchange rates, and equity prices
is robust to this alteration. The mean responses show that long-term government
bond yields significantly decrease, in line with findings by Bowman et al. (2015).
Third, we re-estimate the model FC replacing the interest rate by foreign exchange
reserves growth. We do so as the accumulation of reserves is a policy tool actively
used by central banks in EMEs, for instance to alleviate exchange rate appreciation
pressures. Again we find that the reaction of portfolio flows, equity returns, and
exchange rates is robust to this alteration. Moreover, reserve accumulation increases
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in response to the UMP shock. Similar to the real interest rate response in the
baseline model, this indicates that monetary policy in EMEs reacts to the U.S.
expansion. In particular, the increase in reserves could be related to policies aimed
at mitigating a currency appreciation that arises from the capital inflows.
1.4.4 The role of economic characteristics of countries
Finally, we go into detail and analyze if and to what extent EMEs are affected
differently by the U.S. UMP shock. For this purpose, we split our sample of countries
in different ways according to economic characteristics and analyze whether the
responses of portfolio flows, domestic financial conditions, and monetary policy rates
to the shock differ between groups. In particular, we look at differences in the
estimated peak responses of the variables from model FC across groups with different
country characteristics. The differences in peak responses correspond very closely
to the differences in cumulated IRFs for the country groups.
First, we consider the role of country geography. U.S. capital flows towards Eu-
rope, for instance, may not be as large as towards Latin America, since the latter has
tighter economic and geographical linkages to the U.S. The EMEs we analyze are
grouped by geographic region as follows: Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru), Europe (Hungary, Poland, Russia, Turkey) and Asia (India, Indone-
sia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand). 68% confidence bands
of estimated peak effects in response to the U.S. UMP shock for the different regions
are displayed in Figure 1.4.5. The full set of responses are depicted in Figures 1.C.1
– 1.C.3 in Appendix 1.C.
We indeed observe the strongest reaction of capital inflows after an expansionary
shock for Latin American countries, whereas the smallest reaction is found for Eu-
ropean countries. In principle, comparisons of total flows have to be treated with
caution as they do not take into account that groups may vary by economic size.
The group of Latin American countries and the group of European countries, how-
ever, are of similar size regarding their total GDP, while GDP of the Asian countries
is even larger. The larger response of portfolio flows to Latin America compared to
Asia is reflected in slightly stronger responses of equity returns and exchange rates.
On the other hand, European interest rates and equity returns react with similar
magnitude as their American counterparts whereas the foreign exchange reaction is
29
Chapter 1. Spillovers of U.S. Unconventional Monetary Policy to Emerging Markets:
The Role of Capital Flows
even more pronounced. This can be explained by effects being enhanced by close
trade linkages to advanced European countries, and in particular by currencies being
tied to the euro. In sum, there is evidence for limited regional heterogeneity in quan-
titative respect, indicating that the capital flow channel is of particular importance
for Latin America, whereas for Asia and Emerging Europe also other channels play
an important role. Qualitatively, however, responses across regions are very similar.






























































Note: The figure shows 68 percent confidence bands of estimated peak effects for the model
FC across different geographical regions. LatAm: Latin America, EmEu: Emerging Europe.
Next, we study the role of institutional quality, as Fratzscher et al. (2013) find
evidence that countries with better institutions are less affected by Fed policies. We
follow their approach and proxy the institutional quality by the 2007 average of the
following four indicators of governance: ’Political Stability’, ’Rule of Law’, ’Control
of Corruption’ and ’Regulatory Quality’; all from Kaufmann et al. (2010). The
country characteristics are predetermined to account for the possibility that they
might be contemporaneously related to U.S. UMP. Then, we split our sample into
two groups, one with institutional quality above the cross-country median and one
with institutional quality below the cross-country median. Figure 1.4.6 (left half of
each graph) shows that peak responses are very similar for both groups of countries.
Hence, we do not find evidence that the EMEs in our sample are affected differently
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due to differences in institutional quality. The difference to the results by Fratzscher
et al. (2013) can be explained by the fact that their sample also contains advanced
economies, who – on average – have a higher institutional quality than EMEs.
Figure 1.4.6: Peak responses across country groups with different degree of institu-
tional quality / openness






























































Note: The figure shows 68 percent confidence bands of estimated peak effects for the model FC
across country groups with different characteristics. HIns: institutional quality above cross-country
median, LIns: institutional quality below cross-country median, HOpe: financial openness above
cross-country median, LOpe: financial openness below cross-country median.
We also analyze whether countries with a lower degree of financial openness are
better insulated from U.S. UMP shocks. Financial openness is proxied by the Chinn-
Ito coefficient for capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006). Again, we use
the 2007 value of the country characteristic to avoid problems of endogeneity and
split our sample into two groups, one with financial openness above the median and
one with openness below. Peak responses for the two groups are displayed in Figure
1.4.6 (right half of each graph). There is no evidence that countries with a higher
degree of financial openness at the start of our sample are more strongly affected by
the UMP shock.22
22It is important to keep in mind that this result cannot be interpreted as a test of how efficient
the countries’ micro- and macroprudential measures were during and after the crisis. As the
introduction of measures like capital controls is highly endogenous to the degree of capital inflows
following a monetary policy shock, this question cannot be addressed in the current framework
and constitutes an important avenue for future research.
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Finally, we study how responses to the UMP shock differ with respect to the coun-
tries’ exchange rate arrangements. This is motivated by the classical “trilemma”,
which states that countries can only have two of the following three policy options:
independent monetary policy, free capital flows, or a fixed exchange rate. Hence,
countries that let their currency float freely might have potentially more leeway for
an independent monetary policy, meaning that they can set interest rates indepen-
dently of the U.S. and, in turn, achieve a better buffering of U.S. shocks. Empirical
studies often find evidence for this kind of reasoning (see Klein and Shambaugh,
2015, or Aizenman et al., 2016). However, Rey (2013) argues that the trilemma is
often reduced to a dilemma: a floating exchange rate regime alone might not be
sufficient to insulate countries from the global financial cycle and U.S. monetary
policy as one of its drivers.
Ideally, we would thus split our sample countries in those that are situated in
a floating exchange rate regime (“floaters”) and those that fix there exchange rate
(“peggers”). This, however, is not a straightforward task given our sample period
in which most of the countries are de jure considered to be floaters. Therefore, we
turn to Klein and Shambaugh (2008)’s de facto classification of countries’ prevailing
exchange rate regimes for this task, which is based on observable exchange rate
variation and is commonly used in the literature. Following the strategy outlined
above, we split our sample into two groups, one with exchange rate flexibility above
the cross-country median and one with exchange rate flexibility below the cross-
country median. We measure exchange rate flexibility in two ways, namely by
the number of years that a country was considered a floater in the years 2003–
2007 and 2008–2014, respectively. While the latter classification potentially suffers
from an endogeneity bias between exchange rate stability and the amount of capital
inflows, it serves as a useful benchmark for the results based on pre-crisis data. Both
classifications yield similar, but slightly different groups of countries.23
23Different to the other country characteristics, we do not only use one year of data to group
the countries since de facto exchange rate classifications are far less persistent than the degree
of institutional quality of financial openness considered above. The classification of Klein and
Shambaugh (2008) can be found on Jay C. Shambaugh’s homepage. As alternative specifications
we have also classified countries using only their 2007 observations, which yielded qualitatively
similar results. As an alternative dataset, we have used the coarse classification by Reinhart
and Rogoff (2004) and applied a similar classification strategy. The resulting groups are slightly
different, but the results regarding the responses to the policy shock in both country groups are
very similar.
32
Chapter 1. Spillovers of U.S. Unconventional Monetary Policy to Emerging Markets:
The Role of Capital Flows
Figure 1.4.7 shows the peak responses for the variables in model FC for the group
of floaters (above median) and the group of peggers (below median) for both classi-
fications. It indicates that, despite small changes in the group compositions, results
between the two classifications are very similar. Both floaters and peggers receive
capital inflows of similar magnitude and also experience a similar increase in asset
prices. Moreover, currencies in both groups are found to appreciate after the shock,
reflecting the fact that the group of peggers does not constitute hard pegs in our
sample. Not surprisingly, the appreciation is stronger in countries that float freely.
Of particular interest in the sense of the trilemma is the reaction of monetary policy
in both groups as floating countries should experience a higher degree of policy in-
dependence and thus, should display less of a mirroring interest rate reaction to the
expansionary U.S. shock. However, we find that both groups react to the expansion-
ary shock by decreasing their own monetary policy rates, indicating a procyclical
reaction of monetary policy as found in the panel results.
Figure 1.4.7: Peak responses across country groups with different exchange rate flex-
ibility






























































Note: The figure shows 68 percent confidence bands of estimated peak effects for the model
FC across country groups with different degrees of de facto exchange rate flexibility. 0814Pg:
flexibility in 2008–2014 below cross-country median, 0814Fl: flexibility in 2008–2014 above cross-
country median, 0307Pg: flexibility in 2003–2007 below cross-country median, 0307Fl: flexibility
in 2003–2007 above cross-country median.
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Together with the evidence obtained in Section 1.4.2 (Figure 1.4.4 panel b) on
the importance of portfolio flows as a transmission channel for the UMP shock, we
interpret this result as strongly supporting our Hypothesis 3: via portfolio flows,
U.S. UMP significantly influences monetary policy in EMEs.
Furthermore, our results imply that a floating exchange rate regime alone is not
sufficient to insulate the EMEs in our model from the U.S. UMP shock. This is in line
with the findings of Passari and Rey (2015) and Rey (2016) for a group of small open
advanced economies and U.S. interest rate surprises. However, our results are not
necessarily at odds with existing evidence that stresses the importance of exchange
rate regimes and the classical trilemma. These studies often cover a broader range
of shocks, countries as well as time periods, and allow for a more detailed analysis on
how the varying degrees of exchange rate flexibility and also capital control intensity
are related to the reaction of domestic monetary policy.
There are a number of caveats to the analysis offered in this subsection that
need to be mentioned. Our results most likely constitute lower bounds for the
capital inflows into EMEs after a UMP shock as they do not take the issuance
of debt through subsidiaries into financial centers into account (compare Section
1.3.1). The likelihood that corporations in a country issue debt through an offshore
subsidiary could be related to the underlying country characteristics, in particular
the exchange rate regime or the degree of financial openness. Should this be the
case, results for the individual groups could differ if it would be possible to account
for offshore subsidiaries. Moreover, it is important to note that the different country
characteristics might not be independent from each other. Lastly, due to a lack of
data availability, the influence of other micro- and macroprudential measures that
were taken during the crisis is not taken into account. Nevertheless, overall our
results are indicative that neither a floating exchange rate nor a higher degree of
institutional quality or a lower degree of financial openness are sufficient to insulate
countries from the spillovers of U.S. UMP.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated empirically whether U.S. unconventional monetary
policy has an impact on financial and real variables in emerging market economies,
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and examined whether portfolio flows are an important channel of transmission.
In contrast to existing studies, we used a structural global vector autoregressive
approach that takes economic interlinkages between countries and across time into
account and allows to assess the persistence of the effects of U.S. UMP shocks.
We found that an expansionary UMP shock significantly increases portfolio out-
flows from the U.S. for almost six months. In the EMEs, this is equivalently associ-
ated with portfolio inflows. Along with the increase in inflows, real output growth
and equity returns rise, the real exchange rate appreciates and the real lending
rate decreases. Importantly, portfolio flows proved to be an important channel of
transmission in the GVAR specification. We also found that EMEs, on average,
react pro-cyclically by decreasing their short-term interest rate in response to the
U.S. shock, indicating a monetary policy response that mirrors the expansionary
U.S. impulse. All our findings appeared to be independent of economic character-
istics like the degree of financial openness, institutional quality, or the underlying
exchange rate regime of a country.
Our results complement existing evidence along different dimensions. Fratzscher
et al. (2013), for instance, found that UMP in the U.S. had a direct effect on portfolio
reallocation between advanced economies and EMEs. We showed that U.S. shocks
have persistent effects on portfolio flows, and that these flows are a channel of trans-
mission to EMEs. Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015) found that U.S. monetary
policy had an effect on financial conditions worldwide for the period 1980–2010. We
obtained a comparable result for the particular period of unconventional monetary
policy. Lastly, Passari and Rey (2015) and Rey (2016) showed for a group of open
advanced economies that countries with a flexible exchange rate regime are not in-
sulated from U.S. monetary policy. We documented that also EMEs with a flexible
exchange rate arrangement are affected by U.S. UMP shocks.
Finally, some limitations of our analysis are particularly interesting for future
research. Given our identification strategy and sample period, we did not analyze the
effects of uncertainty about the end of UMP in the U.S. (for instance, the so-called
“taper tantrum”). Future research might explore how such policy uncertainty affects
portfolio flows between the U.S. and EMEs. Furthermore, the dataset on capital
flows does not take potential flows through subsidiaries in financial centers into
account. It might be interesting to study in future research whether the likelihood
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of issuing bond and equity assets by EME firms through offshore subsidiaries is
related to cross-country characteristics, like the degree of financial openness or the
exchange rate regime.
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Appendix
1.A Data and sources
Table 1.A.1: Data construction and sources
Variable Construction and source
Inflation First difference of log of monthly consumer price index (CPI), in
percent. Source: Datastream (U.S.: St. Louis FRED).
Equity return First difference of log MSCI equity, in percent. Source: Datas-
tream (U.S. CPI: St. Louis FRED).
Real output Monthly real GDP is obtained by interpolating quarterly log real
GDP with log index of industrial production using the method
of Chow and Lin (1971). Real GDP growth is first difference of
log real GDP, in percent. Source: Datastream (U.S.: St. Louis
FRED).
Fed balance sheet Sum of assets held by Federal Reserve System. Source: St. Louis
FRED.
VIX Option-implied volatility index. Source: Chicago Board Options
Exchange, retrieved from St. Louis FRED.
Real exchange rate Calculated from log nominal U.S. dollar exchange rate et using
the following formula: et + lnCPIUSt − lnCPIt. Real exchange
rate change is first difference of log real exchange rate, in percent.
Source: Datastream (U.S. CPI: St. Louis FRED).
Real interest rate Calculated from nominal short-term interest rate it using the fol-
lowing formula: it − 12 · ∆ lnCPIt · 100. As nominal short-term
rate, we choose the monetary policy rate (exact definition depends
on policy measures of the respective country (“target rate”, “policy
rate”, ...). Source: Datastream (U.S. CPI: St. Louis FRED).
Real lending rate Calculated from nominal lending rate lt using the following for-
mula: lt−12 ·∆ lnCPIt ·100. Source: IMF International Financial
Statistics (IFS), (U.S. CPI: St. Louis FRED).
Real effective ex-
change rate
Log of index of real effective exchange rate. Change is first dif-
ference, in percent. Source: Bank of International Settlements,
retrieved from Datastream.
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Foreign exchange
reserves







First difference of log commodity price index, in percent. Source:
IFS.
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1.B Identified exogenous balance sheet innovations
For a better interpretation of the identified U.S. UMP shocks, we examine their
time series representation. This inspection allows us to assess whether the major
policy measures taken by the Fed during and after the financial crisis (see Section
3.3 in the paper) are reflected in the estimated innovations. Given that most of the
measures have to some extent an unexpected component, this is a useful check of
the identification approach. In doing so, we follow Boeckx et al. (2014) who apply
a similar balance sheet driven identification strategy for UMP by the ECB.
Figure 1.B.1 shows the time series of the identified UMP innovations in the balance
sheet as well as the time series of identified financial market risk shocks. The phases
of Quantitative Easing (QE) are depicted as shaded areas.24 The sum of the shocks
is, by construction as a white noise residual, zero over the sample period and the
scale is standard deviations. A positive shock reflects an expansionary shock while
a negative impulse is associated with a tightening of the balance sheet relative to
the average endogenous response to other shocks hitting the economy.
Figure 1.B.1: Time series of balance sheet shocks and financial market risk shocks
Note: The figure shows the estimated unconventional monetary policy shock, reflecting an unex-
pected extension of the balance sheet, and financial market risk shock, capturing financial market
turbulence to which the Fed responds, as well as phases of quantitative easing (shaded areas) and
important monetary policy decisions over the sample period. The scale is standard deviations.
24The shock series shown in the figure correspond to the model that yields the median IRF in the
baseline specification with equity prices, i.e. the financial conditions model. The shocks, however,
are virtually identical for the two specifications.
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The figure shows that the identified balance sheet shocks capture the monetary
policy stance of the Fed over the sample period well. The different phases of QE are,
on average, associated with expansionary UMP shocks. On the other hand, ending
the respective program of QE implies contractionary impulses. This is in line with
the notion that the first two programs were ended despite no major improvement
in economic conditions and financial stability. Nevertheless, there are differences
between the identified UMP shocks over the different phases of QE. While shocks
are overwhelmingly estimated to be positive for QE2 and QE3 (after its enlargement
in December 2012), this is not the case for QE1. The main reasons for this is that
the increase in the balance sheet for QE1 has been less steep than for the other two
programs (see Figure 1.B.2). Hence, the estimated policy reaction function in the
GVAR, which also includes a linear trend, perceives QE1 as less expansionary than
QE2 and QE3. This result has to be borne in mind when comparing our results to
existing evidence on the individual programs.
The financial market risk shock, in contrast, most notably captures the turmoil
associated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Hence, most of the Fed
balance sheet enlargement directly after Lehman is regarded by the model as an
endogenous reaction to the collapse and not an exogenous policy innovation. This
reflects the identification strategy which exactly aims at disentangling an endogenous
reaction to financial market turmoil from expansionary policy.
Figure 1.B.2: Federal Reserve assets by type, 2007–2014
Note: In Million of U.S. dollars. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
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1.C Additional figures
Figure 1.C.1: Responses of Latin America’s variables to U.S. UMP shock – model:
FC






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (LATIN AMERICA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows






Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (LATIN AMERICA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (LATIN AMERICA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change









Response of EQUITY RETURNS (LATIN AMERICA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the depicted variables to a one standard deviation UMP shock in the FC model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.2: Responses of Asia’s variables to U.S. UMP shock – model: FC






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (ASIA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows






Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (ASIA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (ASIA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change









Response of EQUITY RETURNS (ASIA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the depicted variables to a one standard deviation UMP shock in the FC model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.3: Responses of Europe’s variables to U.S. UMP shock – model: FC






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EUROPE)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows








Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EUROPE)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate









Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EUROPE)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change








Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EUROPE)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the depicted variables to a one standard deviation UMP shock in the FC model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.4: Responses of Argentina’s variables to U.S. UMP shock – model: BC






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) real GDP growth






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) portfolio inflows






Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME INCL. ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) real fx change
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the depicted variables to a one standard deviation UMP shock in the BC model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.5: Responses of EME variables (mean including Argentina) to U.S. UMP
shock – model: BC








Response of REAL GDP GROWTH (EME INCL. ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) real GDP growth









Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME INCL. ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) portfolio inflows








Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME INCL. ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME INCL. ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) real fx change
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the depicted variables to a one standard deviation UMP shock in the BC model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.6: Responses of Argentina’s variables to U.S. UMP shock – model: FC






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows






Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change








Response of EQUITY RETURNS (ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the depicted variables to a one standard deviation UMP shock in the FC model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.7: Responses of EME variables (mean including Argentina) to U.S. UMP
shock – model: FC









Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME INCL. ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows








Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME INCL. ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME INCL. ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change






Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME INCL. ARG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the depicted variables to a one standard deviation UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC)
model. Confidence bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation
matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.8: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock – model: FC
with portfolio flows as only cross-country transmission channel






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows






Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate








Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change









Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the depicted variables to a one standard deviation UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC)
model with portfolio flows as the only foreign variable. Confidence bands are based on 500 boot-
strap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.9: Responses of portfolio inflows to the United Kingdom and to Hong
Kong – model: FC








Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (GBR)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows -
United Kingdom






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (HKG)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) portfolio inflows -
Hong Kong
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the depicted variables to a one standard deviation UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC)
model. Confidence bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation
matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.10: Responses of alternative measures of financial conditions






Response of REAL LENDING RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) real lending rate








Response of LONG TERM GOVERNMENT BOND YIELD (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) long-term gov.
bond yield









Response of FX RESERVES GROWTH (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) fx reserve growth
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the depicted variables to a one standard deviation UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC)
model. Confidence bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation
matrix each.
Figure 1.C.11: Responses of U.S. variables to U.S. UMP shock – model: FC, coun-
terfactural exercise with restriction to portfolio flows









Response of REAL GDP GROWTH (USA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) real GDP growth








Response of INFLATION (USA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) inflation rate









Response of FBS (USA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) Fed balance sheet







Response of VIX (USA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) VIX








Response of US PORTFOLIO OUTFLOWS (USA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(e) portfolio outflows
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses (blue solid line) and the 68 percent confi-
dence bands (red dashed line) of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions
(FC) model of the depicted variables to a one standard deviation UMP shock in the financial
conditions (FC) model, along with the corresponding impulse responses in the same model where
the transmission through capital flows is counterfactually turned off (green dash-dotted line, see
Section 1.3.5).
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Figure 1.C.12: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: BC
with GDP as only foreign variable









Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows







Response of REAL GDP GROWTH (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real GDP growth








Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real interest rate







Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) real fx change
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the business cycle (BC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.13: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: BC
model with portfolio flows as only foreign variable









Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows







Response of REAL GDP GROWTH (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real GDP growth






Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real interest rate








Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) real fx change
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the business cycle (BC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.14: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC
with portfolio flows as only foreign variable






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows






Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate








Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change









Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.15: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC
with portfolio flows and foreign interest rates as foreign variables







Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows






Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change








Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.16: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC
with portfolio flows and foreign lending rates as foreign variables






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows







Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate








Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change








Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.17: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC
with portfolio flows and foreign equity returns as foreign variables






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows









Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change









Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.18: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC
with lending rate






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows






Response of REAL LENDING RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real lending rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change









Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.19: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC
with long term government bond yields






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows








Response of LONG TERM GOVERNMENT BOND YIELD (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) long-term govern-
ment bond yields






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change









Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.20: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC,
fx reserves as monetary policy instrument in EMEs









Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows









Response of FX RESERVES GROWTH (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) fx reserves growth






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change








Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.21: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC,
U.S. portfolio outflows ordered before monetary policy variables








Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows









Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change









Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.22: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC,
Argentina is dropped from the estimation









Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows









Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate








Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx chagne









Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.23: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC,
alternative lag length









Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows









Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx chagne








Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.24: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC,
post-Lehman sample









Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows






Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real fx change






Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.25: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC,
commodity price inflation & portfolio flows as transmission channels






Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows






Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) real interest rate






Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real ifx change






Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.26: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC,
equity and bond flows








Response of EQUITY INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) equity inflows








Response of BOND INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) bond inflows









Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(c) real interest rate








Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(d) real fx change









Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(e) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
Figure 1.C.27: Responses of EME variables (mean) to U.S. UMP shock - model: FC,
shadow federal funds rate as monetary policy instrument in the U.S.











Response of PORTFOLIO INFLOWS (EME)
 to shock to MP (USA)
(a) portfolio inflows










Response of REAL INTEREST RATE (EME)
 to shock to MP (USA)
(b) real interest rate











Response of REAL FX CHANGE (EME)
 to shock to MP (USA)
(c) real fx change










Response of EQUITY RETURNS (EME)
 to shock to MP (USA)
(d) equity returns
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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Figure 1.C.28: Responses of U.S. equity returns and U.S. REER to U.S. UMP shock







Response of US EQUITY RETURNS (USA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(a) US equity returns






Response of US REER (USA)
 to shock to UMP (USA)
(b) U.S. reer
Note: The figure shows the estimated mean impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence
bands, of the EME variables to the UMP shock in the financial conditions (FC) model. Confidence
bands are based on 500 bootstrap replications with 1000 draws of the rotation matrix each.
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1.D Additional tables
Table 1.D.1: Panel unit root tests
t-stat critical values Type Det
(1% / 5% / 10%)
IP -3.84 -2.73 / -2.63 / -2.56 2 3
D(IP) -11.35 -2.24 / -2.13 / -2.06 2 2
Real GDP -1.77 -2.73 / -2.63 / -2.56 2 3
D(Real GDP) -5.59 -2.25 / -2.13 / -2.06 2 2
CPI -1.98 -2.73 / -2.63 / -2.56 2 3
D(CPI) -8.21 -2.25 / -2.13 / -2.06 2 2
Portfolio Inflows -8.01 -2.25 / -2.13 / -2.06 2 2
D(Portfolio Inflows ) -8.11 -1.70 / -1.56 / -1.47 2 1
U.S. Portfolio Outflows -6.14 -3.52 / -2.90 / -2.58 0 2
D(U.S. Portfolio Outflows) -11.25 -2.58 / -1.95 / -1.62 0 1
VIX -2.62 -3.52 / -2.90 / -2.58 0 2
D(VIX) -8.39 -2.60 / -1.95 / -1.62 0 1
Fed Balance Sheet -3.74 -4.09 / -3.47 / -3.17 0 3
D(Fed Balance Sheet) -1.79 -3.54 / -2.90 / -2.59 0 2
Real Interest Rate -8.09 -2.25 / -2.13 / -2.05 2 2
D(Real Interest Rate ) -14.90 -1.70 / -1.56 / -1.47 2 1
Equity Price Index -2.49 -2.73 / -2.63 / -2.56 2 3
D(Equity Price Index) -10.01 -2.25 / -2.13 / -2.06 2 2
Real FX -2.10 -2.25 / -2.13 / -2.06 2 2
D(Real FX) -12.05 -1.70 / -1.56 / -1.47 2 1
Type: Type of panel unit root test,
2 = P-CEA test controlling for cross-section dependence of errors,
1 = IPS test under the assumption of no cross-section dependence,
0 = simple ADF test for cross-section invariant data.
Det: Deterministics case for the test regression,





Foreign Currency Exposure and the Financial Chan-
nel of Exchange Rates1
2.1 Introduction
The onset of the Global Financial Crisis, the implementation of extraordinarily ex-
pansionary monetary policies across the world and the recent monetary tightening
in the U.S. have renewed the interest in the effects of global and foreign shocks in
small open economies (SOEs). One important international transmission mecha-
nism of such shocks are USD exchange rate fluctuations (Iacoviello and Navarro,
2019; Ben Zeev, 2019). But, how do exchange rate movements affect macroeco-
nomic and financial conditions? Exchange rate movements can affect the economy
through exports and imports (the trade channel) and through valuation effects of
assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency (the financial channel). It has
been conventional wisdom in international macroeconomics that a domestic appre-
ciation has contractionary effects on the economy due to a decrease in net exports,
other things being equal.2 However, because of the ever higher degree of financial
1I thank Kerstin Bernoth, Flora Budianto, Vesna Corbo, Jordi Galí, Georgios Georgiadis, Michael
Hachula, Martín Harding, Mathias Klein, Stefan Laséen, Jesper Lindé, Helmut Lütkepohl, Dieter
Nautz, Annukka Ristiniemi, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, Frank Schorfheide, Ingvar Strid, Mathias
Trabandt, Martín Uribe, Karl Walentin, Lars Winkelmann and seminar participants at Freie
Universität Berlin, at DIW Berlin, at the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Banque de France, at the
Bank of England, at the Bank of Latvia, at WU Wien and participants at the 4th Berlin Internal
Macroeconomics Workshop for their helpful comments and suggestions.
2Under certain conditions, a domestic appreciation can also be expansionary in the absence of the
financial channel. See Section 2.3.
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integration,3 foreign currency exposure has gained more attention (Bénétrix et al.,
2015), and therefore the relevance of exchange rate movements operating through
the financial channel has increased (Bruno and Shin, 2015b; Hofmann et al., 2017).
Crucially, the financial channel can potentially work in the opposite direction of the
trade channel (Avdjiev et al., 2019), since it operates through the liability side of a
country’s external balance sheet. Thus, under foreign currency exposure, a domestic
appreciation decreases the value of liabilities relative to assets. This strengthens the
external balance sheet, which loosens financial conditions and ultimately stimulates
investment and GDP (Avdjiev et al., 2019).4
The aim of this paper is to empirically assess the macroeconomic and financial
effects of USD exchange rate movements in small open economies (SOEs).5 In par-
ticular, I study how the financial channel affects the overall impact of exchange rate
fluctuations, under which conditions it dominates the trade channel, and to what
extent foreign currency exposure – i.e. liabilities denominated in USD – determines
its strength. After showing the effects of the financial channel, I evaluate whether
it amplifies or dampens the effects of foreign monetary policy shocks. I structure
the analysis to answer the following consecutive research questions: (i) What are
the overall macroeconomic and financial effects of USD exchange rate movements in
SOEs? (ii) Under which conditions does the financial channel dominate the trade
channel? (iii) What are the financial channel’s implications for the propagation of
foreign monetary policy shocks into a SOE? I focus on the USD exchange rate since
it is by far the most important currency in international trade and finance, that is
why it is well suited to capture effects working through trade and financial market
relations. To answer the questions, I propose a new identification scheme for USD
exchange rate shocks to individual SOEs and use Local Projections - Instrumental
Variable (henceforth LP-IV) methods. Furthermore, to obtain a structural inter-
pretation of the empirical findings and be able to analyze the trade and financial
3For details, see Figure 2.3.1 in Section 2.3, which shows the rise of financial openness over the
past two decades, defined as the sum of assets and liabilities in foreign currency as a percent of
GDP.
4See Section 2.3 for details.
5The small open economies in my sample are: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa,
Thailand, and Turkey.
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channels in detail, I estimate a small open economy New Keynesian model with
financial frictions and currency mismatch in the banks’ balance sheets.
Exchange rate movements are highly endogenous to macroeconomic conditions,
therefore it is challenging to empirically assess their effects. To deal with this prob-
lem, I construct an external instrument and identify exchange rate shocks that are
specifically related to the USD exchange rate and are exogenous to the set of SOEs
in my sample. The shocks that I identify can be interpreted as changes in the bi-
lateral USD exchange rate unrelated to individual SOEs’ fundamentals or global
driving forces, or as exogenous foreign asset demand shocks, or as financial shocks
affecting foreign exchange market (Engel, 2014; Itskhoki and Mukhin, 2017). In con-
trast to the existing literature (Iacoviello and Navarro, 2019; Ben Zeev, 2019), this
identification scheme allows me to study how exchange rates - through the financial
and trade channels - affect the economy independently from the effects than could
arise from exchange rate movements due to monetary policy or global credit supply
shocks.
I proceed as follows. I consider the effective exchange rate of the USD against a
basket of currencies of other advanced economies (like the Euro Area, UK, Japan,
among others). This series should be unrelated to the fundamentals of the SOEs in
my sample for two reasons. First, the exchange rates of these SOEs are not used to
construct the USD exchange rate against major currencies. Second, under the small
open economy assumption, the countries in my sample are too small to influence this
exchange rate. I regress this series on interest rate differentials, as in the uncovered
interest rate parity (UIP) condition, on macroeconomic variables of the countries
in the basket of currencies, and on global driving forces affecting the currencies
and macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. and in the other advanced economies.
The resulting residuals are orthogonal to those fundamentals and hence represent
shocks to the UIP condition between the U.S. and other major economies (U.S.
risk premium shocks).6 These UIP shocks are often used in the DSGE literature
to proxy exchange rate shocks (see, e.g. Kollmann, 2005). I then use the residual
series as an external instrument in a panel LP-IV setting. Having identified the UIP
shock, I study how exogenous USD exchange rate movements unrelated to SOEs’
fundamentals and global conditions affect real and financial variables in SOEs.
6Note that I use the terms UIP shock and risk premium shock interchangeably.
61
Chapter 2. Foreign Currency Exposure and the Financial Channel of Exchange Rates
The empirical analysis reveals the following results. For a panel of SOEs, I find
that a domestic appreciation against the USD increases real GDP and loosens fi-
nancial conditions in SOEs. This finding indicates the importance of the financial
channel. The appreciation goes hand-in-hand with a rise in domestic real invest-
ment, equity prices, credit and cross-border bank flows. Moreover, the increase in
real GDP occurs despite a deterioration of the trade balance consistent with the
trade channel. To examine the determinants of this result, I assess the sensitivity of
the baseline results to several indicators that reflect the intensity of international fi-
nancial linkages and international trade. First, I analyze whether the results depend
on foreign currency exposure, measured by the amount of liabilities denominated in
USD as percent of GDP. I find that in countries with relatively high liabilities in
USD (e.g. Brazil, Colombia, or the Philippines), the financial channel dominates,
as the domestic appreciation against the USD leads to an increase of real GDP, real
investment, real consumption, and to a loosening of financial conditions, despite the
decrease in net exports. By contrast, in countries with relatively low liabilities in
USD (e.g. Poland, Hungary or India), the appreciation is contractionary, as im-
plied by the trade channel. Further, I investigate whether the results depend on
the amount of foreign assets denominated in USD, or on variables that should in-
dicate the strength of the trade channel, such as trade openness and the amount of
trade with the U.S. I do not find evidence that any of these characteristics affect the
transmission channel of exchange rates. Summing up, for my sample of SOEs, I find
that an appreciation can be expansionary due to the financial channel of exchange
rates, whose strength is determined by exposure to USD liabilities.
Next, I estimate an open economy New Keynesian model with financial frictions,
in which a fraction of the domestic banks’ debt is denominated in USD, similar to
Aoki et al. (2016), Mimir and Sunel (2019) and Akinci and Queralto (2018). As it is
the case in standard open economy DSGE models, fluctuations in the exchange rate
have an effect on the trade balance, as relative prices of exports and imports change.
However, in my model, exchange rate fluctuations also affect the banks’ balance
sheets as their assets are denominated in domestic currency and their liabilities
are denominated in part in USD. Thus, an appreciation of the domestic currency
reduces the value of foreign currency exposure, strengthening borrowers’ balance
sheets, which in turn exerts upward pressure on the value of the local currency.
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This feature of the model allows a careful analysis of the effects of exchange rate
movements through the financial channel. Since the model accounts for both a trade
and a financial channel, I can study to what extent exposure to USD liabilities and
trade openness determine the relative strength of the channels. Finally, with the
estimated open economy New Keynesian model at hand, I also investigate how the
financial channel of exchange rates affect the transmission of foreign monetary policy
shocks.
For the estimation of the model I use Brazilian (high exposure to USD liabilities
and relatively low trade openness) and Polish data (low exposure to USD liabilities
and high trade openness).7 I then analyze the effects of a UIP risk-premium shock.
In line with the empirical results, I find that the level of foreign currency exposure
is an important determinant of the strength of the financial channel. However, in
contrast to the LP-IV analysis, the estimated DSGE models for Brazil and Poland
indicate that the trade channel, trough trade openness, also determines whether an
appreciation is expansionary or contractionary. Specifically, I show that a shock
to the UIP condition, which induces a domestic appreciation against the USD, is
expansionary in Brazil. However, if Brazil would become more open to trade, the
expansionary effects of the appreciation become weaker, and eventually disappear.
By contrast, the appreciation against the USD is contractionary in Poland. However,
if Poland’s exposure to USD liabilities increases sufficiently, the result flips and the
appreciation becomes expansionary. Thus, the model based analysis suggests that
it is the interaction between the financial and trade channels that determines the
effects of exchange rate appreciations in SOEs. Finally, I also find that the foreign
currency exposure and the financial channel amplify the effects of foreign monetary
policy, in line with the results of Iacoviello and Navarro (2019).
The results from the LP-IV and the New Keynesian model estimation indicate
that the financial channel can potentially challenge the conventional wisdom about
the effects of a domestic appreciation, which is solely based on the relationship be-
tween exchange rates and the trade balance. The resulting decrease in net exports
does not necessarily lead to a macroeconomic contraction, since – under foreign
7Earlier versions of this paper contained results for Hungarian data. However, due to significant
inconsistencies in the data for Hungary’s debt and liabilities in USD (see below), the current
version contains the results for Poland. Note that the conclusions I draw from the estimation
with Polish data are identical to those I draw from the estimation with Hungarian data.
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currency exposure – financial conditions loosen, and investment and real GDP may
increase. The level of liabilities denominated in USD is an important factor driv-
ing these results: the higher foreign currency exposure is, the stronger the financial
channel. My findings have several implications. First, it is necessary to consider
the level of foreign currency exposure and thus the strength of the financial channel
to understand the effect of exchange rate movements. Second, the financial chan-
nel has strong effects on domestic financial conditions and potentially amplifies the
effects of foreign shocks. Since policy-markers are often concerned with financial
stability and the transmission of foreign shocks, they need to consider the financial
channel in order to design and implement policies aimed at ensuring the stability
of the domestic financial system and dampening the effects of foreign shocks. Fi-
nally, as documented by other studies (e.g. Aoki et al., 2016; Mimir and Sunel,
2019), the financial channel and its effects potentially justify the implementation
of active macroprudential policies to manage the effects arising from the interac-
tion between USD exchange rate fluctuations, foreign currency debt and domestic
financial conditions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I review the
related literature. In Section 2.3, I describe the channels through which exchange
rate movements affect macroeconomic conditions. Section 2.4 contains a descrip-
tion of the data, the construction of the external instrument that I use to identify
exogenous exchange rate movements and the results from the LP-IVs. Section 2.5
describes the New Keynesian model setup, its estimation and the results drawn from
this analysis. The last section concludes.
2.2 Related literature
My work is related to different strands of the existing literature. Naturally, it relates
to papers that also study the effects of exchange rate movements on macroeconomic
and financial conditions using SVARs (see e.g. Choudhri et al., 2005; Farrant and
Peersman, 2006; Kim and Ying, 2007; Fratzscher et al., 2010; Forbes et al., 2018,
Corbo and Di Casola, 2018). These studies, however, use Choleski decomposition
or sign restrictions to identify exogenous exchange rate shocks. Just by ordering the
exchange rate last, however, a Choleski decomposition offers no assurance that the
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exchange rate shock is indeed unrelated to other fundamentals, possibly not captured
in the VAR. Sign restrictions, on the other hand, are often not satisfying as, for
instance, monetary policy shocks and exchange rate shocks could theoretically imply
the same sign pattern on standard variables in the VAR. My identification strategy,
in contrast, relies on an external instrument that is unrelated to the fundamentals
of the SOEs in my sample and to common driving forces.
A similar approach is used in a recent study by Lane and Stracca (2017). They
study the effects of exchange rate movements on macroeconomic conditions in Euro
area counties, mainly focusing on the trade channel. To identify the exogenous
movements in the exchange rate in individual countries, they use Euro area-wide
effective exchange rate as an external instrument. My paper, in contrast, focuses
on SOEs outside the euro area and not only on macroeconomic effects, but also
on financial variables that affect shock transmission through the external balance
sheet of countries. Further, my paper is also related to the body of work studying
the effects of exchange rate movements through the trade channel. Surveys of this
extensive literature can be found in Auboin and Ruta (2012) or Leigh et al. (2017).
The models I employ to answer my research questions offer an overall assessment
of the effects of currency movements on macroeconomic and financial conditions,
hence my paper directly connects to the recent and fast growing literature on the
financial channel. Georgiadis and Mehl (2016), for instance, find that the impact
of an expansionary domestic monetary policy shock is amplified in countries with
large net long foreign currency exposure. This is so because a monetary loosening
triggers a depreciation of the domestic exchange rate, which in turn strengthens the
external balance sheets of such countries. Bruno and Shin (2015b) and Hofmann
et al. (2017) show theoretically that if a valuation mismatch in private sector bal-
ance sheets in emerging market economies (EMEs) exists, movements in the bilateral
USD exchange rate can affect financial conditions in EMEs, and thus real variables.
They refer to this as the ’risk-taking channel’ of exchange rate appreciation. Hof-
mann et al. (2017) and Bruno and Shin (2015b) find some empirical evidence for this
channel with cross-country panel regression and a Choleski identified VAR. Specifi-
cally, Hofmann et al. (2017) show that a currency appreciation against the USD is
on average associated with a compression of EMEs’ sovereign bond yields and larger
portfolio inflows into EMEs. I extend their research by applying a comprehensive
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model that allows to capture the effects of both, the trade and financial channels,
and by identifying (exogenous) exchange rate movements in a more compelling way
than a Choleski decomposition. Related to these studies, Avdjiev et al. (2019) study
the effects of movements in the USD exchange rate on cross-border banking flows
and investment. They conduct this analysis using, again, a Cholesky identified panel
SVAR and panel regressions. Iacoviello and Navarro (2019) and Ben Zeev (2019)
also study the trade and financial channels, but in contrast to my study, they in-
vestigate the effects of a U.S. monetary policy shock and a global liquidity shock,
respectively. Also, Bernoth and Herwartz (2019) study the effects of exchange rate
movements on sovereign risk in EMEs, and find that a depreciation of the domestic
currency against the USD increases sovereign risk. Moreover, they show evidence
showing that foreign currency exposure is a key determinant for the size of the fall
in risk. Further, my work is related to the global financial cycle and on international
spillovers of U.S. monetary policy, for instance Rey (2016), Miranda-Agrippino and
Rey (2015), Bruno and Shin (2015a), Georgiadis (2015b), and Anaya et al. (2017),
among others.
Moreover, my paper broadly relates to an extensive body of work on open economy
New Keynesian models (Galí and Monacelli, 2005, Farhi and Werning, 2014, among
others), and on their estimation (Adolfson et al., 2007, Justiniano and Preston,
2010). My DSGE model extends recent work by Aoki et al. (2016), Akinci and
Queralto (2018), and Mimir and Sunel (2019), who study the effects of foreign shocks
and the implementation of optimal policy responses in a calibrated open economy
DSGE setting with currency mismatch in the bank’s liabilities. Furthermore, my
paper also relates to Copaciu et al. (2015), who develop and estimate a model for
the Romanian economy where part of the debt is denominated in euro, and to
Gourinchas (2018) who develops and estimates a model for the Chilean economy
and assesses the role of trade and financial openness in the transmission of foreign
shocks. Finally, this paper is also related to Dalgic (2018), who uses an open economy
DSGE model to investigate the role of households’ savings in foreign currency on as
an insurance arrangement.
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2.3 The trade and financial channel of exchange rate move-
ments
To answer this paper’s research questions, first it is necessary to explain the mecha-
nisms through which the financial and trade channels affect the economy, and what
are their effects on macroeconomic and financial variables.
2.3.1 The trade channel
The trade channel, or expenditure switching channel, reflects the relationship be-
tween exchange rate fluctuations and the trade balance. This channel is the key
transmission mechanism of exchange rates in frameworks such as, e.g. the Mundell-
Fleming model and open economy New Keynesian models. Consider, for example,
a deviation from the UIP condition that causes the domestic exchange rate to ap-
preciate. This raises the price of exports while it decreases the price of imports. If
the Marshall-Lerner condition holds,8 the appreciation leads to demand substitution
away from domestic goods towards foreign goods, thus lowering the trade balance
and GDP. 9
2.3.2 The financial channel
The so-called financial channel has become more relevant over time, as global finan-
cial integration has increased. Figure 2.3.1 shows the evolution of financial and trade
openness, defined as foreign liabilities and assets over GDP, and exports and im-
ports over GDP, respectively, for a broad group of advanced economies and EMEs.10
Panel (a) shows that trade openness has increased in the past three decades, how-
8The Marshall-Lerner condition states that an exchange rate appreciation deteriorates the balance
of trade if the absolute sum of the long-term export and import demand elasticities is greater
than one.
9However, as highlighted by Lane and Stracca (2017), an appreciation of the exchange rate can also
be expansionary through the trade channel if the following effects dominate the decrease in net
exports. The appreciation (1) lowers the price of imported intermediaries sufficiently much such
that the production of tradables is considerably less expensive, which in turns increases overall net
exports, and (2) consumption rises significantly due to overall lower price of imports. Generally
speaking, the trade channel suggests that an appreciation of the exchange rate is contractionary
(see Iacoviello and Navarro, 2019; Ben Zeev, 2019).
10For details on the construction of the data, see BIS (2017).
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ever, financial openness has outpaced trade, and roughly tripled since 1990. This
development is shown in Figure 2.3.1b. The ratio of financial openness to trade
openness has more than doubled from 1995 to 2015. This hints to the potentially
rising relevance of the financial channel.
Figure 2.3.1: Financial and Trade Openness
(a) Financial and Trade Openness

































(b) Ratio Financial Openness to Trade
Openness













Note: Panel (a) shows financial openness (red line, defined as foreign liabilities + assets as a percent
of GDP, with the value in 1960 = 100) and trade openness (blue line, defined as exports + imports
as a percent of GDP, with the value in 1960 = 100) for a broad group of advanced economies and
emerging market economies. Panel (b) shows the ratio of financial openness to trade openness.
Source: Own elaboration with data from the BIS. For details see BIS (2017).
Moreover, after the Asian financial crisis, EMEs started to increase their net for-
eign currency positions by accumulating foreign exchange reserves through current
account surpluses and a shift from debt liabilities to equity-type liabilities (Lane
and Shambaugh, 2010; Hausmann and Panizza, 2011; Bénétrix et al., 2015). This
improvement in the net currency exposure masks heterogeneity across sectors in the
economy (Avdjiev et al., 2015). While governments and central banks in EMEs have
increasingly accumulated foreign exchange reserves, the private sector can still be
a large debtor in foreign currency, in particular in USD.11 This USD-denominated
debt is often backed by assets and cash-flows in local currency, creating a valuation
mismatch on corporate balance sheets.12 These developments have not only been
confined to EMEs. Assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency have also
11The stock of USD-denominated debt of non-banks in EMEs was estimated to be $ 3.3 trillion as
of March 2015 (McCauley, McGuire and Sushko, 2015).
12A comprehensive discussion of valuation mismatches in EMEs’ corporate balance sheets can be
found in Avdjiev et al. (2015).
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increased in countries like Canada, Sweden, South Korea and others (Bénétrix et al.,
2020). However, as Kearns and Patel (2016) argue, EMEs are particularly vulnera-
ble to adverse effects arising from currency mismatch in their external balance sheets
due to their relatively less developed financial systems and the consequent tendency
to have unhedged foreign currency debt.13
The financial channel captures the idea that exchange rate fluctuations affect
macroeconomic and financial conditions also through valuation effects in a coun-
try’s external balance sheet. Thus, the currency denominations of the assets and
liabilities in the external balance sheet and possible currency mismatches determine
whether, for instance, an appreciation of the domestic exchange rate is potentially
expansionary or contractionary through this channel.
Avdjiev et al. (2019) argue that the key empirical regularity behind the financial
channel is that an appreciation of a country’s currency against the USD is associated
with an increase of borrowing denominated in USD in that country. Thus, Avdjiev
et al. (2019) indicate that the financial channel mainly operates through the liability
side of the balance sheet of domestic borrowers. Therefore, if a country has (net)
foreign currency exposure, specially in USD, an exchange rate appreciation against
the USD can potentially be expansionary, as the value of liabilities decreases relative
to the (in domestic currency denominated) assets.
Moreover, there are two ways in which the financial channel – working through
the liabilities in the external balance sheet – affects the impact of exchange rate
fluctuations: via supply and demand for USD (Avdjiev et al., 2019). On the supply
side, Bruno and Shin (2015b), and Hofmann et al. (2017) suggest that an appreci-
ation of the local currency against the USD affects financial conditions by making
borrowers’ balance sheets look stronger and thus by increasing their creditworthi-
ness. In turn, the willingness of foreign creditors to extend credit increases for any
given exposure limit,14 which raises capital and banking inflows and subsequently
credit supply. This mechanism is what Hofmann et al. (2017) call the ’risk taking
channel’ of currency appreciation. On the demand side, Avdjiev et al. (2019) point
13Moreover, due to the same reason, EMEs may be more dependent on foreign funds. Chapter 3
in this dissertation deals with this latter issue.
14Such exposure limits can be associated with value-at-risk constraints in the (global) banking
sector (Bruno and Shin, 2015b) or if fund investments of asset managers with a global reach
fluctuate with recent market conditions (see Hofmann et al., 2017).
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out that a domestic borrower who had borrowed in USD, will see her balance sheet
strengthen as the domestic currency appreciates and the USD depreciates.15 In any
case, the financial channel - working through the liabilities - implies that an ex-
change rate appreciation against the USD increases capital and banking flows, and
loosens financial conditions, which stimulates investment and GDP.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that a domestic appreciation can also be
contractionary through the financial channel. This would be the case if a coun-
try’s assets are denominated in USD, and its liabilities mostly denominated in do-
mestic currency. An appreciation of the home currency against the dollar would
trigger a relative decrease in the value of the assets, and thus financial conditions
worsen, which reinforces the contractionary trade-channel (Georgiadis and Mehl,
2016). However, Kearns and Patel (2016) argue that the valuation effects on the
liabilities side have a larger impact on the economy in EMEs, since assets in USD
are held by long-term investors, such as foreign exchange reserve managers, pension
funds and central banks. Thus, valuation changes in assets are likely to lead to
smaller changes in spending and, consequently, exposure to USD liabilities may be
the main determinant of the financial channel’s strength.
2.4 Data, identification strategy and results
2.4.1 Data on exchange rates, macroeconomic and financial conditions
The data set that I use consists of quarterly data, covering 17 SOEs from 1998 - 2019.
The panel for the empirical analysis in unbalanced. The countries in my sample
resemble the sample of many studies on EMEs (see, for instance, Aizenman et al.,
2016) and contains the following EMEs and other SOEs: Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Peru, the
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey. For the LP-IV
analysis, I use times series for real GDP, real private consumption, real gross fixed
capital formation, trade balance as a percentage of GDP, equity prices (MSCI equity
15Avdjiev et al. (2019) also argue that, even an exporting firm whose receivables are in USD
and obligations in domestic currency would incur in USD liabilities if the USD is expected to
depreciate more, in order to hedge further currency risks. This would lead to the same outcome
as explained above.
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price index), credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, the nominal policy
interest rate, the consumer price index, and the VIX. I also use the gross cross-border
banking data of the Bank for International Settlemests’ (BIS), and the shadow
Federal Funds Rate by Wu and Xia (2016).16 All series are seasonally adjusted.
Furthermore, I use the data on the amount of assets and liabilities in USD (as
percent of GDP) by Bénétrix et al. (2015) and by Bénétrix et al. (2020).17 I also
use the financial vulnerability index and data on the trade intensity with the U.S.
constructed by Iacoviello and Navarro (2019).
To construct the instrument for the exogenous exchange rate movements I use the
USD effective exchange rate against major economies,18 the VIX and time series for
real GDP, consumer price index, policy interest rate of the U.S. and the other eight
other major economies, as well as equity price indices and a commodity price index.
For the period of the zero lower bound, I use shadow rates for all the countries for
which the data are publicly available.19
2.4.2 An instrument to identify exogenous exchange rate movements
Since the focus of this paper is on USD exchange rate fluctuations against SOEs’
currencies, I need an instrument to identify exogenous exchange rate movements
specific to the USD. Besides fulfilling the LP-IV conditions discussed below (Stock
and Watson, 2018), such an instrument needs to be in line with certain economic
considerations in order to be useful for the empirical analysis. First, the instrument
should move the USD exchange rate against all currencies in the sample, and there-
fore represent an overall appreciation or depreciation of the USD against all the
16The details on the data and the sources are on Table 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A.
17The data by Bénétrix et al. (2020) end in 2017. Thus I use the last value of assets and liabilities
in 2017 for the rest of my sample. One exception is the data for Hungary. Due to the large
discrepancies between Bénétrix et al. (2020) and Bénétrix et al. (2015) in the estimation of
liabilities in USD for Hungary, in this case I use the data estimated by Bénétrix et al. (2015),
which end in 2013. I use the value of 2013 for the rest of the sample.
18The major currencies index includes the Euro Area, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Switzer-
land, Australia, and Sweden.
19As mentioned above, for the U.S. I use the shadow FFR by Wu and Xia (2016). Moreover, for
the Euroarea and the U.K., I use the shadow rate by Xia and Wu (2018), and for Japan I use
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SOEs’ currencies. Second, the instrument should be exogenous to each single SOE’s
fundamentals; and third, in order to have a shock specific to the USD exchange rate,
the instrument should also be exogenous to U.S. fundamentals.
Two candidate instruments for SOEs’ USD exchange rate shocks arise after these
considerations: shocks to the UIP condition of the U.S., and U.S. monetary policy
shocks, i.e. changes in the U.S. monetary policy stance unexplained by the Fed’s
systematic response to economic (and financial) conditions. There are several rea-
sons why these instruments are well suited to proxy exogenous USD exchange rate
fluctuations in SOE. On the one hand, there is empirical evidence showing that risk
premium shocks to the UIP condition explain the lion’s share of the exchange rate
variance of the USD against several major currencies (Balakrishnan et al., 2016).
Moreover, these shocks also account for a large share of the variation in the real
and nominal exchange rates in calibrated and estimated DSGE models (Kollmann,
2002, 2005; Adolfson et al., 2007; Copaciu et al., 2015; Mimir and Sunel, 2019). Fi-
nally, it has been shown that introducing these shocks in DSGE models is important
to account for the volatility and persistence of exchange rate fluctuations observed
empirically (Engel, 2014; Adolfson et al., 2007). On the other hand, U.S. monetary
policy shocks can also be used, since, for example, a monetary loosening in the U.S.
would cause an overall depreciation of the USD, other things being equal. Moreover,
monetary policy surprises are also seen as important drivers of the exchange rate
and have been widely used to study exchange rate movements (Engel, 2014).
In my analysis I focus on risk premium shocks to the U.S. UIP condition as the
instrument for shocks to the SOEs’ exchange rate for the following three reasons.
First, the literature on open economy DSGE models uses shocks to the UIP condition
as proxies for exchange rate shocks.20 These can be interpreted as exogenous foreign
asset demand shocks, financial shocks affecting foreign exchange market (Engel,
2014; Itskhoki and Mukhin, 2017), or as reflecting a bias in the economic agents’
forecast about future exchange rates (Kollmann, 2005). Moreover, in Section 2.5,
I use a DSGE model to further study the channel of transmission of exchange rate
movements proxied by shocks to the UIP condition. Thus I use U.S. UIP shocks in
the LP-IV analysis to ensure that the results are consistent with those in Section
20The literature also interprets UIP shocks as shocks to capital flows, see for instance Farhi and
Werning (2014).
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2.5. Second, since I am mainly interested in the effects of USD exchange rate
fluctuation on macroeconomic variables in SOEs and because of the financial nature
of UIP shocks, they should not have a first order effect on real variables in the
SOE in my sample. Third, a U.S. monetary policy shock may produce misleading
results because U.S. monetary policy may not only affect foreign economies through
changes in the USD exchange rate, but also through a change in U.S. demand for
non U.S. goods and services. Changes in U.S. import demand can have a direct
impact on the trade balance of single SOEs.21 Moreover, the interpretation of the
resulting exchange rate appreciation against the USD would not be the same, since
using U.S. monetary policy shocks as an instrument, I would be identifying the
effects of U.S. monetary policy in SOEs working through exchange rate fluctuations.
Furthermore, as I will discuss below, the UIP shocks series proves to be a better
instrument for exchange rate shocks in SOEs than U.S. monetary policy shocks,
since the F-statistics in its first-stage regression is higher than the one in the first-
stage regression using U.S. monetary policy shocks. Summing up, using the UIP
shock series as an instrument for USD exchange rate shocks in SOEs allows me to
isolate the effects of USD fluctuations from those arising from changes in demand
and foreign prices. This is necessary to identify and isolate the channels through
which exchange rate fluctuations work.
2.4.2.1 A shock to the U.S. UIP condition
In order to have an instrument that can be used to estimate dynamic causal effects
in a LP-IV setting, the instrument ηt must satisfy the following LP-IV conditions
(Stock and Watson, 2018):
(i) E(1,tη′t) 6= 0 (relevance);
(ii) E(2:n,tη′t) = 0 (contemporaneous exogeneity);
(iii) E(t+jη′t) = 0 for j 6= 0 (lead-lag exogeneity);
where 1,t is the structural shock to be identified and 2:n,t are all other structural
shocks. The relevance condition states that the instrument should be correlated
with the structural shock to be identified. Thus, the U.S. UIP shock, which will
21However, in a later section, I study to which extent the financial channel affects the transmission
of foreign monetary and demand shocks.
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be used as an instrument, should be correlated with the exchange rate shock in
SOEs. To construct the UIP shock specific to the USD, I use the USD exchange
rate against a basket of major currencies. This series is useful because there is a
(fairly) high correlation between the effective exchange rate of the USD against ma-
jor currencies and the exchange rates of the SOEs in my sample, ranging between
0.14 and 0.94, and averaging 0.53.22 Moreover, Figure 2.4.1 presents the standard-
ized SOEs’ exchange rates against the USD (gray lines), and the USD exchange rate
against major currencies (black line). These exchange rates co-move considerably,
as large depreciations of the USD exchange rate against major economies coincide
with appreciations of the SOEs’ currencies. The co-movement is especially visible
during and after the global financial crisis in 2008. Therefore, exogenous movements
to the USD exchange rate against major currencies can also potentially drive indi-
vidual SOEs’ USD exchange rates. In fact, as I will show later, shocks derived from
the U.S. UIP condition against major currencies are a valid instrument for SOEs’
exchange rate shocks, as the F-statistic is well above 10.
Figure 2.4.1: USD Exchange Rates









↑ Appreciation SOEs ↑ Depreciation USD
Note: The figure shows the standardized monthly nominal effective exchange rate of the USD
against major currencies (black line), and the standardized monthly individual exchange rates
against the USD of the 17 countries in the sample (gray lines).
22Table 2.C.1 in Appendix 2.C shows the correlation coefficients.
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Moreover, condition (ii), contemporaneous exogeneity, states that the instrument
should be contemporaneously unrelated to all other shocks. In my application this
condition is satisfied. On the one hand, to estimate the U.S. risk premium shocks, I
use a broad index of currencies and not a bilateral one, say the EUR-USD exchange
rate, to make sure that the instrument is specifically related to the USD and not
to another currency. Further, I use only major currencies of advanced economies
and not an even broader index to minimize the likelihood that the instrument is
related to some of the SOEs’ fundamentals. Since the currencies of the SOEs in my
sample are not used to construct the USD exchange rate against major currencies
and assuming that the SOEs in my sample are too small to influence this exchange
rate, the constructed UIP shocks are unrelated to SOEs’ fundamentals.
On the other hand, as I will explain in detail below, I control for economic and
financial conditions in the U.S. and the other major economies, as well as for global
conditions. I do so by including interest rates, macroeconomic fundamentals, and
financial variables into the estimation of the U.S. risk premium shocks. Thus, these
UIP shocks are uncorrelated with other U.S. specific shocks, to shocks specific to
the major economies and to global conditions, and therefore satisfy condition (ii).
Finally, condition (iii), lead-lag exogeneity, arises from dynamics and requires that
the instrument should be exogenous to past realizations of  and that the instrument
should not be correlated to future shocks. To maximize the likelihood that LP-IV
condition (iii) is satisfied, I follow Stock and Watson (2018) and include relevant
controls in the estimation of the impulse responses using LP-IV.
To estimate the USD risk-premium shock, I start with the risk-premium aug-
mented UIP condition as in Balakrishnan et al. (2016):
Ete
us
t+k − eust = β(iust,t+k − ict,t+k) + (rpust − rpct) (2.1)
where eust is the USD exchange rate against major currencies, iust,t+k is the Federal
Funds Rate. ict,t+k is the policy interest rate in country c, rpust and rpct are country
specific risk-premia and β is a coefficient that links the interest rate differentials with
exchange rate movements, which I will estimate. Next, I generalize Equation (2.1)
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to include the USD exchange rate against major currencies, as well as the country
specific policy rates in each of the seven major economies in the exchange rate:
Ete
us
t+k − eust = β
7∑
c=1
(iust,t+k − ict,t+k) + (rpust − rpct), (2.2)
after taking first differences, following Kiley (2013), Equation (2.2) becomes:
Et∆e
us
t+k −∆eust = β
7∑
c=1
(∆iust,t+k −∆ict,t+k) + ∆R˜Pt, (2.3)
where R˜Pt is the risk premia in the U.S. and the other major economies. Following
Kiley (2013) and Akinci and Queralto (2018), for sufficiently large k, Et∆eust+k = 0,














where RPt is the endogenous risk-premium and ηt is the UIP shock (risk-premium
shock). The transformed UIP equation can be estimated as:








δnZnt + ηt, (2.4)
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where, Znt is a set of variables to control for the endogenous risk-premia in the
U.S. and the major economies, as well as to control for local and global macroeco-
nomic and financial conditions (see below for details). The estimated residuals from
Equation (2.4) can be interpreted as USD UIP shocks.23
Figure 2.4.2: Estimated U.S. UIP shocks















Note: The figure shows the estimated shocks to the U.S. UIP condition (UIP or risk-premium
shocks).
The control variables included in the estimation of Equation (2.4) capture de-
terminants affecting the USD exchange rate against major currencies and affecting
global conditions that, in turn, have an impact on SOEs and their bilateral USD
exchange rates. To control for endogenous risk premia, and monetary, demand and
supply shocks, I include in Zn,t the contemporaneous value and the first lag of GDP
growth, inflation rates and policy (shadow) interest rates a for the U.S., and the other
23This equation can also be interpreted as a VAR for the U.S. and major economies, where the
(nominal effective) exchange rate is ordered last, as it is usual in the SVAR literature that relies
on the Cholesky decomposition to identify exogenous exchange rate movements, e.g. An et al.
(2014), Hofmann et al. (2017), among others.
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major economies, and the lagged first difference of the exchange rate against major
currencies. Moreover, I also include the contemporaneous value and the first lag of
the first difference of equity prices in the U.S., of commodity prices and the VIX
to control for global economic and financial conditions. To avoid overparametriza-
tion, I apply a general-to-specific approach and exclude one-by-one all variables for
which the estimated coefficient is not significant at the 30 % level.24 Nevertheless,
the regression still includes more than 20 control variables in the final specification.
Including a large number of control variables should not be a problem, because this
increases the likelihood that the residuals from Equation (2.4) capture UIP shocks
and not other determinants of exchange rate fluctuations. In Section 2.4.3, I briefly
discuss results using alternative specifications of Equation (2.4).
After estimating Equation (2.4), I use the estimated residual from this regression
(the U.S. UIP shocks) η̂t, as the instrument for exchange rate shocks in the SOEs.
Figure 2.4.2 shows the estimated USD UIP shocks, where the positive values depict
an appreciation of the USD exchange rate, and thus show a negative realization
of the shocks from the perspective of the U.S. The large positive and negative re-
alizations of these time series tend to coincide with several events associated with
global turmoil or crises in a subset of the SOEs in the sample. For instance, it
is well documented that the USD appreciated strongly in the onset of the global
financial crisis, during the so-called "Taper Tantrum", or during the recent turmoil
in EMEs (Argentina, Turkey, among others). These events are also consistent with
’flight-to-safety’ episodes, which are associated with an appreciation of the USD and
a depreciation of SOEs’ currencies.
2.4.2.2 First-stage regressions
From the considerations above, the U.S. UIP shocks satisfy the LP-IV conditions
(i)-(iii), and thus are a good instrument for USD exchange rate movements in SOEs.
Additionally, to test the relevance condition formally, I compute the F-statistic of
the instrument in the first-stage regression of the LP-IV estimations.
The results from the first stage regressions of Equation (2.5), when real GDP
is the dependent variable, are reported in Table 2.4.1. The first column presents
24The interest rate differentials, the lagged exchange rate and U.S. variables are always included
in the estimation.
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the estimation results when the U.S. UIP shock is used as an instrument for the
SOEs’ exchange rate against the USD, and the second column presents when U.S.
monetary policy shocks are used as an instrument.
The results shown in Table 2.4.1 confirm that the U.S. UIP shocks are a strong
instrument, since the F-statistic is well above 10. Moreover, the sign of the coefficient
is plausible: a positive risk premium shock which results in an overall depreciation of
the USD (the effective exchange rate of the USD decreases), appreciates the SOEs’
exchange rate.
Table 2.4.1: First stage regressions LP-IV
First stage regressions instruments
Baseline: UIP shocks from Equation 2.4
Instrument: U.S. UIP shock η̂t -0.15∗∗∗
1st lag ∆ bilateral USD exchange rate 0.26∗∗∗
2nd lag ∆ bilateral USD exchange rate -0.08
1st lag ∆ real GDP 0.40∗∗
2nd ∆ real GDP 0.07
1st lag ∆ CPI 0.36
2nd lag ∆ CPI 0.23
1st lag ∆ policy interest rate 0.11∗
2nd lag ∆ policy interest rate -0.13∗∗
∆ shadow FFR -0.09∗
1st lag ∆ shadow FFR -0.15
∆ VIX -0.08∗∗∗
1st lag ∆ VIX -0.03∗∗∗
Instrument’s F-statistic 21.22
Number of observations 1559
Number of countries 17
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.4.3 Local Projections Instrumental Variables
With the instrument for exchange rate shocks to SOEs at hand, I compute the
impulse responses of several macroeconomic and financial variables using the local
projection method by Jordà (2005). Specifically, I use LP-IV (see Stock and Watson,
2018) in a panel fixed effects setting, allowing intercepts to vary by country but
constraining other coefficients to be the same.25 This method’s advantage compared
to instrumental variable structural VAR (SVAR-IV) is that LP methods are more
robust to misspecification (Jordà, 2005; Ramey, 2016). Moreover, Stock and Watson
(2018) argue that under invertibility of the SVAR’s instantaneous impact matrix of
the structural shocks, which can be interpreted as no omitted variables in the SVAR,
SVAR-IV and LP-IV are both consistent but the former is more efficient. However,
if invertibility fails, LP-IV is consistent while SVAR-IV is not. Therefore, as pointed
out by Winne and Peersman (2018), LP-IV can be a solution to omitted variable
bias.26
2.4.3.1 Empirical results: Macroeconomic and financial effects of ex-
change rate fluctuations
The strategy to answer the first research question, i.e. What are the overall macroe-
conomic and financial effects of USD exchange rate movements in SOEs?, is straight
forward. After identifying an exogenous exchange rate movement in SOEs, I study
the effects of a currency appreciation on several macroeconomic and financial indica-
tors using LP-IV. Consider, for example, an appreciation of the domestic currency
against the USD. From the considerations in Section 2.3, it can be inferred that
an appreciation against the USD should decrease the trade balance through the
trade channel, while the effects of the financial channel are more ambiguous. If
the empirical results show that an appreciation against the USD increases invest-
ment and loosens financial conditions, it can be inferred that the financial channel
works through the liability side of the balance sheet. Moreover, if the appreciation
25My approach is similar to Lane and Stracca (2017), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), and
Klein (2016).
26In a further exercise, I estimate mean-group panel SVAR-IV for a subset of the variables I
consider in the LP-IV settings. The results are in line with the local projections, as well as with
results in the literature (Hofmann et al., 2017, 2019; Avdjiev et al., 2019). A discussion of this
estimation, as well as the impulse responses is available in Appendix 2.B.
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is ultimately expansionary, even though the trade balance deteriorates, there is an
indication that the financial channel dominates the trade channel on average.
To study this question, I use the following econometric specification, similar to
Lane and Stracca (2017). The response of the variable of interest27 yt at horizon h
can be computing by estimating the following panel regression:
yi,t+h−yi,t−1 = αi+δht+βh∆ei,t+h+Πh(L)∆yi,t−1 +Ξh(L)∆xi,t−1 +ui,t+h, , (2.5)
where i and t country and time indices; αi are country fixed effects, t is a linear
trend, Πh(L) and Ξh(L) are polynomials in the lag operator, with L = 2 in the
baseline estimation. xi,t−1 is a set of controls such as real GDP, the exchange rate
against the USD, price level, interest rate, VIX, and the (shadow) federal funds
rate. All variables, except for the trade balance and interest rates, are transformed
by taking their natural logarithm. I consider h = 0, 1, 2, ..., 12, measuring the effects
up to three years ahead. Accordingly, βh measures the dynamic average cumulative
response of the variable of interest at horizon h to an exchange rate movement ei,t+h.
Following Ben Zeev (2019), I use standard errors that allow arbitrary correlations
of the error term across countries and time. As discussed above, the exchange
rates against the USD are highly endogenous variables, thus an OLS estimation of
Equation (2.5) would lead to inconsistent estimates. Consequently, I instrument the
exchange rate ei,t+h with the (cumulative) U.S. UIP shocks η̂t estimated from the
U.S. UIP Equation (2.4). The choice of the variables of interest and controls, as
well as the empirical model in general is such that the results are comparable to the
ones from the DSGE model in Section 2.5.
Figure 2.4.3 presents the cumulative responses of macroeconomic and financial
variables28 to a one percent appreciation of the SOEs’ domestic currencies against the
USD. Overall, the results are in line with other empirical evidence in the literature
(Hofmann et al., 2019; Avdjiev et al., 2019).
27Either real GDP, real private consumption, real gross fixed capital formation, the trade balance
as % of GDP, equity prices, capital inflows, the policy interest rate and the price level.
28All responses, except for the equity price index, are cumulative.
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Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses of several macroeconomic and financial
variables to a one percent appreciation of the domestic exchange rates for the panel of 17 SOEs.
The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90% and 95% confidence bands respectively.
§ as a fraction of GDP.
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Real GDP increases by around 0.25 percent after around 3 quarters. The cu-
mulative impulse response of private consumption is not significantly different from
zero, while real investment increased significantly by around one percent after three
quarters. The trade balance as a share of GDP deteriorates, reaching a trough of 0.4
percentage points; this effect is in line with the implications of the trade channel.
CPI also decreases, probably as a result of lower import prices. Moreover, the short-
term interest rate also decreases in the SOEs. This is in line with a central bank’s
response to lower inflation, but also with "fear of floating", i.e. central banks may
decrease their short-term interest rates not only to combat falling inflation, but to
stabilize the domestic exchange rate after an appreciation. Moreover, equity prices,
credit to the private sector and cross-border bank liabilities increase, showing that
the appreciation is associated with an overall loosening of financial conditions.
To make sense of these results, it is possible to attribute the responses of the
different variables to the effects of the exchange rates through the trade and financial
channel. The decrease of the trade balance and CPI inflation is in line with the
trade channel. As the domestic currencies appreciate against the USD, the SOEs’
trade balances deteriorate on average, and as imports become cheaper, the inflation
decreases. Despite the decrease in the trade balance, there is an overall expansionary
effect on GDP and its other components. This, in combination with the increases
in cross-border liabilities, credit, equity prices and real investment, suggests (i) that
the financial channel is expansionary – thus it works through the valuation effects
of the liabilities, in line with Hofmann et al. (2019) and Avdjiev et al. (2019) – and
(ii) that the financial channel appears to dominate the trade channel.
These results are robust to different specifications of Equation (2.4), i.e. the
estimation of the shock, and of Equation (2.5). In Equation (2.4), first I include
only contemporaneous variables in the estimation. Second, I include the equity price
indices of the U.S. and the other major economies. Third, I add a dummy variable
for the last two quarters of 2008 to control for the financial crisis. In all these
cases, the estimated UIP shocks remain similar, leading to quantitatively similar
results.29 Finally, turning to the estimation of the LP-IVs, I change the lag lengths
in Equations (2.5), and I include other exogenous variables such as commodity prices
29Moreover, I also regress the exchange rate against major currencies only on the interest rate
differentials. The new shocks series is different from the baseline, and even though the instrument
is indeed different, many of the impulse responses remain qualitatively similar. However, the
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and U.S. real GDP to control for global demand. The results remain quantitatively
robust to those changes. The same is true for the results below.30
2.4.3.2 Empirical results: The channels
To examine the drivers of the above results, and to answer the second research
question, i.e. Under which conditions does the financial channel dominate the trade
channel?, I need to be able to disentangle the two channels. As stressed by Avdjiev
et al. (2019), the external balance sheet is the key variable that determine the
strength of the financial channel. Especially relevant for this paper are the liabilities
and assets denominated in USD (as percent of GDP).
Again, consider an appreciation of the SOEs’ currencies against the USD. As
discussed above, it is possible to infer whether the financial channel dominates the
trade channel and whether liabilities or assets in foreign currencies determine the
strength of the financial channel by interpreting the impulse response functions.
Figure 2.4.3 shows that an appreciation against the USD is overall expansionary
since the rise in real GDP is accompanied by a loosening of financial conditions and
an increase in real investment. This suggests that the financial channel dominates
the trade channel and that the liability side of the external balance sheet is relatively
more important than the asset side in determining the effects of the financial channel.
To take a more detailed look at the results, I exploit the heterogeneity of the SOEs
in my sample and I split the sample of countries according to economic characteristics
that may be relevant for the relative strength of the financial and the trade channels.
Specifically, I assess whether the degree of foreign currency exposure (measured by
liabilities in USD), assets in USD, trade openness and trade with the U.S. determine
the effects of an appreciation against the USD.
I proceed as follows: I use data on liabilities in USD by Bénétrix et al. (2015)
and Bénétrix et al. (2020). I calculate the mean level of liabilities in USD for each
country over the period in my sample. Then I divide the countries into two groups:
countries with high liabilities in USD, which are those that have an average above
results from this last exercise can be misleading, since the resulting shocks also capture demand
and financial shocks in the U.S. and the other advanced economies.
30The results from the robustness analysis are in Appendix 2.C. For ease of exposition, I report
only the robustness results for GDP.
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the median, and countries with low liabilities in USD. I then re-estimate Equation
(2.5) for the two groups and assess whether the cumulative responses differ from each
other. I do the same for assets in USD, the external vulnerability index and the
trade intensity index with the U.S. by Iacoviello and Navarro (2019), and for trade
openness. The distributions of liabilities and assets in USD are shown in Figures
2.C.1 and 2.C.2 in Appendix 2.C.
Financial channel - Importance of liabilities in USD
Figure 2.4.4: Responses to a one percent appreciation of the domestic currency
































































































0 4 8 12
Quarters
Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of several macroeconomic
variables to a one percent appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. The first row shows responses
when USD liabilities are above median, the second row shows responses when USD liabilities are
below median. The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90% and 95% confidence bands
respectively.
Figure 2.4.4 shows the cumulative responses of real GDP, real consumption and
real investment to a one percent appreciation of the SOEs’ domestic currencies
against the USD. The first row shows the cumulative responses for the group of
SOEs where exposure to liabilities in USD as percent of GDP, is above median, and
the second row when USD exposure is below median.
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Figure 2.4.5: Responses to a one percent appreciation of the domestic currency
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0 4 8 12
Quarters
Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of several macroeconomic
variables to a one percent appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. The first row shows responses
when USD liabilities are above median, the second row shows responses when USD liabilities are
below median. The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90% and 95% confidence bands
respectively.
§ as a fraction of GDP.
In the first row, real GDP, real consumption and real investment all increase
significantly. The increase in in GDP happens despite a fall in net exports, i.e. the
trade balance (see Figure 2.4.5), which is compensated by the strong increase in
investment. Meanwhile, the responses for countries with debt in USD below median
is different: at first, the response of real GDP and consumption is not significantly
different from zero, but the overall cumulative effect is significantly contractionary
after 10 quarters, while real investment initially increases slightly significantly.
Figure 2.4.5 shows the cumulative responses of the trade balance, CPI and the
policy interest rate. Again the first row presents the results when liabilities in USD
are above median and the second row when they are below median. In both cases,
the trade balance and CPI decrease significantly, showing the effects from the trade
channel. The decrease in net exports is of similar magnitude in both groups for the
first three quarters, while the decrease in CPI seems stronger, though less significant,
in SOEs with low exposure to USD liabilities. Moreover, the policy interest rate
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Figure 2.4.6: Responses to a one percent appreciation of the domestic currency




























































































0 4 8 12
Quarters
Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of several financial variables to
a one percent appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. The first row shows responses when USD
liabilities are above median, the second row shows responses when USD liabilities are below median.
The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90% and 95% confidence bands respectively.
§ as a fraction of GDP.
decreases in both cases. However, in SOEs with high exposure to USD liabilities
the central banks’ reaction to the appreciation against the USD is stronger and
faster, probably due to the fact that a higher amount of liabilities leads to stronger
valuation effects in the balance sheet, thus central banks may be willing to decrease
the interest rate more aggressively to combat the appreciation and its valuation
effects. When exposure to USD liabilities is below the median, central banks do not
decrease the policy rate as quickly, despite the faster decrease of CPI.
Further, Figure 2.4.6 shows the responses of equity prices, credit and cross-border
bank liabilities to a one percent appreciation of the domestic exchange rate against
the USD. In both groups the equity price index increases significantly, though the
rise is stronger for countries with high exposure to USD liabilities. Moreover, credit
as well as cross-border liabilities increase significantly when USD exposure is above
the median, and they increase insignificantly when they are below the median.
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Summing up, these results shed light on the conditions under which the finan-
cial channel is strongest. When exposure to USD liabilities is relatively high, an
appreciation of the domestic exchange rate against the USD leads – on average –
to overall expansionary effects. When exposure to USD liabilities is relatively low,
it appears that the trade channel dominates the financial channel, since the overall
effect is – on average – slightly contractionary. In the latter case, the decrease in the
trade balance appears to cause the decrease of real GDP and real consumption. At
the same time, the reaction of the financial variables - equity price index, credit and
cross-border banking liabilities- is smaller. Thus, the bottom line of this exercise
is that the financial channel seems to dominate the contractionary effects from the
trade channel in countries where USD liabilities are relatively high, i.e. where the
balance sheet effects of a currency appreciation are potentially more powerful.
Figure 2.4.7: Responses to a one percent appreciation of the domestic currency






































































































0 4 8 12
Quarters
Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of several macroeconomic
variables to a one percent appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. The first row shows responses
when the external vulnerability index by Iacoviello and Navarro (2019) is above median, the second
row shows responses when the index is below median. The dark gray and light gray areas represent
the 90% and 95% confidence bands respectively.
88
Chapter 2. Foreign Currency Exposure and the Financial Channel of Exchange Rates
As a robustness check for role of exposures to liabilities denominated in USD, I re-
estimate Equation (2.5) dividing the SOEs in my sample according to the external
vulnerability index by Iacoviello and Navarro (2019). This index is supposed to
reflect a country’s financial health. It is constructed as an equally-weighted average
of inflation, current account deficit as a share of GDP, external debt minus foreign
reserves (as a share of GDP), and foreign exchange reserves.
Generally speaking, the vulnerability index provides a broader picture than just
inspecting the role of exposure to USD liabilities, since it also includes other macroe-
conomic indicators and assets in foreign currency.
Figure 2.4.8: Responses to a one percent appreciation of the domestic currency
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Quarters
Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of several macroeconomic
variables to a one percent appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. The first row shows responses
when the external vulnerability index by Iacoviello and Navarro (2019) is above median, the second
row shows responses when the index is below median. The dark gray and light gray areas represent
the 90% and 95% confidence bands respectively.
§ as a fraction of GDP.
The impulse responses in Figures 2.4.7 - 2.4.9 are very similar to the ones estimated
conditioning on the level of liabilities. This is not surprising because after inspection
89
Chapter 2. Foreign Currency Exposure and the Financial Channel of Exchange Rates
of the data, the countries in which the vulnerability index is above median coincides
very often to the observations where liabilities in USD are above median. The
bottom line of this exercise is similar to the one above. When the vulnerability index
is relatively high, the financial channel appears to dominate the trade channel, and
when the vulnerability index is low, the opposite appears to happen.
Figure 2.4.9: Responses to a one percent appreciation of the domestic currency
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Quarters
Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of several macroeconomic
variables to a one percent appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. The first row shows responses
when the external vulnerability index by Iacoviello and Navarro (2019) is above median, the second
row shows responses when the index is below median. The dark gray and light gray areas represent
the 90% and 95% confidence bands respectively.
§ as a fraction of GDP.
Assets and the trade channel
Next, to further analyze the financial channel, I again re-estimate Equation (2.5)
grouping the SOEs by other indicators related to the financial and trade channel.
First, I divide the countries by the amount of net liabilities in USD. Panel (a) in
Figure 2.4.10 shows the cumulative response of GDP for countries with high net
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liabilities in USD (upper figure) and the lower figure shows the response for low
net liabilities in USD (lower figure). As in the previous cases, the effect of an
appreciation against the USD is expansionary in countries with high net liabilities
in USD, while the effect is not significant for countries with low liabilities in USD.
Second, I group the SOEs by the amount assets denominated in USD. If the assets
in the external balance sheet matter for the strength and direction of the financial
channel, an appreciation of the domestic currency should have a contractionary
effect when assets are relatively high. Panel (b) of Figure 2.4.10 show the responses
of GDP in two groups, countries with relatively high amount of assets in USD are
relatively high (upper figure) and countries with low assets (lower figure). In both
cases, the appreciation increases real GDP, but the rise is not significant. The lack
of significant difference between the responses in both states seems to suggest that
assets in USD are less important for the strength of the financial channel.
Figure 2.4.10: Responses to a one percent appreciation of the domestic currency
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Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of real GDP to a one percent
appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. Panel (a) shows the responses when net liabilities
in USD are above median (upper figure) and below median (lower figure). Panel (b) shows the
responses when assets in USD are above median (upper figure) and below median (lower figure).
Panel (c) shows the responses when trade openness is above median (upper figure) and below
median (lower figure). Panel (d) shows the responses when trade with the U.S. is above median
(upper figure) and below median (lower figure). The dark gray and light gray areas represent the
90% and 95% confidence bands respectively.
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Moreover, I can also use trade openness and the trade intensity with the U.S. to
gauge the strength of the trade channel. However, because of the fact that countries
have multiple trading partners, the trade weighted exchange rate is more relevant
for trade than the bilateral exchange rate against the USD (Hofmann et al., 2019;
Kearns and Patel, 2016). This hinders the study the trade channel whit my empiri-
cal strategy, since the shock that I identify is related to the SOEs’ bilateral exchange
rate against the USD. Still, as mentioned above and pointed out by Gopinath (2015),
international trade is conducted in very few currencies, and the USD is the most
dominant. Thus, despite the limitations described above, I can examine the strength
of the trade channel by conditioning the responses on trade openness, and on the
trade intensity with the U.S. (Iacoviello and Navarro, 2019). In this sense, if the
trade channel dominates the financial channel, an appreciation should be contrac-
tionary when trade intensity with the U.S. and overall trade openness are high.
Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 2.4.10 show the impulse responses conditioned on
trade openness and trade intensity with the U.S. respectively. Again, real GDP
increases after an appreciation, regardless whether the trade openness or trade with
the U.S. is above or below the median. These findings suggest that the trade channel
may not play a big role when the USD exchange rate moves. These results, in
combination with the previous ones in Figures 2.4.4 - 2.4.6, suggest that the strength
of the channels depend mostly on the level of liabilities in USD, rather than on
variables that could reflect the relevance of trade.
Moreover, the findings in panels (c) and (d) could also indicate that the identified
shock, as well as the overall empirical model, may not be suitable to shed light
into the trade channel in its full extent. To properly study the trade channel,
the identification of country specific exchange rate shocks or a different kind of
model may be needed. Therefore, in the next section, I use an estimated DSGE
model where the financial and trade channels are explicitly modeled, and where
the exchange rate against the USD has a direct impact on exports and imports,
and on the external balance sheet of the economy. Thus, the DSGE model may be
more appropriate to examine the trade channel, than the LP-IV with the identified
instrument.
92
Chapter 2. Foreign Currency Exposure and the Financial Channel of Exchange Rates
2.5 A DSGE model for a SOE with liabilities in foreign cur-
rency
In Section 2.4, I have shown empirically that exchange rate appreciations can be
expansionary depending on the level foreign of currency exposure. In this section I
use an open economy DSGE model to deepen the precious analysis, to look closer
at financial channel of exchange rates and to have a structural interpretation of the
empirical results. Thus, with the estimated DSGE model at hand, I can further
address the second research question, (ii) Under which conditions does the financial
channel dominate the trade channel? and I can examine whether the financial
channel of exchange rates has an effect on the transmission of foreign monetary policy
shocks, and thus answer the third research question, (iii) What are the financial
channel’s implications for the propagation of foreign monetary policy shocks into a
SOE?






















I extend a standard New Keynesian small open economy model (see, for instance,
Adolfson et al., 2007; Justiniano and Preston, 2010), by including financial frictions
where banks can borrow funds in foreign currency (USD) while their assets are
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denominated in domestic currency, similar to Aoki et al. (2016).31 This adds a
potentially powerful financial channel to the existing trade linkages in standard open
economy models. Moreover, the presence of liabilities in USD introduces a feedback
mechanism between exchange rate movements and banks’ balance sheets, which
translates into a loosening of financial conditions when the domestic exchange rate
appreciates. Thus, the model is able to take into account the level of USD liabilities
as the key determinant of the strength of the financial channel, in line with the
empirical evidence presented in Section 2.4.32
The model is structured as follows (see Figure 2.5.1). The representative house-
hold buys consumption goods from final goods producers, which consist of domes-
tically produced and imported consumption goods. Also, the household sells its
labor to the intermediate goods firms. To save, it holds deposits in banks, which
are denominated in local currency and yield the risk-free rate. Therefore there is no
exchange rate risk for the household, and its deposits are fully insured. The house-
hold can also directly finance intermediate goods firms, however, it is less efficient
than banks in doing so. Moreover, the investment good is composed of domestic
and imported goods. Capital producers produce new investment goods and repair
depreciated capital, which they sell to intermediate goods firms. Intermediate goods
producers have capital and labor as inputs for production. Furthermore, they receive
funding from domestic banks.
Banks have two sources of financing, domestic deposits from the household (de-
nominated in domestic currency), and foreign debt from foreign investors, which
is denominated in foreign currency (USD). Since banks’ assets are denominated in
local currency and part of their liabilities are denominated in USD, they do face
exchange rate risk. Moreover, they also face a financial friction similar to the one
in Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Further, I assume
that it is easier for banks to run away with foreign funds, which implies the financial
friction is more binding for deposits in foreign currency.
31Akinci and Queralto (2018) and Mimir and Sunel (2019) build open economy DSGE models with
a similar financial friction.
32My model does not allow for domestic agents to own assets in USD. However, while the data
shows that the countries in my sample do in fact have assets in USD, the results from Section 2.4
suggest that assets do not play a major role in explaining the strength of the financial channel.
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2.5.1 Model
I the following section I briefly the key elements of the model, especially those of
the financial frictions, the key feature for my analysis.33
2.5.1.1 Firms
There is a continuum of domestic monopolistic firms i that produce an intermedi-
ate, differentiated good using capital kt and labor lt, and subject to an aggregate
stationary productivity shock At:
yHt (i) = Atkt−1(i)
αlt(i)
1−α (2.6)
where α ∈ (0, 1).
The monopolistic intermediate goods producers face quadratic price adjustment
costs (Rotemberg, 1982). They set their prices Pt(i) to maximize the expected

































Yt. Λt,t+j is the stochastic
discount factor. et+j is the nominal exchange rate, PH∗t+j(i) is the price of the domestic
good abroad, exHt+j(i) is exports of the domestic good, and κ is the price adjustment
cost parameter.
33For a detailed derivation of this kind of models, I refer to Adolfson et al. (2007), or Mimir and
Sunel (2019). See the appendix for the full list of equilibrium equations.
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where pHt is the price level of domestically produced goods divided by the CPI price
level, piHt is the inflation rate of the domestically produced goods, and pit is the gross















Zt and wt are the real rental price of capital and the real wage respectively, and
ξ˜ct is a cost-push shock.
Similarly, the solution of the imported goods firms’ problem is given by:
pFt =
η
















where where pFt is the price level of imported goods divided by the CPI price level,
piFt is the inflation rate of the imported goods, and st is the real exchange rate.
These intermediate goods are combined into final domestic and imported goods

















with η > 1.
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2.5.1.2 Households
The domestic representative household consists of a continuum of bankers and work-
ers. Each banker manages a bank until it retires with probability (1 − σ). After
retirement, the bankers transfer their remaining net worth to the household, and
are replaced by the same amount of bankers. Each new banker receives a fraction
of total assets as start-up funds. It is also assumed that bankers are more efficient
than workers in providing funds to firms since workers pay extra management costs.
Moreover, besides investing directly in firms, workers can deposit currency at the
banks, but cannot hold directly foreign debt nor borrow from foreigners.
The representative household chooses consumption ct, labor supply lt, direct cap-




















t ) + dt = wtlt + Πt + (Zt + (1− δ)qt)kht−1 +Rt−1dt−1, (2.10)
where hc ∈ (0, 1] is external consumption habit, σc > 1 is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, ζ > 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ζ0
is the utility weight of labor, qt is equity price, dt the real value of deposits, χ(kht )
represents the cost disadvantage of the households in providing funding firms, Rt is
the gross real interest rate, Πt is profits, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and ξ˜gt is a
preference shock.
Moreover, the consumption good is an aggregate of domestically produced and









γc + (1− ω) 1γc (cFt ) γc−1γc ] γcγc−1 ,
where ω ∈ (0, 1) is the home bias parameter, and γc > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and imported goods.
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2.5.1.3 Banks
As stated above, banks fund intermediate goods firms, i.e. buy equity in inter-
mediate goods firms. Banks finance their operations by accepting deposits from
domestic households, by borrowing from abroad and by using their own net worth.
Each banker retires at some point and brings back its net worth to the household. To
motivate a limit on the bank’s ability to raise funds, I follow Aoki et al. (2016), who
introduce a moral hazard problem similar to the one in Gertler and Karadi (2011)
and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). After raising funds, the bank decides whether to
operate honestly or divert funds. When bankers decide to divert funds, creditors
will force them to bankruptcy and bankers will loose the franchise completely. Thus,
the bankers’ decision of diverting funds or to act honestly depends on the value of
future dividends that they would get if she is honest, and on the value of the assets
that could be diverted. The objective of the banks is the expected present value of








where σj−1(1 − σ) is the probability of retirement. The aggregate flow of funds
constraint of banks is given by:
nt = (Zt + (1− δ)Qt)kbt−1 −Rt−1dt−1 − stR∗t−1d∗t−1, (2.12)
where kbt , dt, R∗t and d∗t are the individual bank’s capital holdings, domestic de-
posits, the foreign interest rate and foreign debt.
Aoki et al. (2016) assume that the ability of banks to divert funds depends on the
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is the fraction of assets financed by foreign borrowing, and γ > 0 is the degree of
home bias in funding. A positive γ means that banks can divert a larger fraction
of assets when they raise foreign funds. Since banks evaluate whether they divert
funds by comparing the value of their franchise with the value of divertable funds,
the incentive constraint of the bank is given by:
Vt ≥ Θ(xt)qtkbt
Thus, banks choose kbt , dt and d∗t to maximize its value:
Vt = Et [Λt,t+1 [(1− σ)nt+1 + σVt+1]] .









where ψt is Tobin’s q ratio of banks. After defining the leverage multiple as φt = qtktnt ,






















tφtxt + νt) ,
subject to the incentive constraint:
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where µ∗t is the cost advantage of foreign currency debt over domestic deposits, and
the banks’ stochastic discount factor is: EtΩt+1 = EtΛt,t+1 (1− σ + σψt+1). The risk








where log(ψt+1) = ρψlog(ψt) + ξψt+1, and ξ
ψ
t+1 is the risk premium shock (UIP
shock).











νt = Et [Ωt+1Rt+1] (2.17)
In cases, where µt and µ∗t are positive, the incentive constraint is binding and the
solution of the banks’ problem is given by:
φt =
νt
Θ(xt)− (µt + µ∗txt)
(2.18)
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Thus, the leverage ratio is a decreasing function of θ and and increasing function
of µt and µ∗t ; and xt is an increasing function of µ˜∗t . Intuitively, this means that if
µ˜∗t is large, banks will raise more deposits from foreign investors.
2.5.1.4 Capital producers
Capital producers operate in a perfectly competitive environment. They repair the
depreciated capital that they acquire from intermediate goods firms and purchase
investment goods, which they transform into capital. Thereafter, they sell their
produced capital goods to intermediate goods firms at price qt.










γc + (1− ω) 1γc (iFt ) γc−1γc ] γcγc−1 .























represents investment adjustment costs, δ ∈ (0, 1)
is the depreciation rate, and ξ˜It is a stationary investment efficiency shock.
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2.5.1.5 Monetary policy
The policy maker in the domestic economy sets the nominal interest rate following
a Taylor rule, which responds to inflation and to deviations of GDP from its steady
state. In an alternative specification, I allow the policy maker to also respond to
changes in the nominal exchange rate. The Taylor rule is given by:
rnt −rn = (1−ρi) [ωi(pit − pi) + ωy(gdpt − gdp) + ωe(∆et)]+ρi(rnt−1−rn)+ξMPt (2.22)
where rnt is the nominal interest rate and ξMPt ∼ N (0, σi) is the domestic monetary
policy shock. In the baseline specification I assume ωe = 0.
2.5.1.6 Market clearing, foreign economy and exogenous disturbances




















+ χ(kht ) (2.23)
where gHt is government consumption. Following Aoki et al. (2016), exports are a








and ϕ is the elasticity of export demand.
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Aggregate capital is kt = kht + kbt , and aggregate net worth of banks evolves as:
nt = (σ + ξ)(Zt + (1− δ))kbt−1 − σRtdt−1 − σstR∗t−1d∗t−1. (2.27)
where ξ are the new bankers’ start-up funds, kbt is the capital owned by the banks,
and d∗t is net foreign debt (foreign investors’ deposits in the domestic banks). Finally,











Following Copaciu et al. (2016), the foreign economy, which is exogenous to the
domestic one, consists of a simple closed economy New Keynesian model subject to
a demand shock, a cost-push shock, and a monetary policy shock. The former two
shocks follow AR(1) processes, while the latter is an i.i.d. process.
The domestic economy is subject to the UIP-risk premium shock and to five
other purely domestic shocks: stationary technology shock, stationary investment
efficiency shock, cost push shock, preference shock and monetary policy shock. The
UIP, technology, investment efficiency, cost push and preference shocks follow an
AR(1) process, while the monetary policy shock is an i.i.d. processes. In total, the
model is subject to nine different shocks, six of them affect the domestic economy
directly
2.5.2 Estimation of the DSGE model
The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques for Brazilian and Polish data.34
Brazil is one of the countries with highest amount of foreign liabilities in USD in
my sample. Moreover, Brazil is a relatively closed economy. On the other hand,
Poland is one of the countries with lowest liabilities in USD in my sample, and at
34The estimates of the foreign asset and liability positions of Hungary are one of the few that are
not similar or identical in Bénétrix et al. (2015) and Bénétrix et al. (2020). This is why in this
version of the paper, I present the results for Poland. The conclusions and implications drawn
remain the same.
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the same time it is very open to trade.35 The sample period for the estimation
is 1997Q1 - 2019Q2.36 I use nine observable time series: real GDP growth, CPI
inflation, real consumption growth, real gross fixed capital formation growth, the
nominal policy interest rate, the nominal exchange rate against the USD, U.S. real
GDP growth, U.S. CPI inflation, and the Federal Funds Rate.37 I remove the mean
of all the observable variables. Moreover, similar to Christiano et al. (2011), I allow
for measurement errors in all the observables, except for the nominal interest rates
(both in the domestic economy and in the U.S.). I calibrate the variance of the
measurement errors for all the variables to be 10% of the standard deviation of the
time series, except for inflation, for which I calibrate it to be 25%, again, following
Christiano et al. (2011).
Table 2.5.1 presents the calibrated parameters. The discount factor is calibrated
to match the mean policy interest rates in Brazil and Poland in the sample period.
Further, I set the steady state for the foreign interest rate at 1.2% to match the
mean of the (shadow) FFR. The parameter ω was calibrated so that trade openness
in Brazil is 24% and in Poland 74.5% of domestic GDP, matching the data. The
parameters θ, γ and ξ are calibrated so that the leverage ratio in Brazil equals 8.25
and in Poland 8.5, the foreign debt denominated in USD in Brazil amounts to 29%
of GDP and in Poland to 9%, and the spread between return on bank assets and
deposits equals 2 percentage points in both cases. These four key parameters in the
model are calibrated and not estimated because the data used for estimation does
not allow for their identification. Moreover, I calibrate ρex = 0.2, which is close
to the value in Mimir and Sunel (2019) and is consistent with OLS estimates of a
linearized version of Equation (2.24). I calibrate all other parameters following Aoki
et al. (2016) and Mimir and Sunel (2019).
35Figure 2.C.3 in Appendix 2.C shows a scatterplot for USD liabilities and trade openness.
36I estimate the model with data of all other countries in my sample, except for Israel and the
Czech Republic. The results and conclusions drawn from those exercises are very similar to the
ones I present in this section. The responses of real GDP to a 100 basis points decrease in risk
premium (UIP shock) for all fifteen countries are in Appendix 2.D.
37For the period when the Federal Funds Rate was at the zero lower bound, I use the shadow rate
by Xia and Wu (2018). Wu and Zhang (2019) also estimate a DSGE model using the shadow
rate and show that this is equivalent to taking into account unconventional monetary policies in
the model.
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Table 2.5.1: Calibrated parameters and steady state targets
Parameter Value - Brazil Value - Poland Description Target
β 0.985 0.985 Discount factor (quarterly) mean policy rate
γc 0.5 0.5 Elastic. H-F. goods Mimir & Sunel (2019)
κ 0.0015 0.0015 Cost of direct finance Aoki et al. (2016)
α 0.4 0.4 Cost share of capital Mimir & Sunel (2019)
δ 0.02 0.02 Depreciation rate Aoki et al. (2016)
ψ1 0.01 0.01 For. debt elastic. prem. literature
η 11 11 Elasticity of demand Mimir & Sunel (2019)
ρex 0.2 0.2 Foreign output in exports Literature and estim.
ω 0.85 0.625 Home bias in ct and it Trade openness
σ 0.923 0.938 Survival probability Aoki et al. (2016)
ξ 1.2× 10−4 1.2× 10−4 Endowment new bankers φt, xt & spread
θ 0.49 0.44 Divertable assets φt, xt & spread
γ 5.34 20.39 Home bias in funding φt, xt & spread
ωe 0.10 ——— TR coefficient exch. rate ————————
pit 1 1 Gross inflation Mimir & Sunel (2019)
xt 0.29 0.09 Portion of the banks liab. in USD Liab. in USD as % of all liab.
φt 8.25 8.5 Leverage ratio World Bank data
st 0.02 0.02 Spread bank assets & deposits Aoki et al. (2016)
R∗t 1.012 1.012 Foreign interest rate/(shadow) FFR mean
Table 2.5.2 present the priors of the estimated parameters of the model. I chose the
priors following the literature on the estimation of open economy DSGE models with
data for SOEs (see, for instance, Justiniano and Preston, 2010; García-Cicco et al.,
2014; Copaciu et al., 2015). Further, I scale the standard deviations of the shocks
such that they are of similar order of magnitude (Christiano et al., 2011). Finally, I
obtain the estimation results using a Metropolis-Hastings chain with 200,000 draws
after a burn in of 50,000 and an acceptance ratio of around 0.30 for Brazil and 0.20
for Poland. The estimated parameters are also shown in Table 2.5.2. In general,
the posterior means seem to be plausible, and are in line with the broad literature
on estimated DSGE models. Similarly to García-Cicco et al. (2014), the posterior
mean of the investment adjustment cost parameter in both countries is close to 1,
which would be on the low end of this parameter’s estimates in the literature.
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Table 2.5.2: Priors and posteriors
Prior Posterior Brazil Posterior Poland
Para. Description Dist. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
σc Intertemp. elastic. of subst. gamma 1.2 0.4 0.81 0.16 1.17 0.29
ζ Inv. Frisch elas. norm. 5 0.5 4.39 0.58 5.15 0.61
hc Habit in consumption beta 0.7 0.1 0.79 0.03 0.71 0.05
κ Inv. slope PC norm. 150 20 216.6 16.3 196.8 25.1
ϕ Elas. exp. dem. norm. 1 0.05 0.87 0.02 1.11 0.06
κI Inv. adj. cost norm. 3 0.5 0.9 0.16 1.16 0.25
ωpi TR coeff. inf. gamma 1.5 0.15 1.20 0.05 1.13 0.1
ω∆y TR coeff. growth gamma 0.5 0.15 0.53 0.12 0.22 0.07
ω∗pi U.S. TR coeff. inf. gamma 1.5 0.15 1.29 0.10 1.31 0.09
ω∗∆y U.S. TR coeff. growth gamma 0.5 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.22 0.04
γ∗∆y Elast. of subst. U.S. gamma 1.2 0.4 2.65 0.45 2.91 0.62
κpi∗ Inv. slope PC U.S. norm. 150 50 149.3 44.85 163.1 46.21
ρi Autoreg. dom. TR beta 0.7 0.1 0.47 0.04 0.58 0.02
ρA Autoreg. techn. shock beta 0.7 0.1 0.66 0.10 0.33 0.07
ρI Autoreg. inv. effi. shock beta 0.7 0.1 0.72 0.08 0.89 0.06
ρψ Autoreg. risk prem. shock beta 0.7 0.1 0.92 0.02 0.91 0.02
ρcp Autoreg. cost push shock beta 0.7 0.1 0.90 0.03 0.93 0.02
ρg Autoreg. pref. shock beta 0.7 0.1 0.25 0.07 0.38 0.04
ρy∗ Autoreg. for. dem. shock beta 0.7 0.1 0.87 0.02 0.92 0.03
ρpi∗ Autoreg. for. inf. shock beta 0.7 0.1 0.39 0.08 0.41 0.02
ρi∗ Autoreg. for. MP shoc beta 0.7 0.1 0.88 0.01 0.87 0.01
σi × 10 s.d. dom. MP shock inv. gam. 0.1 2 0.12 0.02 0.19 0.02
σA × 10 s.d. stat. tech. shock inv. gam. 0.1 2 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.01
σI s.d. stat. inv. effi. shock inv. gam. 0.1 2 0.46 0.10 0.66 0.12
σψ × 10 s.d. risk prem. shock inv. gam. 0.1 2 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.01
σcp s.d. cost push shock inv. gam. 0.1 2 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.01
σg s.d. pref. shock inv. gam. 0.1 2 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.02
σy∗ × 10 s.d. for. dem. shock inv. gam. 0.1 2 0.02 0.002 0.16 0.03
σpi∗ × 10 s.d. for. infl. shock inv. gam. 0.1 2 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.01
σi∗ × 100 s.d. for. MP shock inv. gam. 0.1 2 0.14 0.01 0.16 0.01
2.5.2.1 The UIP shock
Impulse response analysis - UIP shock
To study the effects of an appreciation of the exchange rate, and again address
the first and second research questions of this paper, I follow Copaciu et al. (2015)
and analyze the impulse responses of the relevant variables to a shock to the UIP
condition.
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Figure 2.5.2 shows the impulse responses to a 100 basis points38 decrease in the
risk premium for Brazil (black line) and Poland (red line). The decrease in the
risk premium leads to a nominal exchange rate appreciation in both countries, but
the appreciation is larger in Brazil, which has more liabilities in USD than Poland.
Moreover, this appreciation leads to a decrease in net exports of roughly the same
magnitude in both countries, relative to their respective steady state values. At the
same time, inflation decreases in both cases, as expected after an appreciation. The
decrease, however, is more pronounced in Poland, since higher trade opennes means
that a higher share of the CPI is due to foreign prices. These responses are in line
with the implications of the trade channel. The central bank reacts to the decrease
in inflation by lowering the interest rate. Again, the responses in Poland are of a
larger magnitude.
Figure 2.5.2: Impulse responses from a 100 basis points decrease in the risk premium
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The appreciation also leads to an increase in equity prices in both countries.
In this case, the response in Brazil, the economy with more liabilities in USD, is
much stronger. Investment also rises in Brazil by a significantly higher amount than
38I study the response to a 100 basis points decrease in the risk premium rather than a one percent
appreciation of the exchange rate because the UIP shock affects specifically the risk premium.
Studying a one percent appreciation would have the similar implications.
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in Poland. In Brazil, high foreign currency exposure creates a positive feedback
effect between the exchange rate appreciation and the banks’ balance sheet, which
translates into more favorable financial conditions for investment. The response
of consumption, in contrast, is much stronger in Poland. Again, this is probably
due to the higher amount of foreign goods in the consumption basket. Overall, the
appreciation turns out to be expansionary in Brazil and contractionary in Poland,
as real GDP increases in the former and decreases in the latter.
The appreciation’s radically different outcomes in Brazil and Poland cannot be
accounted by the rather small discrepancies in all estimated parameters. Therefore,
the different results must reflect the different levels of liabilities denominated in USD
and of trade openness. In Brazil, the financial channel clearly dominates the trade
channel, while in Poland the opposite is true.
The bottom line of this exercise is that an appreciation due to a decrease in the
risk premium could be expansionary when foreign liabilities denominated in USD are
high and trade openness is (relatively) low. The expansionary appreciation is due to
the financial channel: since the value of the banks’ liabilities is lowered relative to
the assets (due to the appreciation), bank equity and credit increase, which relaxes
financial constraints. This raises investment, which in turn increases GDP. These
effects are not offset by the decrease in net exports. In contrast, under low debt in
USD and high trade openness, the trade channel dominates the financial channel
and the appreciation is ultimately contractionary.
The fact that an appreciation raises real GDP in Brazil and lowers it in Poland is
broadly in line with the results from Section 2.4. There, I have shown evidence that
if foreign currency exposure is high, an appreciation has expansionary effects on all
of GDP’s components, except for net exports. If liabilities in USD are low, and thus
the financial channel is weak, the appreciation decreases GDP and consumption. I
do not find the contractionary effect on consumption in the model. However, it is
important to stress that, the estimation in Section 2.4 was done for a panel of 17
different SOEs, not for single countries. It is possible that a LP-IV estimation for
single countries could deliver the DSGE model’s results.39
39I chose to estimate the panel LP-IV to exploit the cross-sectional dimension, to counteract the
relatively short time series dimension.
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A closer look - Trade and financial channels
The previous results suggest the financial channel dominates the trade channel if
liabilities in USD are high and trade openness is low. The opposite is true when
liabilities in USD are low and trade openness high. To further disentangle the
channels, I perform the following exercise: I decrease the level of foreign liabilities
in Brazil to amount 15% of total bank liabilities, keeping trade openness at its
original value. The results are shown in Figure 2.5.3, where the red dotted line
depicts this scenario and the black line the baseline results. In this case, the domestic
appreciation has weaker effects on consumption, but specially on investment and real
GDP. Investment’s response to the shock is much weaker (around one percentage
point smaller). Equity prices also rise by significantly less than in the baseline.
Figure 2.5.3: Impulse responses from a 100 basis points decrease in the risk premium
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Next, I double trade openness (blue line), keeping the fraction of bank’s debt
denominated in USD at the baseline level. When trade openness is higher, the
effect of the UIP shock on the exchange rate is weaker. However, inflation and the
policy interest rate decrease by more, due to the stronger decrease in CPI because
of the higher share of foreign prices in the consumption basket. Moreover, the
responses of equity prices and investment remain roughly unchanged, highlighting
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the importance of foreign currency exposure in determining the financial effects in
this model. Crucially, the resulting appreciation increases consumption by more,
since households now consume a higher amount of imported goods, whose price
has decreased domestically. Net exports decrease by roughly the same amount,
but note that in this scenario, the steady state share of exports and imports over
GDP is higher; thus there is a stronger reaction in trade. The stronger reaction
of trade indeed weakens the expansionary effects of the financial channel. These
results show that foreign currency exposure is an important driver of the financial
channel’s strength, and in turn, on the overall impact of exchange rate movements
in SOEs. At the same time, trade openness has a strong impact on the effects of
exchange rate appreciation, which complements the results from section 2.4, adding
the trade dimension to the analysis.
Figure 2.5.4: Impulse responses from a 100 basis points decrease in the risk premium
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I also perform a similar analysis using the model estimated for Poland. In this
case, I increase the level of USD denominated debt to 15% of total banks’ liabilities,
leaving trade openness at its original level. The results are shown in Figure 2.5.4,
where the red lines depict the impulse responses for Poland under a moderately
high level of foreign currency exposure, and the black lines the baseline results. The
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UIP shock has a larger effect on exchange rates, but also on consumption and more
importantly on investment and equity prices. These two variables rise by consid-
erably more, which indicates a stronger effect from the financial channel. Despite
these increases, however, the appreciation is still contractionary, as Poland’s trade
openness is very high and the financial channel does not fully compensate the de-
terioration of the trade balance. The blue lines show the responses for Poland if
trade openness is halved, from around 75% of GDP to around 38%. The amount of
liabilities in USD are at the baseline level. Again, the appreciation is still contrac-
tionary, though the decrease in GDP is smaller. This works mainly through trade,
since the responses of investment and equity prices remain roughly at the baseline
level. Again, net exports decrease by more, but this is relative to a smaller steady
state level, which means that the contribution of net export to GDP is smaller. This
exercise’s conclusions are the same as above.
Figure 2.5.5: Brazil: Sensitivity to financial and trade openness
(a) Real GDP response to a 100 basis points
decrease in the risk premium
Quarters













(b) Real GDP response to a 100 basis points
decrease in the risk premium
Quarters













Note: Panel (a) shows the responses of real GDP for different degrees of foreign currency exposure,
i.e. for different steady state shares of foreign liabilities xt. Panel (b) shows the responses of
real GDP for different degrees of trade openness, i.e. for different calibrations of home bias in
consumption and investment ω.
What the results show is that foreign currency exposure and the financial channel
of exchange rate do have a strong impact on how USD exchange rate fluctuations af-
fect economic activity in Brazil and Poland. At the same time, however, the analysis
using the open economy New Keynesian model sheds light onto another dimension
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that was not captured by the empirical analysis using LP-IV: trade openness and
the trade channel. To have a closer look at this issue, I computed the response of
real GDP to a 100 basis points decrease in the risk premium for Brazil for different
degrees of foreign currency exposure (panel a, Figure 2.5.5) and for different degrees
of trade openness (panel b, Figure 2.5.5). I did the same with the model estimated
with Polish data (Figure 2.5.6).
Figure 2.5.6: Poland: Sensitivity to financial and trade openness
(a) Real GDP response to a 100 basis points
decrease in the risk premium
Quarters













(b) Real GDP response to a 100 basis points
decrease in the risk premium
Quarters













Note: Panel (a) shows the responses of real GDP for different degrees of foreign currency exposure,
i.e. for different steady state shares of foreign liabilities xt. Panel (b) shows the responses of
real GDP for different degrees of trade openness, i.e. for different calibrations of home bias in
consumption and investment ω.
From this exercise, it is clear that the trade and financial channels work in opposite
directions. Further, the strength of the financial channel seems to depend on the
amount of debt in USD: the higher the degree of exposure to USD debt, the stronger
the expansionary effects of exchange rate appreciations. Moreover, this simulations
also complement the insights from form Section 2.4. The trade channel also plays a
pivotal role in determining the effects of the exchange rate appreciation: the more
open is an economy to trade, the stronger the contractionary effects. Thus, the model
suggest that the interaction between the financial and trade channels determine the
effects of an appreciation.
However, there are two important caveats. First, with my model I abstract from
assets in foreign currency. However, as Dalgic (2018) shows, households in EMEs
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– which make up the bulk of the countries I analyze – hold significant amounts of
deposits in USD as an insurance mechanism. This, in turn, weakens the expansion-
ary effects of exchange rate appreciations, as households become poorer and their
consumption decreases.40 Moreover, the importance of the trade channel may be
overstated in this model, particularly for Poland. This is so, because I use U.S.
data to estimate the foreign block of the model, since I am interested in USD ex-
change rate shocks. However, the U.S. is a minor trading partner for Poland. Only
around 3% of Poland’s exports and imports are to and from the U.S., and even
though Poland USD trade invoicing is higher (around 30% of exports and imports,
Gopinath, 2015), the trade channel implied by Poland’s 75% trade openness seems
too strong.41
2.5.3 Implications of the financial channel
The above analysis has shown that UIP shocks, i.e. the main driver of exchange rate,
have expansionary effects in this model. Having understood the channels through
which the UIP shock works, it is possible to gauge to what extent exchange rate
movements – through the financial channel – can dampen of amplify other shocks,
such as domestic and foreign monetary policy shocks. This way, I can answer the
third research question, namely (iii) What are the financial channel’s implications
for the propagation of foreign monetary policy shocks into a SOE?
2.5.3.1 Impulse response analysis - U.S. monetary policy shocks
The traditional view on the effects of the exchange rate, i.e. the implications drawn
from the Mundell-Fleming model, states that a foreign expansionary monetary pol-
icy shock leads to an exchange rate appreciation in the domestic economy, which
ultimately leads to lower GDP. The appreciation, in turn, causes inflation to fall.
Responding to this, the domestic central bank lowers the policy interest rate, mim-
icking the foreign monetary policy. However, the financial channel implies that the
appreciation of the exchange rate would relax financial constraints which ultimately
40However, Dalgic (2018) also finds expansionary effects from an appreciation through the financial
channel.
41This would be also true for Hungary, which has similar trade intensity with the U.S. and a similar
degree of USD invoicing in trade.
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boosts economic activity. Thus, through the financial channel, the appreciation
could lead to an even stronger comovement of financial conditions in the domestic
and foreign economy. In this case, international spillovers may be stronger.
Figure 2.5.7: Impulse responses from a foreign one percent expansionary monetary
policy shock
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I consider the effects of an expansionary U.S. monetary policy shock on Brazil,
for the baseline case and for lower USD debt (x = 0.15). Figure 2.5.7 shows the
responses to such a shock. The foreign monetary surprise leads to an appreciation of
the domestic economy’s nominal exchange rate. The appreciation is much stronger in
the case of higher USD liabilities, which also leads to a strong decrease in inflation.
The response of the central bank is also stronger in the baseline case, as are the
increases in real GDP, real investment, real consumption and equity prices. Overall,
as in the previous analysis, the effects of an foreign expansionary monetary policy
shock are larger, the higher foreign currency exposure is. Thus, these results indicate
that foreign monetary policy is amplified by the financial channel of exchange rates.
This is in line with the empirical literature. Iacoviello and Navarro (2019) show that
high financial vulnerabilities amplify the spill-over effect of U.S. monetary policy in
EMEs.
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2.5.3.2 Alternative policy response - Exchange rate in the Taylor Rule
It is widely known that central banks of some SOEs, specially EMEs, do not just
follow an inflation target but also try to stabilize the exchange rate with their pol-
icy actions. As Agustín Carstens, General Manager of the BIS, said in a speech
at the London School of Economics: "Irrespective of the official labeling, emerging
market economies’ central banks have, in practice, attached a significant weight to
the exchange rate in the conduct of their monetary policy [...]"42. Since most of the
countries in my sample are in fact EMEs, it is necessary to study to what extent
having the nominal exchange rate in the Taylor affects the responses to an appreci-
ation and also to a foreign monetary policy expansion. For that purpose I add the
nominal exchange rate to the Taylor Rule (see Equation 2.22) and study the impli-
cations of such a modified Taylor Rule. For ease of exposition, I focus on the model
estimated with Brazilian data, where the central bank does not respond to exchange
rate changes (black line), and compare the responses to the same model allowing
the central bank to respond to the exchange rate with a Taylor Rule coefficient
ωe = 0.10 (red line).
Figure 2.5.8: Impulse responses from a 100 basis points decrease in the risk premium
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42The speech is available at: https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp190502.htm
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Figure 2.5.8 shows the impulse responses after a shock to the UIP condition that
decreases the risk premium by 100 basis points. When the central bank tries to
stabilize the exchange rate in addition to inflation and GDP, the nominal exchange
rate increases by roughly the same percentage points, while inflation decreases by
more. Also, the interest rate decrease is much stronger. This translates into a faster
decline of the real interest rate and a stronger increase in consumption. However,
in general, responses under this new policy regime do not differ much from the
baseline scenario. GDP increases on impact by a bit less, but after four quarters
the differences in the responses appear to fade out, and investment’s responses are
almost identical under both policy regimes. A possible explanation for the very
similar results is that, while a stronger decrease in the interest rate helps to some
extent to mitigate the appreciation, it reinforces other financial effects. Overall,
it does not seem that targeting changes in the exchange rate would help stabilize
the economy. Moreover, as pointed out by Akinci and Queralto (2018), who use
a similar model, there are considerable welfare losses associated with targeting the
exchange rate in addition to inflation. However, a welfare analysis is needed to
seriously examine this policy regime, which is beyond the scope of this work.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigated the macroeconomic and financial effects of USD ex-
change rate fluctuations in a sample of 17 SOEs. In particular, I examined how
the financial channel affects the overall impact of exchange rate fluctuations and
assessed to what extent foreign currency exposure determines the relative strength
of the financial channel. To address the underlying endogeneity of the exchange
rate, I constructed an external instrument based on the UIP condition for the USD
exchange rate against major currencies. The empirical results indicated that a do-
mestic appreciation against the USD can potentially have expansionary effects. This
can be rationalized by the importance of the financial channel. Further, I found that
the strength of the financial channel is determined by the level of foreign currency
exposure, since the expansionary effect of a domestic appreciation is larger, the
higher foreign liabilities in USD are.
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I also estimated an open economy New Keynesian model, in which a fraction of the
domestic banks’ liabilities is denominated in USD. In line with the empirical results,
I found that the level of foreign currency exposure is an important determinant of the
strength of the financial channel. Further, the model estimates for Brazil and Poland
indicated that, under foreign currency exposure, a domestic appreciation against the
USD is expansionary, but higher openness to international trade can weaken these
results. By contrast, under low foreign currency exposure and high trade openness,
an appreciation is contractionary, but higher debt in USD can flip the results. Thus,
the model based analysis indicated that it is the interaction between the financial
and trade channels that determines whether an exchange rate appreciation against
the USD is expansionary in SOEs. Finally, I also found that the financial channel
amplifies the effects of foreign monetary policy in SOEs. My paper implies that
taking the financial channel of exchange rates explicitly into account is of utmost
importance to fully understand the macroeconomic and financial effects of exchange
rate movements and of foreign shocks, and to design and implement policies aimed
at mitigating their effects.
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Appendix
2.A Data and sources
Countries and sample
Brazil (1996Q1 - 2019Q3), Chile (1996Q1 - 2019Q3), Colombia (2000Q1 - 2019Q3),
Czech Republic (1996Q1 - 2019Q3), Hungary (1996Q1 - 2019Q3), India (1996Q2 -
2019Q3), Indonesia (2000Q1 - 2019Q3), Israel (1996Q1 - 2019Q4), Korea (1996Q1 -
2019Q3), Mexico (1996Q1 - 2019Q3), Peru (1996Q1 - 2019Q3), Philippines (1998Q1
- 2019Q3), Poland (1995Q1 - 2019Q3), Russia (2000Q1 - 2019Q3), South Africa
(1996Q1 - 2019Q3), Thailand (1996Q1 - 2019Q4), and Turkey (1998Q1 - 2019Q3)
Sources
Table 2.A.1: Data and sources
Variable Construction and source
real GDP real GDP in domestic currency
Source: Datastream
Investment real gross fixed capital formation in domestic currency
Source: Datastream
Consumption real domestic private consumption in domestic currency
Source: Datastream
Trade balance Trade balance as % of domestic GDP
Source: Datastream
Equity price (SOEs) MSCI equity prices in domestic currency (for the SOEs)
Source: Datastream
Equity price (AEs) S&P 500, Euro Stoxx, S&P/TSX 60, Nikkei, FTSE 100, SMI,
OMXS30, S&P/ASX 200
Source: Datastream
Policy rate (SOEs) Policy interest rate
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF
118
Chapter 2. Foreign Currency Exposure and the Financial Channel of Exchange Rates
Policy rate (AEs) Shadow rates for the U.S., the Euroarea, the U.K. and Japan






Lending rate Lending interest rate
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF
CPI Consumer price index
Source: Datastream
GDP Deflator GDP deflator
Source: Datastream
Credit to the private
sector
Credit to the private sector as a percent of GDP
Source: Datastream, BIS
VIX Option-implied volatility index




Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reporting claims on each
of the SOEs
Source: BIS





USD nominal effective exchange rate against major economies




Source: Bénétrix et al. (2015)
Assets in USD Assets in USD
Source: Bénétrix et al. (2015)
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Vulnerability Vulnerability index
Source: Iacoviello and Navarro (2019)
Trade with U.S. Trade intensity with the U.S.
Source: Iacoviello and Navarro (2019)
Trade openness (exports + imports)/nominal GDP
Source: World Bank and Datastream
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2.B Panel - Instrumental Variable SVAR
In this section, I discuss the alternative empirical model, namely a panel instrumen-
tal variable SVAR similar to Winne and Peersman (2018), as well as the data used
in this exercise, and the empirical results.
Using the instrument in an SVAR model
For each SOE, I estimate the following reduced-form VAR model:
yt = c+ Π(L)yt−p + Φ(L)xt−p + ut, (2.B.1)
where in the vector of endogenous variables (yt) contains the bilateral USD exchange
rate, the log of industrial production, log of CPI, the policy interest rate, net ex-
ports, bilateral capital flows with the US, and CDS. The choice of variables aims
at capturing the overall impact of exchange rate movements on the macroeconomy
working through the trade and the financial channel, respectively. The vector xt−p
contains the exogenous variables, i.e. the (shadow) Federal Funds Rate and the
VIX. The 7 × 1 vector c includes constant terms, the matrix Π(L) in lag polyno-
mials captures the autoregressive part of the model, and the vector ut contains k
serially uncorrelated innovations, or reduced-form shocks, with V (ut) = Σu. Lag
length selection for each EME is based on the AIC selection criteria.
Following Hachula and Nautz (2018), I use the proxy SVAR approach developed
by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013) to identify exchange rate
shocks with the instrument I constructed in the main part of the paper. Suppose
that the reduced-form innovations ut of the VAR are related to several uncorrelated
structural shocks. One of them is the exchange rate shock, εfxt , while the others
shocks are in the ε∗t . The relation between the reduced-form and the structural




The vector bfx captures the impact impulse to an exchange rate shock of size one.
The other shocks ε∗t are uncorrelated with ε
fx
t and are left unidentified as they play
no role for the question that I aim to answer in the study.
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Identification of shocks in the proxy VAR exploits their correlation with a set of
proxy variables (or external instruments) ηt, whereas the proxy needs to be uncorre-
lated with the other structural shocks. Similar to the case in the LP-IV estimation,
I need an instrument such that:
E(ηtε
fx
t ) = φ 6= 0, (2.B.3a)
E(ηtε
∗
t ) = 0. (2.B.3b)
The instrument ηt is ηˆt. As explained in the main text, I have constructed the
instrument such that it is unrelated to other shocks that drive SOEs’ fundamentals
and global variables. Under these conditions, the relative responses of two variables i
and j in the system to a exchange rate shock, bfxi /b
fx
j , can be consistently estimated
using the correlation between ηt and the estimated reduced-form residuals. Note
that this relative response allows to compute the response of all other variables to a
shock that affects the bilateral exchange rate against the USD by a pre-scaled size
on impact, say a 1% appreciation. Additionally assuming that Σε = I, Mertens and
Ravn (2013) show how to then fully retrieve bfx.
With the proxy ηt at hand, there are different options for implement the iden-
tification of the VAR model. In this paper, I follow Gertler and Karadi (2015) or
Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015) and employ a two stage least square approach. This
method starts with the estimated reduced-form residuals of the VAR, ut. Then, in
the first stage, ufxt , the reduced-form residual in the equation with the USD exchange
rate, is regressed on the instrument ηt:
ufxt = βηt + η
1
t , (2.B.4)
to form the fitted value uˆtfx. Intuitively, in this first stage regression the variation
in the reduced-form shock of the exchange rate is isolated that is due to exchange
rate shock. The second stage regressions are then carried out as follows:
uit = γ
iuˆt
fx + η2t (2.B.5)
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where uˆtfx is orthogonal to the error term η2,t given assumption (2.B.3b) and uit
is the reduced-form residual for each i equation of the VAR. This is done for all
equations other than the exchange rate equation. The estimated coefficient γˆi is a
consistent estimate of bfxi /b
fx
fx. Along with the assumption that Σ = I, this then
allows to generate impulse response functions to the exchange rate shock.
Usually, it is tested whether there is a sufficiently strong correlation between the
instrument and the reduced-form VAR innovations. This is a necessary condition
for the instrument to be considered a useful tool for analyzing the underlying drivers
of the variables. In particular, if a weak instrument problem is present, the results
from the second stage regression will not be informative. I test the relevance of
the instrument by adding a constant to equation 2.B.4 and by performing an F-
test. The resulting F-statistic in the first stage for the instrument that I obtain
is between 10.46 and 62.44, depending on each individual country. This is above
the recommended value of ten (see Stock et al., 2002) and indicates that a weak
instrument problem is not present.
Data
The data set consists of monthly series from 2000 - 2016. The monthly data for
the construction of the instruments for the exchange rate movements is obtained
from several sources. The USD effective exchange rate against major economies
and the VIX were retrieved from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data,
FRED. Further, time series for the industrial production, consumer price index,
policy interest rate of the U.S. and the other eight other major economies, were
obtained from Datastream. I also use equity price indices and a commodity price
index, both retrieved from Datastream.
Moreover, the monthly data for the SVAR analysis were retrieved from Datas-
tream and Bloomberg. One exception is the capital flows. The source of bond and
equity flows are the monthly estimates of changes in U.S. holdings of foreign secu-
rities provided by the Federal Reserve Board. This dataset is based on estimations
based on data reported by the Treasury International Capital Reporting System
(TIC). For details, see Bertaut and Tryon (2007) and Bertaut and Judson (2014).
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Results Panel SVAR
Figure 2.B.1: EMEs’ responses to a one percent depreciation of the USD



































(c) consumer price index
















































(g) credit default swap
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the EMEs’ variables to a one percent depreciation of the USD. Confidence bands are based on
1000 bootstrap replications.
Similar to Winne and Peersman (2018), I calculate the mean response (and con-
fidence bands) fot the 17 SOEs in my sample. Figure 2.B.1 shows the panel results,
i.e. the mean impulse responses across countries to a one percent depreciation of
the USD . In general, this results strongly hint to the importance of the financial
channel, especially the risk-taking channel of Hofmann et al. (2017). The depre-
ciation of the USD, i.e. the appreciation of each SOEs’ domestic currency, goes
hand-in-hand with increased portfolio inflows (they increase by around 70 million
USD on impact), and a decrease of around 3.5 percent in the CDS, the measures
for financial conditions and risk respectively. Net exports increase insignificantly
on impact due to the value effects after the depreciation of the USD, and decrease
significantly by around 0.2 percent after 5 months. The fall in net exports, which
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would have a negative impact on domestic GDP (proxied by industrial production),
appears to be compensated by the looser financial conditions and decreased risk,
as predicted by Hofmann et al. (2017), since IP increases significantly, reaching a
peak of around 0.2 percent after 5 months. Finally, prices measured by the CPI
decrease on impact due to lower import prices in EMEs, and increase insignificantly,
while interest rates do not have a significant reaction. Summing up, an appreciation
against the USD goes hand in hand with reduced risk, which in turn attracts capital
inflows, loosening financial conditions and boosting output, even though net exports
are significantly reduced.
Furthermore, Figure 2.B.2 shows the impulse responses of alternative measures
of risk and financial conditions. The government bond yield spread decreases on
average by 0.8 percentage points after the one percent appreciation vis-a-vis the
USD, while equity prices increase significantly by around 1.6 percent. This is in line
with the results and considerations above.
Figure 2.B.2: EMEs’ responses to a one percent depreciation of the USD - alternative
measures of risk and financial conditions








(a) 10-year government bond yield
spread







(b) equity price index
Note: The figure shows the estimated impulse responses, along with 68 percent confidence bands,
of the EMEs’ variables to a one percent depreciation of the USD. Confidence bands are based on
1000 bootstrap replications.
To sum up, the results from the proxy SVAR indicate that on average a cur-
rency appreciation against the USD is expansionary in the set of SOEs. The results
also suggest that the currency appreciation is expansionary because financial effects
dominate trade effects that would work in the opposite direction. This is in line
with the findings in section 2.4.
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2.C Appendix for Section 2.4
USD Liabilities, assets and trade openness















Note: The dashed red line depicts the median.













Note: The dashed red line depicts the median.
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Note: The dashed lines depict the medians.
Exchange rate correlations
Table 2.C.1: Correlations of the USD exchange rate against major currencies and
USD exchange rate against individual SOEs’ currencies
Brazil Chile Colombia Czech Rep. Hungary India Indonesia Israel Korea
0.61 0.67 0.78 0.94 0.75 0.21 0.22 0.51 0.47
Mexico Peru Philippines Poland Russia S. Africa Thailand Turkey
0.16 0.86 0.64 0.84 0.33 0.33 0.74 0.14
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Robustness checks
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Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of real GDP to a one percent
appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. Panel (a) shows the response for all countries. Panel
(b) shows the response when liabilities in USD are above median. Panel (b) shows the response
when liabilities in USD are below median. The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90%
and 95% confidence bands respectively.
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Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of real GDP to a one percent
appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. Panel (a) shows the response for all countries. Panel
(b) shows the response when liabilities in USD are above median. Panel (b) shows the response
when liabilities in USD are below median. The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90%
and 95% confidence bands respectively.
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Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of real GDP to a one percent
appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. Panel (a) shows the response for all countries. Panel
(b) shows the response when liabilities in USD are above median. Panel (b) shows the response
when liabilities in USD are below median. The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90%
and 95% confidence bands respectively.
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Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of real GDP to a one percent
appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. Panel (a) shows the response for all countries. Panel
(b) shows the response when liabilities in USD are above median. Panel (b) shows the response
when liabilities in USD are below median. The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90%
and 95% confidence bands respectively.
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Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of real GDP to a one percent
appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. Panel (a) shows the response for all countries. Panel
(b) shows the response when liabilities in USD are above median. Panel (b) shows the response
when liabilities in USD are below median. The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90%
and 95% confidence bands respectively.
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Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of real GDP to a one percent
appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. Panel (a) shows the response for all countries. Panel
(b) shows the response when liabilities in USD are above median. Panel (b) shows the response
when liabilities in USD are below median. The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90%
and 95% confidence bands respectively.
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2.D Appendix DSGE model























































































































+ (1− ω) (pFt )1−γc) (2.D.13)







































































































































Θ(xt)− (µt + µ∗txt)
(2.D.30)
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qtkbt = φtnt (2.D.38)

































































rnt − rn = (1− ρi) [ωi(pit − pi) + ωy(gdpt − gdp) + ωe(∆et)] + ρi(rnt−1− rn) + ξMPt
(2.D.45)





Foreign economy and shocks
The foreign economy is given by:





(R∗t −R∗) + ξ˜y
∗
t (2.D.47)
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AR(1) processes for all shocks except for the domestic and foreign monetary policy
shocks. The processes take the following form:
at = a = ρa (at−1 − a) + t,
where at is the exogenous variable of interest and t is the shock of interest.
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Data for estimation
Figure 2.D.1: Brazil: Demeaned data for estimation
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Figure 2.D.2: Poland: Demeaned data for estimation
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The Impact of International Capital Flows on Do-
mestic Investment1
3.1 Introduction
In the mid 1990s, emerging market economies (EMEs) started an unprecedented
process of financial account liberalization, which lead to higher capital flows, and to
a heated debate about the effects of these flows on the economy. About a decade
later, as several major economies implemented unconventional monetary policies in
response to the global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis, EMEs experienced
again large and volatile flows of capital. This revived the discussion about the
determinants of those flows2 and about their short- and medium-term effects on
economic and financial conditions.
In this paper, we revisit this discussion and re-assess the relationship between
capital flows and investment, a key determinant of medium-term economic devel-
opment in EMEs. In particular, we study whether changes in capital flows affect
domestic investment significantly. Moreover, we compare the effects in EMEs with
those in advanced economies (AEs) and assess whether economic responses in EMEs
and AEs differ from each other. We also aim to understand what accounts for the
differences. We use Local Projections Instrumental-Variable (LP-IV) methods to
estimate the impact of capital flows and its subcategories, i.e. foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), portfolio flows and credit, on investment for a panel of EMEs and AEs.
1This chapter is based on a research paper that is joint work with Florentine Schwark.
2See Fratzscher (2012), Forbes and Warnock (2012), Ahmed and Zlate (2014) for a detailed analysis
on the determinants of capital flows.
141
Chapter 3. The Impact of International Capital Flows on Domestic Investment
To address the potential endogeneity of capital flows, we follow Mody and Murshid
(2005) and construct an instrument based on the weighted sum of capital flows into
and from a region. This instrument is strongly correlated with capital flows into
and from an individual country and at the same it is likely that it is exogenous to
single countries in our sample (Mody and Murshid, 2005; Mileva, 2008).
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, in a static setting, we find
that net capital inflows increase investment significantly in EMEs, while the effect
of capital flows in AEs is much weaker. Moreover, we find that the lending interest
rate - our proxy for domestic financial conditions - has a weaker effect on investment
in EMEs than in AEs. Our impulse responses estimated with local projections also
confirm the static results: the increase in investment due to higher capital flows is
stronger and more persistent in EMEs. Regarding the composition of capital inflows,
we find that net FDI increases investment significantly, while net portfolio inflows
have no significant impact. This result is in line with Mody and Murshid (2005)
who argue that FDI has a higher level of productivity than portfolio flows due to
profound knowledge of direct investors regarding the domestic economy. We also
find that portfolio flows firms have a significant impact, which might be due to the
same reasoning. Finally, we examine whether foreign capital flows (gross inflows)
have a different impact on the economy than domestic ones (gross outflows)3. In
this case, we find that capital inflows have generally a larger effect on investment
than outflows, which shows that foreign capital is more productive than domestic
one, maybe because foreign flows are accompanied by foreign know-how or human
capital.
Next, we aim to understand which country characteristics account for the signifi-
cant differences between the responses in EMEs and AEs. There are several possible
explanations for our results, but with our empirical model we can test two of them.
First, as pointed out by Mody and Murshid (2005), capital inflows may be more pro-
ductive in countries where capital is relatively scarce. This implies that capital flows
have a larger impact on investment in countries that are relatively poor. If this is
true, then the impact of capital flows in relatively rich EMEs would be weaker than
in relatively poor EMEs. Thus, to test whether a country’s wealth determines the
3See Forbes and Warnock (2012) for the a discussion on gross inflows and outflows and the impor-
tance of studying them separately.
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effect of capital flows on investment and thus accounts for the distinct response in
AEs, we condition the responses in EMEs to the level of GDP per capita. Moreover,
a second explanation would be financial development. EMEs have less developed
financial systems than AEs, so they may be more dependent on foreign capital to
finance investment, hence the larger impact of capital flows on EMEs’ investment.
To test this, we condition the response of investment in EMEs on the degree of fi-
nancial development. EMEs with relatively more developed financial systems would
profit less from capital flows than EMEs with more developed financial system. We
find robust evidence supporting the latter hypothesis and show that financial de-
velopment is the key determinant of the strength of the effect of capital flows on
investment.
One implication of our findings is that capital flows in general, and FDI in partic-
ular, have indeed a large, positive impact on EMEs’s investment and therefore also
possibly on the future production capacity. Thus, EMEs would profit from creating
an environment that is attractive to foreign capital. Moreover, since we observe that
capital flows have stronger effects in countries with less developed financial sectors,
we can infer that those countries are less resilient to adverse effects of large swings
in capital flows. Thus, a further implication of our findings is that financial devel-
opment is important to strengthen a country’s resilience to phenomena like sudden
stops or capital surges.
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it is close to studies on
the impact of net capital flows on investment in EMEs for earlier periods. Bosworth
and Collins (1999) concluded that capital inflows into EMEs have significantly raised
domestic investment. They found that this effect is even stronger for FDI flows.
Similarly, Mody and Murshid (2005) find a positive effect when assessing the impact
of flows on investment. In a very similar vein, Mileva (2008) analyzes the effect of
FDI, foreign loans, and portfolio flows on domestic investment in a panel of Eastern
European countries and former Soviet republics. She also finds a significant effect,
especially for FDI flows. The first two papers use data from 1970s to the late 1990s,
while the latter focuses on the period 1995-2005. Moreover, Fukuda et al. (2013)
study the effect of U.S. monetary policy prior to the financial crisis on some advanced
economies as well as on Latin American and Asian countries. They find a stronger
spillover effects on output during the 1990s than during the 2000s. Further, they
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build a DSGE model to provide a theoretical framework to their empirical findings.
Furthermore, Igan et al. (2016) study whether capital inflows have an impact on
industry growth in EMEs, and whether these effects are potentially influenced by
the composition of capital inflows, the dependency of different sectors on foreign
finance. They find a significant impact of inflows on growth in industries that are
particularly dependent on external finance. Finally, Desai et al. (2005) investigate
whether FDI outflows decrease the level of domestic investment in the U.S., which
relates to our analysis of the effects of net capital flows on advanced economies.
Second, this study is related to the large literature on the benefits and costs of
financial account liberalization including global financial integration and relaxation
of capital account restrictions, especially for EMEs and developing countries. On the
one side, some studies suggests that financial account openness is a source of insta-
bility and propose the introduction of capital controls and other macro-prudential
measures (e.g., Rodrik, 1998, Bhagwati, 1998 and Ostry et al., 2010). On the other
side, other present evidence that financial integration has positive effects on growth
(Bekaert et al., 2005, Kose et al., 2011), depending on the degree of financial depth
and institutional quality. Also Kose et al. (2006) find that financial globalization
can be beneficial for developing countries after an extensive literature review. The
results in our paper suggest that while an increase in capital flows increases invest-
ment, EMEs’ dependency on foreign capital due to less developed financial systems
may pose a risk, as swings in capital flows may affect EMEs strongly.
Finally, our essay is linked to studies on the connection between financial devel-
opment, investment and economic growth. Levine (2005) presents model-based and
empirical evidence that imply that better developed financial systems enhances in-
vestment and growth, as financial systems ease financing constrains that firms may
face. Finally, Xu (2000) shows evidence that investment is an important channel,
through which financial development affects growth.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 3.2 comprises the
description of the data, and our empirical model. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we present
our results, and Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Data and empirical model
3.2.1 Data
Our data set consists of annual data covering 34 EMEs and 26 AEs from 1999 - 2019.
We have an unbalanced panel, thus for some countries we have slightly shorter time
series. We use time series on real investment, capital flows and its components, real
GDP, lending and policy interest rates, credit to the private sector as a percentage
of GDP, the primary balance and the VIX. All variables, except for the interest rates
and those that are expressed as percentage of GDP, are transformed by taking their
logarithm. Further, we use the IMF’s financial development index, the financial
account openness index by Chinn and Ito (2006) and the vulnerability index by
Iacoviello and Navarro (2019). Tables 3.A and 3.A.2 in the appendix show the full
list of countries, of the data, the transformations and the sources.
3.2.2 Empirical model
Similar to Mody and Murshid (2005) and Mileva (2008), we are interested in the ef-
fects of the capital flows and its components, net and gross, on domestic investment.
For that purpose, we estimate the cumulative response of investment, Ii,t+h− Ii,t−1,
at horizon h, to an exogenous change in capital flows. Following Jordà et al. (2015),
these effects are modeled as:
Ii,t+h − Ii,t−1 = αi + βhKi,t + Πh(L)∆Ii,t−1 + Ξh(L)∆xi,t−1 + ui,t+h, , (3.1)
where i and t country and time indices, αi are country fixed effects, Πh(L) and Ξh(L)
are polynomials in the lag operator, with L = 1 in the baseline. Ki,t is a matrix
that contains either net, gross, FDI, loans, or portfolio flows (all as a share of GDP).
The matrix xi,t−1 is a set of controls such as real GDP, the lending interest rate,
credit to the private sector as a percent of GDP, the primary balance as a percent
of GDP and the VIX. The latter is our measure for country-invariant uncertainty
and for the global financial cycle (see Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015). We also
include the lagged value of investment. Note that all variables enter the equation
in first differences. We consider h = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, measuring the effects up to four
years ahead. Accordingly, βh measures the dynamic average cumulative response of
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investment at horizon h to a change in capital flows Ki,t. Following Ben Zeev (2019),
we use Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors that allow arbitrary correlations
of the error term across countries and time.
Finally, for the estimation of Equation (3.1), we use aggregated net and gross
capital flows data as well as disaggregated data by type of flows. We do this for
several reasons: First, we use data on net inflows to obtain a general understanding
of the effects of in- or decreasing financial flows. Second, we disaggregate the data to
analyze the absolute and relative importance of different types of flows, e.g. whether
the effect on investment of FDI is larger than that of loans or whether portfolio flows
are more productive than loans. Finally, we want to differentiate between gross and
net capital outflows because, as Mileva (2008) argues, foreign capital (gross capital
inflows) may be more productive than domestic capital (gross capital outflow). More
importantly, Broner et al. (2013) and Forbes and Warnock (2012) have shown that,
especially for the period in which we are interested, gross flows have been more
volatile and large, while net flows have been relatively more stable. Therefore, only
studying net inflows may mask interesting dynamics. Also, extreme episodes of
gross capital inflows and outflows have different effects on the economy (Forbes and
Warnock, 2012), thus it can be argued that in general different types of gross capital
inflows and outflows can affect the economies differently.
3.3 Panel Results
3.3.1 Instrument and first stage regressions
As discussed in the introduction and highlighted by Mody and Murshid (2005), we
encounter an important issue while estimating Equation (3.1), namely the problem
of reverse causality. It may run from investment to capital flows, not the other
way around as implied by Equation (3.1). Thus an OLS estimation would lead to
inconsistent estimates. To deal with this problem, we follow Mody and Murshid
(2005) and Mileva (2008), and we build an instrument based on the GDP weighted
sum of capital flows to different regions. For example, in the case of Brazil, our
instrument is the weighted sum of capital flows into and from the Latin American
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countries in our sample minus the flows into and from Brazil.4 We are aware that
these regional flows only reflect supply side or push factors, so this variable would
obviously not account for pull factors attracting capital flows to individual countries.
However, as discussed below, regional flows prove to be a good instrument for capital
flows.5 With the instrument at hand, we estimate Equation (3.1) with Two Stage
Least Squares, following Jordà et al. (2015).
Table 3.3.1: First stage regressions
Capital flows or its components ( as % of GDP)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
EMEs baseline AEs baseline EMEs inflows EMEs outflows
Regional net inflows§ 0.11∗∗∗ (33.22) 0.04∗∗∗ (13.01)
Regional inflows§ 0.11∗∗∗(34)
Regional outflows§ 0.11∗∗∗ (37.21)
Lag investment 0.07 ∗∗ 0.59 0.003 -0.07∗∗
Real GDP -0.1 -1.39 0.074 0.16
Lending rate -0.011 0.40 0.016 0.02
Primary balance (% of GDP) -0.03 0.58 -0.04 -0.01
Terms of trade -0.017 0.31 -0.007 0.008
VIX -0.0008 0.005 -0.0007 -0.0005
R2 0.29 0.09 0.35 0.18
Number of observations 587 452 587
Number of countries 34 26 34 34
§ as % of GDP
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The F-statistics of the instruments are in parenthesis.
In order for our instrument to be valid, regional flows should be correlated with
capital flows into individual EMEs and AEs. Table 3.3.1 reports the results of the
first stage regression for four specifications. The first two columns shows the results
from the baseline specification for EMEs and AEs respectively. The third and fourth
column reports the results when we consider inflows and outflows separately and
show only the coefficients for EMEs. To see the results when we study the effects
4We do not split AEs into regional groups, and we consider them to be all in one region. Thus the
instrument would reflect the global pool of capital available in AEs.
5A similar approach was proposed by Blanchard et al. (2015).
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of the different components of capital flows, see the fifth, sixth and seventh column
of Table 3.A.3 in the appendix.6 The F-statistic of regional flows (in parenthesis),
which is always well above 10, suggests that the instrument is relevant, in the sense
of Stock and Watson (2018). Moreover, regional flows should be exogenous to single
countries in our sample. Since the regional flows variable for an individual country
does not include the capital flows into that specific country, the instrument should be
unrelated to all other domestic variables in that individual country. In this sense, as
suggested by Mody and Murshid (2005) and Mileva (2008), the instrument is likely
to be exogenous.
3.3.2 The capital flows - investment relation: EMEs vs. AEs
We begin by comparing how net capital inflows, and gross inflows and outflows
affect investment in EMEs and AEs. First, we aim to have a broad picture about
the relative importance of capital flows in determining domestic investment, thus we
are not only interested in the coefficient βh, but also on the estimated coefficients
of the other controls. Thus, Table 3.3.2 reports the estimates of Equation (3.1) for
h = 0. The first column shows the baseline estimation for EMEs, the second the
baseline estimation for AEs, the third the estimation with gross inflows and outflows
for EMEs, and the last one the estimates for the components of net capital inflows.
The estimated coefficients for capital flows can be interpreted as the response of
investment to an increase in capital flows on impact.
We find that in EMEs, a one percentage point increase in net capital inflows in-
creases investment significantly by 0.91 percent. An increase in GDP raises invest-
ment significantly by 0.49 percent, an increase in the lending interest rate decreases
investment significantly by 0.34 percent, as expected, and a one percent improve-
ment of the terms of trade increases it significantly by 0.23 percent. We do not find
a significant effect of lagged investment, the primary balance or the VIX. Moving to
the estimation for AEs (the second column), we find that net capital inflows have a
much weaker impact in AEs, but at the same time the lending rate and the primary
balance have a much stronger effect, decreasing investment by 2.57 percent and in-
creasing it by 0.69 percent respectively. Summing up, we find that capital flows have
stronger effects on investment in EMEs than in AEs, and at the same time, domestic
6Table 3.A.3 shows the full results for the first stage regressions.
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financial conditions, proxied by the lending interest rate, and domestic factors are
more important in AEs.7
Table 3.3.2: EMEs vs. AEs
Real investment Ii,t − Ii,t−1
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
EMEs baseline AEs baseline EMEs EMEs
infl. & outfl. compon.
Net inflows (% of GDP) 0.91∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
Inflows (% of GDP) 0.67∗∗∗
Outflows (% of GDP) -0.24
Net FDI inflows (% of GDP) 2.11∗∗∗
Net portfolio inflows (% of GDP) 0.44∗
Net credit inflows (% of GDP) 0.87
Lag investment -0.04 -0.11 -0.01 -0.06
GDP growth (per capita) 0.49∗∗ 1.55∗∗ 0.39∗ 0.34
Lending rate -0.34∗ -2.57∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗ -0.37∗∗
Primary balance (% of GDP) 0.14 0.69∗∗∗ 0.11 0.12
Terms of trade 0.23∗∗∗ 0.06 0.22∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗
VIX -0.001 -0.07∗ 0.001 0.0007
Number of observations 587 452 587 587
Number of countries 34 26 34 34
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
R2 is omitted because it lacks informative contents in the IV estimation.
Turning our attention to gross inflows and outflows, we find that inflows have
a significant positive effect on investment in EMEs (third column in Table 3.3.2),
while outflows do not affect investment significantly. This could indicate that foreign
capital is more productive than domestic one, as it may also involve inflows of know-
how and even human capital. All other estimates remain similar to those from the
7Our results are robust to other indicators for domestic financial condition, e.g. the policy interest
rate and credit to the private sector. See the appendix for those results.
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baseline. Finally, column (4) shows the results when we study the components of
net capital inflows collectively. We find, as do Mody and Murshid (2005) and Mileva
(2008), that FDI and credit affect domestic investment significantly, while portfolio
flows do not. The stronger effects of FDI, and to a lesser extent the effects of portfolio
flows, can be attributed to the fact that direct investors may have a more detailed
knowledge of the host country’s economy and the specific sector in which they are
investing. At the same time, direct investors, in contrast to international creditors
and even portfolio investors, potentially gain control of the business in which they
are investing. This perhaps also involves the implementation of foreign technologies
and the transfer of know-how. Again all other coefficient remain quantitatively
similar to the estimates of the baseline specification.
As explained above, we are also interested in gross FDI, portfolio and credit flows.
Thus, we estimate a version of Equation 3.1, where we include gross in- and outflows
of the different subcategories. The results are presented in Table 3.3.3. The first
column shows the effects of gross FDI flows. We find that a one percentage point
increase in FDI inflows increases domestic investment by 2.34 percent, while an
increase in outflows decreases it significantly by 2.32 percent. Moreover, we find
that portfolio inflows increase in domestic investment significantly, while outflows
do not. Finally, credit inflows also increase domestic investment significantly, and
outflows decrease it, but the magnitude of the effect of inflows is higher. Thus, we
also see in these last two cases that foreign capital indeed has a stronger effect on
investment.
However, the focus of our analysis is the differences between the effects of capital
flows in EME and AEs. After understanding that net capital inflows have a larger
effect on impact on investment in EMEs, while domestic conditions seem to be more
important in AEs, we want to understand the dynamic effects of capital flows. For
that purpose, we estimate Equation (3.1) fot h = 0, ..., 4 and compute the cumulative
response of investment to a one percentage point increase in net capital inflows in
EMEs and AEs separately. Figure 3.3.1 presents the impulse responses constructed
using LP-IVs. Net capital inflows increase investment in EMEs on impact, reaching
a peak after one year. The response is still significant up to two years after the
initial increase in net capital inflows. In AEs, the rise in investment resulting from
an increase in net capital inflows is small and is significantly different from zero
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only on impact. The differences between these two different groups of countries is
significant and striking: capital flows have much stronger and longer lasting effects
in EMEs.
Table 3.3.3: Gross inflows and outflows: FDI, credit and portfolio
Real investment Ii,t − Ii,t−1
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
EMEs FDI EMEs credit EMEs portfolio
FDI inflows (% of GDP) 2.34∗∗∗
FDI outflows (% of GDP) -2.32∗∗∗
Portfolio inflows (% of GDP) 1.72∗∗
Portfolio outflows (% of GDP) 1.34
Credit inflows (% of GDP) 1.37∗∗∗
Credit outflows (% of GDP) -0.65∗∗∗
Lag investment -0.05 -0.03 -0.07
GDP growth (per capita) 0.32 0.54∗∗ 0.31
Lending rate -0.39∗∗ -0.35∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗
Primary balance (% of GDP) 0.08 0.08 0.09
Terms of trade 0.17∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
VIX -0.008 0.04 0.008
Number of observations 591 587 587
Number of countries 34 34 34
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
R2 is omitted because it lacks informative contents in the IV estimation.
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Figure 3.3.1: Real Investment response to a one percentage point increase in net
capital inflows
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Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of real investment to a one
percentage point increase in capital flows. Panel (a) shows the response in EMEs and panel (b)
shows the response in AEs. The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90% and 95%
confidence bands respectively.
3.4 Country characteristics, capital flows to EMEs and AEs
and the domestic financial sector
3.4.1 Data examination
The clear differences in the IRFs and in the estimated coefficients for the lending
rate suggest that in EMEs capital flows play a more important role for investment,
while in AEs domestic financial conditions seem to be more important. Next, we
inspect the data for net capital inflows in AEs and EMEs, as well as at domestic
credit, in order to have a more detailed understanding of our results. We can see
a much larger share of GDP of net inflows in EMEs compared to AEs (see Figures
3.4.1 and 3.4.2).
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In addition, the domestic credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP is much
smaller for EMEs than for AEs, which may result in a higher dependency of firms on
international creditors since available financial assets may not always be available
from domestic creditors (see Figures 3.4.3 and 3.4.4). These comparisons suggest
that, in EMEs, funding to domestic firms is more often granted by international
investors. Another way to understand the dependency of local investment on foreign
creditors is to look at domestic credit in relation to international capital flows.
Again, we find that the domestic credit market is much larger and important in
AEs than in EMEs (see Figure 3.4.5).































































































Chapter 3. The Impact of International Capital Flows on Domestic Investment

















































































































Chapter 3. The Impact of International Capital Flows on Domestic Investment
3.4.2 What accounts for the differences?
We aim to understand what accounts for the differences between EMEs and AEs,
specifically those in the impact of capital flows on investment. As we showed be-
fore, capital flows seem to be more important in EMEs while domestic financial
conditions, i.e. lending rate, in AEs. One possible explanation is that international
capital is more productive and therefore has a stronger impact on investment in
countries where it is relative scarce, i.e. where its marginal product is higher. We
can further argue, that capital is more productive in countries that are relatively
poor, as they have less capital than relatively rich countries. Figures 3.4.6 and 3.4.7
show GDP per capita in the countries in our sample. As EMEs are poorer than
AEs, this explanation possibly accounts for our earlier results: capital flows have a
stronger impact on investment in EMEs, maybe because EMEs are poorer, thus in
those countries the marginal product of capital flows is larger.
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Moreover, our results could also be explained by the differences in financial de-
velopment between EMEs and AEs. As we can see in Figures 3.4.8 and 3.4.9, the
IMF’ financial development index is generally lower for EMEs, i.e. their financial
sectors are less developed and thus EMEs may be forced to rely more heavily on
foreign sources of funds for investment.
In order to test which of the two possible explanations accounts for the differences
between EMEs and AEs, we exploit the inter and intra-group heterogeneity in the
countries. As we saw above, AEs and EMEs differentiate themselves in GDP per
capita and financial development, among other characteristics.8 Moreover, we see
in Figures 3.4.6 - 3.4.9, the AEs in our sample does not have large intra-group
differences in GDP per capita and financial development. At the same time, we
see that EMEs are very heterogeneous in those respects. For instance, our group of
EMEs has more variability in the data with GDP per capita ranging from around
5,000 USD in some cases to almost 30,000 USD. Thus, due to the lack of variance in
the AEs, we only can test our two candidate explanations in the group of EMEs, for
8In the analysis below, these other characteristics will be captured to certain extent by country
fixed effects. However, their careful analysis is important, and is one of the next steps in this
research project.
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which we assess whether the effect of capital flows on investment in richer and/or
more financially developed EMEs differs from the responses in poor and/or less
financially developed EMEs. This will shed light on which of these two explanations
account for the results above.
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Thus, we exploit the heterogeneity of countries in our sample of EMEs, and re-
estimate Equation (3.1) adding a dummy that controls for the relative wealth of a
country and a dummy that controls for the relative development of its financial sys-
tem. Moreover, as a robustness check and to rule out other possible explanations, we
also add dummies that control for a country’s external vulnerability (see Iacoviello
and Navarro, 2019) and capital account openness (see Chinn and Ito, 2006). We
construct the first dummy in the following way: it equals one when a country’s mean
GDP per capita in PPP terms in the period analyzed terms is above the median
in EMEs, and it equals zero when it is below. Similarly, the dummy for financial
development equals one when a country’s mean IMF’s financial development index
between 1999- 2018 is above the cross-country median and zero when it is below.
We build the other dummies in the same way. We then interact these dummies
with the capital flows variables, and if, e.g., a country’s relative wealth is the key
determinant of the strength of the effects of capital flows on investment, then we
would see that in relatively richer EMEs, capital flows have a smaller effect on in-
vestment. By contrast, if domestic financial development is the main driver of our
results above, we would see that in EMEs with more developed financial sectors the
effect of capital flows is smaller than in the other group. Understanding whether
there is a difference between richer and poorer EMEs and/or EMEs with more and
less developed financial sectors, would shed light on what determines the strength
of the impact of capital flows on investment, and also would indirectly account for
the differences between AEs and EMEs.
Table 3.4.1 reports the results. Column (1) shows the results when we include the
dummies and interaction terms for GDP per capita and financial development. The
coefficient for the interaction between net capital inflows and GDP is negative, i.e.
the impact of net capital inflows on investment is smaller in rich EMEs. However,
this effect is not significantly different from zero. Next, we see that the interaction
between net capital inflows and the dummy for financial development is negative,
i.e. the impact of capital inflows is smaller in EMEs with more developed financial
sector. The value of the estimated coefficients of the other controls remain similar.
Column (2) shows the results of the estimation when we include interaction variables
for other possible determinants of the impact of capital inflows on investment, such
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as external vulnerability or financial openness. The main message from column (1)
remains and we observe only a significant effect of financial development.
Table 3.4.1: Net capital flows: country characteristics
Real investment
Ii,t − Ii,t−1
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Orthog.
Net capital inflows (% of GDP) 1.37∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗
Net capital inflows × GDP per cap. -0.31 -0.17 -0.22
Net capital inflows × financial dev. -0.74∗∗∗ -0.84∗∗∗ -0.41∗
Net capital inflows × vulnerability -0.17
Net capital inflows × financial open. -0.29
Lag investment -0.06 -0.05 -0.03
Real GDP 0.54∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.46∗∗
Lending rate -0.34∗ -0.34∗∗ -0.34∗∗
Primary balance (% of GDP) 0.14 0.13 0.11
Terms of trade 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
VIX -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
Number of observations 587 587 587
Number of countries 34 34 34
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
R2 is omitted because it lacks informative contents in the IV estimation.
However, these results may be misleading, since there is a positive correlation
between financial development and GDP per capita (see Figure 3.4.10). This is ex-
pected, as it is reasonable to think that rich countries have indeed more developed
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financial sector, or that high financial development may foster GDP growth. Thus,
we need to disentangle these two effects to be able to attribute the corss-sectional
defferences on one of them. To do so, we regress the financial development index on
lagged GDP per capita, and we compute the resulting errors. They should be free
from the the effects of GDP, thus we build our dummy for financial development
based on this transformation. We do the same for GDP per capita: we regress it
on the lagged financial development index, and the resulting errors should be free
of the effect of financial development. Again, we build the dummy for the level of
GDP per capita based on this. Column (3) shows the results of the estimation using
these orthogonalized dummies. Even though the coefficient of financial development
is smaller, it is still significant. This strongly suggest that financial development is
what accounts for cross-country differences in the effects of capital flowson invest-
ment.
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After understanding that financial development is potentially the main driver
between cross country differences in the EMEs, and thus perhaps accounts for the
differences between EMEs and AEs, we estimate the response of investment to a one
percentage point increase in net capital inflows. To understand the role of financial
development, we split our sample of EMEs in two groups: those with high financial
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development (Figure 3.4.11 panel a) and those with low (panel b), and estimate
Equation (3.1) for h = 1, ..., 4 and for each group. For completeness sake, panel (c)
of Figure 3.4.11 shows the response of AEs, also shown in Figure 3.3.1.
Figure 3.4.11: Real Investment response to a one percentage point increase in net
capital inflows
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Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of real investment to a one
percentage point increase in capital flows. Panel (a) shows the response in EMEs with high financial
development, panel (b) shows the response in EMEs with low financial development, and panel
(c) shows the response in AEs. The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90% and 95%
confidence bands respectively.
The response of investment in EMEs with high financial development looks very
similar to the response in AEs: a one percentage point increase in net capital inflows
increases investment by around half a percent on impact. The response is short-
lived and the effect disappears after just one year. In EMEs with low financial
development investment increases by over one percent on impact, the response is
significant for a longer time, reaching a peak after one year and fading out after two
years. This means that capital flows have a weaker impact on investment EMEs
with high financial development. This suggests that financial development account
for the differences between AEs and EMEs. As mentioned before, one possible
explanation for this result is that the private sector in EMEs relies more heavily on
foreign sources of financing, due to the less developed domestic financial markets. In
this sense, international capital flows act as a substitute for perhaps more expensive
and less accessible domestic funds.
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Figure 3.4.12: Real Investment response to a one percentage point increase in the
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Note: The figure shows the estimated cumulative impulse responses of real investment to a one
percentage point increase in capital flows. Panel (a) shows the response in EMEs with high financial
development, panel (b) shows the response in EMEs with low financial development, and panel
(c) shows the response in AEs. The dark gray and light gray areas represent the 90% and 95%
confidence bands respectively.
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Next, Figure 3.4.12 repeats the same exercise but focuses on the effects of the
different types of flows. The first row shows investment’s response to an increase in
net FDI inflows, the second row the response to net credit inflows and the last row
the response to portfolio inflows. Again, panel (a) corresponds to countries with
high financial development and panel (b) to EMEs with low financial development.
These results confirm out earlier insights: it appears that the degree of financial
development accounts for cross country differences in the effect of capital flows on
investment. Financial development affects specially the effect of FDI, which in turn
is the component of capital flows that has the largest impact on investment (see also
Tables 3.3.2 and 3.3.3). Again, these results point to financial development as a key
driver of the cross-country differences.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated how capital inflows and their different subcategories,
i.e., foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio flows and credit, affect domestic in-
vestment, which is an important indicator for medium-term economic development.
We compared the results for EMEs with those for AEs. Our estimations showed that
investment in EMEs is more dependent on international capital flows than those in
AEs. Moreover, changes in investment in EMEs depend on variations in net FDI
and portfolio inflows. We found indications that the difference in the effects of cap-
ital flows in EMEs and AEs is linked to the differences in financial development.
Specifically, we found that investment in EMEs with high financial development
respond to increases in capita flows the same way as AEs do. At the same time,
EMEs with lower financial development experience strong increases in investment
after an exogenous increase in (net) capital inflows.
Our results have several implications for policy makers. First, we found that FDI
inflows have a very strong positive impact on investment in EMEs. Thus, policy
markers may be interested in generating the tight conditions to attract this type of
flows. Moreover, the fact that EMEs with low financial development experience a
stronger effect of capital flows on investment, also suggests that these countries may
be more prone to suffer the adverse effects of capital flow reversals or sudden stops.
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Thus, policies aimed at granting a better access to domestic financing may isolate
EMEs from volatile global financial conditions.
However, since this essay is work in progress, we still have to address several
issues. For instance, we do not have a clear, structural explanation why financial
development weakens the effects of capital flows on investment. Moreover, we have
not explored other potential factors that could affect the international capital flows
- investment relation, such as institutional quality, quality of policies (Mody and
Murshid, 2005), exchange rate arrangements and competitiveness, or cross-industry
differences in access to domestic and foreign finance and to foreign markets (Igan
et al., 2016). Finally, we have pointed out that domestic credit conditions appear to
matter more for AEs than for EMEs. To explore this important issue in detail, and
to have a better and more robust analysis, we need to address the possible reverse
causality between investment and domestic financial conditions. In this paper, we
address this issue by using the lag of the lending interest rate. This analysis may
possibly benefit from identifying domestic credit supply shocks to explore this point
in a structural way. Thus, this essay’s conclusions should be taken carefully.
165
Chapter 3. The Impact of International Capital Flows on Domestic Investment
Appendix
3.A Data and sources
Table 3.A.1: Data construction and sources




Source: World Development Indicators.
Net capital inflows capital inflows - capital outflows (depending on the type we use
either PDI, loans or portfolio flows), as % of GDP
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.
Gross capital flows Either FDI, loans or portfolio flows (equity + bond flows), as %
of GDP.
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.
Real GDP Domestic currency, logarithm




Source: World Development Indicators.
VIX Option-implied volatility index.





Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.
Policy interest rate As nominal short-term rate, we choose the monetary policy rate
(exact definition depends on policy measures of the respective
country (“target rate”, “policy rate”, ...). Percent.
Source: Datastream.
Credit to the pri-
vate sector
% of GDP.
Source: Datastream, World Development Indicators.
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Terms of Trade Logarithm
growth Source: Datastream.
Total Flows Sum of capital flows to all countries of the same group minus the
flows to each specific country
Source: Own calculations based on the International Financial
Statistics Dataset.
Regional Flows Sum of capital flows to all countries of the same geographic region
and country group minus the flows to each specific country







Chinn and Ito (2006).
Vulnerability Index Iacoviello and Navarro (2019)
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ria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa,







































Table 3.A.3: First stage regressions
Capital flows or its components ( as % of GDP)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
EMEs baseline AEs baseline EMEs inflows EMEs outflows EMEs FDI EMEs portfolio EMEs credit
Regional net inflows§ 0.11∗∗∗ (33.22) 0.04∗∗∗ (13.01)
Regional inflows§ 0.11∗∗∗(34)
Regional outflows§ 0.11∗∗∗ (37.21)
Regional net FDI inflows§ 0.10∗∗∗ (18.5)
Regional net portfolio inflows§ 0.11∗∗∗ (29.49)
Regional net credit inflows§ 0.12∗∗∗ (37.7)
Lag investment 0.07 ∗∗ 0.59 0.003 -0.07∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.00 0.04∗∗
Real GDP -0.1 -1.39 0.074 0.16 0.01 0.008 -0.12
Lending rate -0.011 0.40 0.016 0.02 0.022∗∗ -0.012 -0.022
Primary balance (% of GDP) -0.03 0.58 -0.04 -0.01 -0.006 0.002 -0.015
Terms of trade -0.017 0.31 -0.007 0.008 0.01∗ 0.0003 -0.03
VIX -0.0008 0.005 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.0006 0.0002
R2 0.29 0.09 0.35 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.30
Number of observations 587 452 587 587 591 587 591
Number of countries 34 26 34 34 34 34 34
§ as % of GDP
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The F-statistics of the instruments are in parenthesis.
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3.B Robustness
Table 3.B.1: Robustness: other proxies for domestic financial conditions
Real investment Ii,t − Ii,t−1
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
EMEs EMEs AEs AEs
Net inflows (% of GDP) 0.86∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
Lag investment -0.03 -0.15 -0.03 -0.1
Real GDP 0.60∗∗ 1.4∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 1.31∗
Policy rate -0.07∗ -0.43∗
Credit to the priv. sector (% of GDP) -0.17 0.2∗
Primary balance (% of GDP) 0.14 0.49∗∗ 0.12 0.52∗∗∗
Terms of trade 0.23∗∗∗ 0.03 0.22∗∗∗ 0.05
VIX -0.007 -0.10∗∗ 0.04 -0.10∗∗∗
Number of observations 591 453 591 587
Number of countries 34 26 34 34
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.






The Drivers of Public Debt: A Holistic Approach1
4.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a rapid increase in public debt. In 2007, gross general
government debt in advanced economies stood at around 70 percent of GDP; by
2013, it had risen to over 105 percent (IMF, 2014). The resulting concerns over
sovereign debt sustainability have led to significant financial and economic disrup-
tion, and the optimal policy response to these elevated debt levels is a topic of
controversy among policymakers and academics. The proximate causes of this rapid
increase in debt are well know. Deep recessions reduced nominal GDP and caused
primary balances to deteriorate; banking sector recapitalization forced steep changes
in the debt level; and in some cases, sovereign bond yields spiked, increasing the
cost of debt. But what is less clear is how these various drivers of debt interacted
with each other to propagate or mitigate their eventual impact on the debt level.
For instance, a shock to the marginal interest rate on sovereign debt, perhaps as
a result of increased risk aversion will, ceteris paribus, leads to an increase in the
debt-to-GDP ratio. But this spike in yields may also have a detrimental effect on
real growth, which would worsen debt dynamics further. On the other-hand, the
government may react to this increase in yields by undertaking fiscal consolidation,
which would improve debt dynamics. The overall path of debt, especially over the
medium term, is unclear. But gaining a deeper understanding of these dynamics is
critical for assessing risks to sovereign debt sustainability.
1This chapter is based on a research paper that is joint work with Alex Pienkowski. A version of this
chapter was published under the title "What Really Drives Public Debt: A Holistic Approach"
as IMF Working Paper no. 137, Volume 15, 2015.
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In this paper, we explore how the various drivers of sovereign debt - the primary
balance, the interest rate, growth and inflation - interact with each other. At the
core of this analysis is the standard debt dynamics equation:
dt = dt−1
(1 + iet )
(1 + gt)(1 + pit)
− pbt
where dt is the sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio; ite is the effective interest rate on
sovereign debt; gt is real GDP growth; pit is inflation, calculated with the GDP
deflator; and pbt is the primary balance to GDP ratio. Using a structural vector
auto-regression (SVAR) model, we consider how these components interact with each
other in a holistic manner. In particular, we also assess the role of the monetary
policy and exchange rate regimes, i.e. whether a country is in a monetary union,
has a peg or lets its currency float freely. This choice is often cited as an important
determinant of sovereign debt dynamics. It has been argued that an independent
central bank may have better control over nominal GDP, greater access to seignorage
revenues and is better able to prevent creditor runs - all of which should contribute
to more stable debt. In this paper, we consider to what extent this indeed matters
for debt dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is organized into four additional sections. Section 4.2
summarizes the relevant literature on this topic; Section 4.3 sets out the methodology
used and describes the data; Section 4.4 presents the results; and the last section
concludes and discusses potential extensions.
4.2 Survey of the Literature
As far as we are aware, this is one of the few papers to explore how the various com-
ponents that drive debt interact with each other in a single unified SVAR framework.
There are, however, several important strands of literature that look at specific in-
teractions in this regard. These can be summarized into three main categories -
i) the response of discretionary fiscal policy to the debt level and other variables;
ii) factors that influence the interest rate on sovereign debt, with particular focus
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on the credit spread; and, iii) the significant literature on fiscal multipliers. Our
methodological approach draws heavily from the literature to estimate the fiscal
multiplier. Finally, we also explore the literature on monetary policy and debt.
Several papers find that governments tighten fiscal policy in response to higher
debt. Using data on the U.S., Bohn (1998, 2005) show that, after controlling for the
business cycle and temporary expenditure shocks (e.g. wars), the primary balance
reacts positively to debt. This, he argues, provides evidence that U.S. sovereign debt
does not follow a random walk but reverts to some steady-state level and therefore
is sustainable. Abiad and Ostry (2005) use a similar methodology, but with a panel
of emerging markets. When controlling for additional factors, such as commodity
prices and the quality of institutions, they also find that the primary balance reacts
to stabilize debt. Also focusing on emerging markets, Mendoza and Ostry (2008)
find a non-linear relationship between the primary balance and debt. At low debt
levels, the primary balance responds positively to debt, but at higher debt levels, this
response diminishes. One explanation for this is that sovereigns suffer from fiscal
fatigue whereby they cannot increase the primary balance beyond certain levels.
A number of models assume that the market interest rate on sovereign debt in-
creases with the debt level, but identifying this channel is difficult. Ceteris paribus,
one would expect the interest rate on sovereign debt to increase as debt rises, as both
the willingness and ability of governments to honor their debt obligations should de-
cline. But finding an empirical relationship between the two has been difficult. This
is because the sovereign’s ability to repay is an important omitted variable. Corsetti
et al. (2014) model sovereign default as a function of the distance to a debt limit -
a point where debt is so high that a sovereign is no longer able or willing to service
it. As agents are forward looking, this affects market interest rates in a non-linear
fashion. Ghosh et al. (2013) combine a non-linear fiscal reaction function with a
similar debt limit concept. Here interest rates are a function of both the debt level
and ability to repay. The paper uses this methodology to calculate the fiscal space
of individual countries. Controlling for sovereign debt is important when estimating
the size of the fiscal multiplier. In their seminal paper, Blanchard and Perotti (1999)
use a structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) model to estimate the size of the U.S.
fiscal multiplier. They use out-of-model estimates of automatic stabilizer elasticities
in order to identify the impact of changes in taxes and spending on growth. This
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technique has been used by many subsequent studies, including this paper. Favero
and Giavazzi (2007) introduced the debt level as a fully endogenous component of
this system. They argue that this is important for two reasons. First, fiscal policy
can react to debt, and so excluding this from the system introduces an important
omitted variable bias. Second, it is important to track the evolution of debt to
ensure that the results of the model do not imply unrealistic (i.e. explosive) debt
paths. Closest to our study is the paper by Cherif and Hasanov (2018), who use a
similar technique, but focus more on debt sustainability in the U.S. They find that
positive shocks to growth have a significant impact on reducing debt, but shocks to
inflation or fiscal consolidation are less effective at containing debt. This suggests
that in some cases, austerity can be self-defeating.
The role of monetary policy in influencing debt sustainability has been a matter
of debate in recent years. De Grauwe and Ji (2013) show empirical evidence that
euro zone countries (without "stand-alone" central banks) are more susceptible to
self-fulfilling liquidity crises. Krugman (2014) illustrates this point using a more
generalized theoretical framework. By contrast, Hilscher et al. (2014) and Reis
(2013) argue that the U.S. has little scope to reduce its debt burden through central
bank generated inflation. The trade-off between default risk and inflation risk is
illustrated in Reis (2013), although this paper also demonstrates how central banks
can reduce the risk of multiple equilibria. Corsetti et al. (2014) develop a model
that illustrates how central banks can tackle liquidity crises, but not solve solvency
crises. The results of this paper suggest that monetary policy regime plays a crucial
role in sovereign debt dynamics.
4.3 Methodology and data
4.3.1 Empirical model
Following Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Cherif and Hasanov (2018), our empirical







γdt−i + ut, (4.1)
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dt = dt−1
(1 + iet )
(1 + gt)(1 + pit)
− pbt (4.2)
where the Matrix Yt includes the primary balance, real GDP growth, the inflation
rate and the effective interest rate on sovereign debt, in that order, and ut are
reduced form errors. All of the variables included in Yt are components found in
the simple debt accumulation equation (Equation 4.2).2 The lag lengths are k = 4
and l = 1. In regard to the interest rate itm, we use the marginal rather than the
effective rate. The reason for this is that the effective rate tends to be slow moving,
as it is the weighted average of past borrowing costs. The marginal interest rate
on new government borrowing is more responsive to changes in debt sustainability
risks; and as such, is a more important signal for markets and governments, which
will influence how they react. It is important to note that the marginal interest rate
is not the monetary policy rate, but the rate on new sovereign borrowing (defined
by average maturity).
Moreover, again following Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Cherif and Hasanov
(2018), we include the lagged level of the debt to GDP ratio as an exogenous variable
in the SVAR. We do so because changes in debt have feedback effects with the
primary balance and interest rates, which may amplify the effects arising from fiscal
shocks. Thus, excluding debt could potentially lead to omitted variable bias. More
importantly, we take into account the dynamics of debt while computing the impulse
responses, thus we need to keep track of Equation (4.2).
Our empirical approach is as follows: first we estimate the reduce form VAR
(Equation 4.1) using OLS. Since Equation (4.2) is an identity, we do not need to
estimate it, but following Favero and Giavazzi (2007), we will use it to construct the
IRFs. Then, in order to identify the shocks to the primary balance and the other
determinants of debt, we use an AB-model (Lütkepohl, 2007), where the matrices
A and B relate the reduced form errors to the structural shocks et in the following
way:
2Equation (4.2) is also depicted in the introduction.
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Aut = Bet,
The estimates derived in the A matrix are used to illustrate how each of these
components interact with each other, both contemporaneously and through time.
In order to identify the shocks, we follow Blanchard and Perotti (1999) and Cherif
and Hasanov (2018) and impose the following restrictions:
A =

1 µpb,g µpb,pi µpb,i
α21 1 0 0
α31 α32 1 0
α41 α42 α43 1
 B =

β11 0 0 0
0 β22 0 0
0 0 β33 0
0 0 0 β44

To transform the reduced form errors, ut, into structural error terms, et, the A
matrix imposes certain identification conditions. Following Blanchard and Perotti
(1999), the µ terms are elasticities, which are estimated separately from this model.
They represent the elasticity of the primary balance with respect to growth (µpb,g);
the elasticity of the primary balance with respect to inflation, and the elasticity
of the primary balance with respect to the marginal interest rate. The first two
components are forms of automatic stabilizers, while the third is assumed to equal
zero (the government is assumed to be too slow to react to changes in the interest rate
contemporaneously). These country specific elasticities are taken from Girouard and
Andre (2005), although as discussed in Section 4.4, the results are not particularly
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sensitive to these values. The α coefficients are estimated, and are ordered in a way
which is standard to the literature.3
To construct the IRFs we need to consider the endogenous debt accumulation
equation, as Equation (4.1) includes debt as a lagged variable. As mentioned earlier,
we can derive the evolution of debt from the endogenous variables included in Yt.
In the initial period, debt is taken at its existing level, and all of the variables in
Yt respond to this level by the coefficients estimated in the γ vector (Equation 4.1).
The variables Yt+1 are then used to construct debt in the following period, using
Equation (4.2). This process continues for all subsequent periods.
As discussed by Cherif and Hasanov (2018), the inclusion of the debt feedback
equation implies nonlinear relationships among the variables. Thus, in order to
take this into account, we compute the impulse responses as in Cherif and Hasanov
(2018), similar to the generalized impulse responses by Pesaran and Shin (1998). The
IRFs are constructed as the difference between the forecast of the model, summarized
by Equations 4.1 and 4.2, with and without a given shock et, for h periods ahead,
subject to some initial values4 wt−1:
IRF (Yt; et, wt−1, h) = Et (Yt+h|et, wt−1)−Et (Yt+h|wt−1) , for h = 0,1,2,... (4.3)
Moreover, we again follow Cherif and Hasanov (2018) and bootstrap the data to
construct the bands and the median response in the following way: First, after the
initial estimation of the original reduced form VAR, the residuals are resampled and
used to compute new data. In a second step the VAR is re-estimated, the structural
identification is performed and the different IRFs are computed. This last step is
repeated 2000 times to obtain the bootstrapped distribution of the IRFs. From the
distribution, we obtain the median IRF for each shock, and the 16% and the 84%
quantiles which represent the confidence bands.
Further, it is important to note that the debt accumulation Equation (4.2) will
only approximate the actual evolution of debt. Other factors, such as bank recapi-
3Aside from the primary balance, it is assumed that shocks to growth will contemporaneously
impact inflation and interest rates; shocks to inflation will impact interest rates, but not growth;
and shocks to interest rates will have no contemporaneous effect on growth or inflation.
4These initial values are the lags of debt included in the estimation of the empirical model.
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talization (not included in the primary balance) or methodological changes to debt
or nominal GDP calculations, will also affect debt-to-GDP. But these factors are
not accounted for in Equation (4.2). However, Figure 4.3.1 shows that the approxi-
mation is very close, and should not bias the results in this analysis. Likewise, the
relationship between the marginal and effective interest rate is defined with a second
auxiliary equation. Given that Equation (4.2) uses the effective interest rate and
Equation (4.1) uses the marginal interest rate, we need a second auxiliary equation
to link the two. Following Caprioli and Momigliano (2011), we approximate the







where nt is the average maturity of the sovereign at time t. This, as with the
debt accumulation equation, is also an approximation to the actual evolution of the
effective interest rate. But as panel (b) of Figure 4.3.1 illustrates, the relationship
is also close.
Figure 4.3.1: Actual and simulated data for the U.S.

















































(b) Actual and derived Effective Interest
Rate
Note: Panel (a) shows the actual and derived Debt-to-GDP ratio for the U.S. and panel (b) shows
the actual ad derived Effective Interest Rate for the U.S.
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4.3.2 Data
The data covers fifteen OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the
United Kingdom and the United States), and was retrieved from several sources.5
Most of the data covers the period 1999-2014 on a quarterly basis, however, depend-
ing on availability, we use longer time series for some countries.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 General patterns
The results consist of 375 different IRFs - 5 responses to each of the 5 different shocks
over the 15 countries in the sample. Therefore, in order to make the results tractable
to the reader, we present them in two formats. The first is a simple summary table,
which draws out the median results derived from the estimates. The second is the
standard IRFs, which we present to highlight specific differences within the sample.
In regard to the former, Table 4.4.1 presents the results that we expect to find based
on a priori economic intuition. In this table, the rows summarize four potential
shocks imposed on the system - the primary balance, real growth, marginal interest
rates and debt. The columns show how we expect the other variables to respond.6
Each cell in the table shows the expected direction of the reaction.
5Sources: Eurostat, U.K. National Statistics Office, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Datastream,
Haver, IMF debt database, OECD, DGO Portugal, International Financial Statistics, IMF Fiscal
Monitor, U.K. debt management office, Bank of Italy.
6To simplify the illustration of the results, we do not include in this table the inflation shock
and the potential response of inflation and growth. This is because most responses to shocks
to inflation, as well as most of the responses of inflation to other shocks were not statistically
different from zero. We exclude GDP growth since there is already a significant literature on the
impact of growth from changes in the government balance and interest rates, and so this is not
the focus of the paper.
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Table 4.4.1: A priori Expectation of Economic Relationships
Response
Primary Marginal Debt to
Balance Interest Rate GDP ratio
Shock
Primary Balance (+)1 Shock decrease decrease
Real Growth (–)1 unclear increase unclear
Marginal Interest Rate (+)1 increase Shock unclear
Debt to GDP ratio (+)1 increase increase Shock
31 (+) refers to an exogenous increase, (–) refers to an exogenous decrease.
Take the example of a positive shock to the primary balance i.e. a shock that
causes fiscal consolidation (first row). In this case, we expect the marginal interest
rates to fall as markets may view this as increasing the ability of the government
to repay its debts. We expect the debt to GDP ratio to decline as repayments
increase and interest payments gradually fall. Next, assume a negative shock to
growth. It is unclear, ex-ante, how a government might react - it may choose to
pursue expansionary fiscal policies, in order to stimulate growth. Or it may choose
to consolidate, in order to ensure that debt does not increase too significantly. The
reaction of markets is, however, likely to be push up interest rates. This means the
overall impact on debt is ambiguous.
Table 4.4.1 can, therefore, be viewed as a set of hypotheses that we test in this pa-
per. As well as the direction of the response, we also investigate both the magnitude
and persistence of these effects. By first considering the average response of all coun-
tries in the sample, our results may shed light on the hypotheses described above
(Table 4.4.2). The IRFs used to construct this table are shown in the appendix.
The primary balance reacts actively to growth shocks and is highly sensitive to
changes in the marginal interest rate. The response of the primary balance to growth
shocks appears to be counter-cyclical, despite controlling for automatic stabilizers
in the SVAR. This suggests that governments in the sample use active discretionary
fiscal policy to help stimulate/suppress demand in the face of growth shocks - the
peak response of a one percentage point fall in growth is a 0.6 percentage point
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Table 4.4.2: Summary of all countries
Response (median)
Primary Marginal Debt to
Balance3 Interest Rate3 GDP ratio3
Shock
Primary Balance (+)1 1.00 0.04 -1.25
Real Growth (–)1 -0.60 0.01 1.60
Marginal Interest Rate (+)1 0.7 1.00 0.45
Debt to GDP ratio2 (+)1 2.1 -0.04 1.00
3 (+) refers to an exogenous increase, (–) refers to an exogenous decrease.
2 Debt is an auxiliary variable in this system, so we construct the responses to changes in debt
as the difference of the solution of the model for h periods ahead from a ten-percentage points
increase in debt, and the solution of the model without the increase in debt.
3 Reflects the peak response to the shock.
loosening in the (structural) primary balance. The government reaction function
also seems to be sensitive to the marginal interest on its debt. A one percentage
point increase in the marginal rate leads to an average tightening of the primary
balance of around 0.7 percentage points. This reaction may be explained by the
governments’ desire to stabilize debt in order to prevent interest rates increasing
to unsustainable levels. This is followed by a loosening as the interest rate shock
dissipates. Finally, the primary balance reacts to debt positively - a ten percentage
points increase in debt, on average generates a 2.1 percentage points tightening in
the primary balance. In summary, governments in this sample seem to actively react
to shocks that impact debt dynamics - these responses are designed to stabilize debt,
and thus mitigate the second-round effects of these shocks.
The estimated market reaction to these shocks does not match the economic a
priori intuition summarized in Table 1. The market reaction to the primary balance,
growth and debt shocks are close to zero. Part of this counter-intuitive result can
be explained by factors, other than credit risk, driving long-term interests - most
notably a decline in the long-term real rate associated with the crisis. However,
as explored in greater detail below, this sample average hides more interesting and
more intuitive cross-country differences.
The final column of Table 4.4.2 illustrates the peak impact on debt from each
of the shocks and subsequent responses. The response of debt to these shocks is
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mechanical, through Equation (4.2). However, it is interesting and important to
note that debt eventually stabilizes following each of these shocks. This means that
while some of the responses act to exacerbate the impact on debt, the overall system
does bring debt back to its pre-shock level. We explore these below, when we discuss
specific country groups.
4.4.2 Splitting the sample
Within this sample average, there lies a number of interesting differences between
countries. In this regard, we split the countries into two categories that seem to
be important in determining differences in debt dynamics. The first category in-
cludes sovereigns that do not have full control over monetary policy, such as those
in a currency union or have a fixed exchange rate regime. The second category
includes sovereigns which have an unconstrained monetary policy regime, typically
inflation targeters. There are a number of reasons why the presence of an indepen-
dent monetary policy regime may be important for sovereign debt dynamics. First,
country authorities can better control nominal GDP, therefore providing a mech-
anism to stabilize debt-to-GDP without resorting to fiscal consolidation. Second,
a central bank can use seigniorage revenues to help repay debt (potentially at the
expense of higher inflation). Third, large purchases of government debt (sterilized
or unsterilized) can help "coordinate" creditors in order to avoid a run on sovereign
debt i.e. the central banks can reduce the likelihood of multiple equilibria. The
following section will explore how these two country groups (constrained and un-
constrained monetary policy) react differently to various shocks to the components
of debt. In each example, the median country IRF in each group is used to illustrate
this relationship.7
4.4.3 The response of interest rates
The response of the marginal interest rate to shocks to the primary balance and
growth is similar for both monetary policy regime groups. Panel (a) of Figure 4.4.1
7Countries defined as having constrained monetary policy in the sample include - Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain. Countries defined as having
unconstrained monetary policy in the sample include - Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
184
Chapter 4. The Drivers of Public Debt: A Holistic Approach
shows that a one percentage point exogenous deterioration of the primary balance
generates a small increase in the marginal interest rate, for both groups, peaking
at around 0.1 percentage points. This somewhat counter-intuitive result may be
associated with correlation, or an unspecified common shock may be driving both
fiscal consolidation and higher borrowing costs. The response of marginal interest
rates to growth shocks is essentially insignificant for both monetary policy regime
groupings (panel b of Figure 4.4.1). In summary, therefore, this evidence suggests
that markets do not significantly react to changes in two key determinants of debt
dynamics. This may be because shocks to these variables are often not viewed as
being a threat to debt sustainability - they may only matter in times of crisis. In
this regard, therefore, the debt level itself may be a more important determinant of
the marginal interest rate.
The reaction of marginal interest rates to a shock to debt is more interesting (panel
c of Figure 4.4.1).8 Following an exogenous increase in the debt level (perhaps as a
result of bank recapitalization costs), the marginal interest rate on the constrained
monetary policy group increases sharply, and is persistent for around 1.5 years. This
presumably reflects the market’s perception that the credit risk for these sovereigns
has materially increased. The gradual reduction in interest rates only occurs once
debt has been stabilized, primarily through fiscal consolidation (see below). In con-
trast, the marginal interest rate seems to persistently fall for the unconstrained
monetary policy group. This somewhat puzzling result may be attributed to how
these country authorities use monetary policy in such circumstances. These coun-
tries may be able to manipulate long-term sovereign rates (perhaps through asset
purchase facilities or forward guidance) in order to stabilize debt dynamics. Hence
this could point to evidence that country authorities use monetary policy as a tool
to stabilize debt dynamics. However, the modeling approach used here is not able to
determine this hypothesis precisely given the reduce form nature of the estimation
technique. And furthermore, it cannot determine whether such monetary policy
8Since debt is not part of the endogenous system, but is included as a predetermined (lagged)
variable into the VAR model, we construct the responses to changes in debt as the difference of
the solution of the model for h periods ahead from a ten-percentage points increase in debt, and
the solution of the model without the increase in debt. We do not construct confidence bands for
this exercise.
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Figure 4.4.1: Responses of the Marginal Interest Rate to different shocks
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Note: The continuous line shows the responses of the constrained countries and the dotted lines
the responses of the unconstrained countries. The shocks are set to be a one percentage point
increase in the primary balance (panel a), a one percentage point decrease in growth (panel b) and
a ten percentage points increase in debt (panel c).
action is an explicit policy to help stabilize debt, or whether it is the unintended
consequence of other monetary policy objectives.
4.4.4 The response of the primary balance
The response of the primary balance to a shock to the marginal interest rate is very
different for the two groups. A shock to interest rates typically generates a large
and persistent increase in the primary balance from countries without full control
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of monetary policy (panel a of Figure 4.4.2). This finding may be explained by the
country authorities’ perception that they are more vulnerable to a loss of confidence
in their ability to control debt, and so react strongly to any increase in marginal
borrowing costs. In contrast, there is virtually no reaction from countries with an
unconstrained monetary policy regime. This may be because these countries are less
concerned by a loss of confidence by markets; or because they perceive changes in
interest rates as being attributed to other factors than an increase in the probability
of default. For whatever reason, there is no systemic response of the primary balance
for this group.
We find a similar pattern for the response of the primary balance to a negative
shock to growth. Similar to the previous case, the (structural) primary balance
does not react to shocks to growth for countries with unconstrained monetary pol-
icy (panel b of Figure 4.4.2). These countries can use monetary policy to counter
demand shocks, and thus help to stabilize debt dynamics without needing to resort
to fiscal consolidation. This is not the case for countries with constrained mone-
tary policy. When these countries are hit by a growth shock, they need to pursue
persistently tighter primary balance in order to stabilize debt dynamics. Put differ-
ently, these countries seem more vulnerable to growth shocks than countries with
unconstrained monetary policy.
Both country groupings tighten fiscal policy in response to debt shocks, but the
response from the constrained monetary policy group is much larger. Although the
primary balance in countries with independent monetary policy may not react to
growth and interest rates shocks, they typically will tighten fiscal policy in response
to a shock to the debt level (Figure 4.4.2, panel c). This confirms the result of
Bohn (1998, 2005) and others that the primary balance reacts proportionally to the
debt level. This result is also found for constrained monetary policy group, but
the response is significantly larger. This is perhaps not surprising given the results
described above. These countries do not have full control over monetary policy to
stimulate aggregate demand, and so must rely on more on fiscal tightening in order
to stabilize debt - hence the larger response shown in panel (c) of Figure 4.4.2.
An important caveat to note is that most of the countries in the constrained group
were also subject to fiscal rules imposed by the Euro area Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP). This may have systematically influenced fiscal policy over this period.
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Figure 4.4.2: Responses of the Primary Balance to different shocks
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Note: The continuous lines shows the responses of the constrained countries and the dotted lines
the responses of the unconstrained countries. The shocks are set to be a one percentage point
increase in the marginal interest rate (panel a), a one percentage point decrease in growth (panel
b) and a ten percentage points increase in debt (panel c).
Although this is not something that we can test directly in this framework, there
are two factors that suggest that these rules are not driving these results. First, the
SGP rules were broken on a number of occasions, so were not deemed binding on
policy. Second, many countries in the unconstrained group - for example, the UK,
USA and Australia - also had fiscal rules (see Budina et al. (2012)), but experienced
fiscal policies that were very different to the constrained group.
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4.4.5 The evolution of debt
In the final part of the results section, we explore how the various components
of debt interact together to influence the overall trajectory of debt. While some
relationships act to exacerbate the impact of shocks to debt, in all cases the debt
level converges back to the pre-shock level. However, the deviation from the original
debt level and the persistence of this impact differs significantly depending on the
nature of the shocks and the monetary policy regime in place.
Figure 4.4.3: Responses of the Debt to different shocks
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Note: The continuous lines shows the responses of the constrained countries and the dotted lines
the responses of the unconstrained countries. The shocks are set to be a one percentage point
increase in th primary balance (panel a), a one percentage point decrease in growth (panel b), a
one percentage point increase in the marginal interest rate (panel c), and a ten percentage points
increase in debt (panel d).
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Debt takes significantly longer to return to pre-shock levels when countries with
unconstrained monetary policy are hit with primary balance shocks (panel a of
Figure 4.4.3). Considering a negative one percentage point shock to the primary
balance, the peak impact on the debt level is 2 percentage points for countries
with unconstrained monetary policy, and this impact is highly persistent. This
suggests that these countries are able to maintain this higher debt level for a long
period of time, only gradually reducing debt back to pre-crisis levels. Countries
with constrained monetary policy react by reducing debt at a much quicker rate-
perhaps because country authorities feel more vulnerable to debt at a more elevated
level. Negative shocks to GDP generate a significant increase in the debt level for
both country groups (panel b of Figure 4.4.3). The median debt levels increase
by around 2-2.5 percent of GDP at the peak. The constrained group experiences
a slightly larger peak impact on its debt level partly because the rising debt level
causes a larger increase in marginal interest rates than the unconstrained monetary
policy group. However, a stronger primary balance response causes the debt level to
return to its pre-crisis level at a faster rate. The unconstrained group, in contrast,
can afford to reduce its debt level at a more measured pace, perhaps because the risk
of an adverse market reaction is less acute. Interest rates shocks matter very little for
the debt of countries with unconstrained monetary policy (panel c of Figure 4.4.3).
For these countries, the impact on debt quickly dies out. In contrast, the impact on
the debt of an interest rate shock is highly persistent. panel d of Figure 4.4.3 shows
how a 10pt increase in debt - perhaps as a result of the realization of some contingent
liability - will persist through time. Both country groups show a similar response
with debt returning to its pre-shock level after around 5 years. These responses,
which appear similar, likely hide differences in the underlying dynamics. Countries
with unconstrained policy have more scope to reduce debt by stimulating growth.
In contrast, as seen above, those with constrained policy are more likely to resort
to fiscal consolidation.
4.4.6 Diagnostics and robustness tests
All data series used in the estimation process are stationary. We tested for unit
roots with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test. The ADF test rejected the hypothesis of a unit root for
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most of the time series, especially for real GDP growth and inflation. In the cases
in which the hypothesis of a unit root could not be rejected, we implemented the
KPSS test. On this basis, we found four countries-Japan, Portugal, Austria and
the Netherlands- with at least one non-stationary data series, so they were dropped
from the sample. Therefore, we proceeded with the VAR analysis without major
concerns about stationarity.
The model results are also robust to changes in the specification. Given the rela-
tively small number of observations for each country, we changed the lag length to
test whether this significantly altered the results. The results remained consistent
- for instance, using a lag length of 2 (rather than 4) quarters did not change the
results much and the IRFs maintained the same sign, and similar magnitude and sta-
tistical significance. The sample period (1999-2014) was a time of structural change
in the euro area, which can be characterized into two episodes - i) the adoption of
the euro which led to financial convergence with falling inflation and market interest
rates; ii) the Euro area crisis, where market interest rates diverged significantly. In
order to test how this influences the results, we restricted the sample to exclude
the crisis years (2008-2014). For the countries where a longer time series is avail-
able (U.S., U.K.), there is no significant change in results. However, as expected,
there are some differences for the other countries with shorter data series. In these
cases, some have confidence bands that are wider and some shocks become insignifi-
cant. Given the shorter time series and that the crisis period witnessed a significant
amount of debt dynamics activity, this is not surprising. The median debt level for
the unconstrained group is slightly below that of the constrained group, over the
sample period (panel a of Figure 4.A.1). However, the large variance in debt levels
within these groups suggests that this should not introduce a systematic bias into
the estimates. The SVAR identification technique is also varied. Using a Cholesky
decomposition, rather than imposing the automatic stabilizer elasticities, also main-
tains the results as largely unchanged. Removing outliers countries (for instance,
Norway with its large sovereign wealth fund) does also not materially change the
results. On balance, therefore, the model is robust to altering the specification.
191
Chapter 4. The Drivers of Public Debt: A Holistic Approach
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored how the various drivers of sovereign debt - the primary
balance, the interest rate, growth and inflation - interact with each other. The SVAR
model that we used in this study includes an endogenous debt accumulation equa-
tion, which allowes us to incorporate debt feedback effects into these interdependen-
cies. With this model, we gained a deeper understanding of how these relationships
might act to exacerbate or mitigate the impact on debt following a shock to one of
its components. The sample of countries is made up of 15 advanced economies, with
differing monetary policy regimes. This choice of policy regime plays an important
determinant in explaining cross-country differences in debt dynamics.
Our empirical results indicated that sovereign credit markets do not seem to sys-
tematically respond to shocks to growth or the primary balance but are sensitive
to the debt level. For countries with constrained monetary policy, such as those in
a currency union or with a fixed exchange rate regime, market interest rates react
positively with the debt level - this increase presumably reflects a rise in credit risk.
This is not the case for countries with unconstrained policy, where there is some evi-
dence that higher debt may be associated with downward pressure on the long-term
rate. This does not imply that advanced economies with unconstrained monetary
policy do not need to be concerned with sovereign debt dynamics - only that these
economies may have more tools at their disposal to tackle debt problems. This hy-
pothesis is strengthened by the evidence that countries with constrained monetary
policy are more reliant on fiscal adjustment to stabilize debt. These countries use
fiscal policy to stabilize debt when faced with shocks to growth, the primary bal-
ance and the debt level itself. This is less pronounced for the unconstrained group,
although some fiscal consolidation does seem to follow a shock to debt. These differ-
ences mean that the unconstrained group tends to bring debt back to its pre-shock
level at a more measured pace.
Our paper, therefore, provided some empirical evidence to support the often cited
opinion that the exchange rate and monetary policy regime matters for sovereign
debt sustainability. Our analysis also provided the basis to assess how a shock - say
to growth - will impact debt dynamics directly and through second round effects
(such as through the primary balance and interest rates). This is particular useful
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for debt sustainability analysis - both in terms of looking at the impact of adverse
shock to the system and in terms of assessing the realism of baseline projections.
This analysis could be extended in a number of useful directions. First, the analysis
could be extended to emerging markets economies (where data is available) - this
would likely require the addition of an exchange rate term into both the SVAR and
auxiliary debt accumulation equation to control for foreign currency denominated
debt. Papers by Adler and Sosa (2013) and Estevao and Samake (2013) provide
useful analytical frameworks to support this type of extension. Finally, to overcome
the curse of dimensionality that we face in this paper, Bayesian techniques could be
used to estimate the SVAR.
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Appendix
4.A Additional Figures
Figure 4.A.1: Responses of the Marginal Interest Rate to different shocks
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Note: The figures shows the mean responses. The shocks are set to be a one percentage point
increase in th primary balance (panel a), a one percentage point decrease in growth (panel b), and
a ten percentage points increase in debt (panel c).
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Figure 4.A.2: Responses of the Primary Balance to different shocks
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Note: The figures shows the mean responses. The shocks are set to be a one percentage point
decrease in growth (panel a), a one percentage point increase in the marginal interest rate (panel
b), and a ten percentage points increase in debt (panel c).
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Figure 4.A.3: Responses of Debt to different shocks
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Note: The figures shows the mean responses. The shocks are set to be a one percentage point
increase in th primary balance (panel a), a one percentage point decrease in growth (panel b), and
a ten percentage points increase in debt (panel c).
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